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Sum mary
This dissertation is to provide empirical evidence as well as in-depth
discussions to reflect the theme of new technologies like the Internet and its impact
and implications on the political systems and public opinion in the Chinese context.
It is the premise that technology can transform the mode of political communication
and that this in turn can change the nature of political participation, as well as the
milieu in which political discussions are made.
This project concludes that the Internet has not at this stage fundamentally
transformed China's political system, let alone caused a sudden political regime
collapse and engendered a sweeping democratisation process. The Internet is,
however, expanding people's minds, facilitating public discourse, and pushing for
more transparent and accountable governance. In other words, the Chinese
government is argued as not being as much in control of public debates on the
Internet as it is of debates in other forms of media channels; the government cannot
control and manipulate public opinion as much as it has traditionally done.
This work has contributed to a more systematic picture of public opinion on
political issues with documented examples, thanks to the Internet. Besides, this
research has shed light on how to measure the impact of the Internet upon political
debates, and to document the political impact of the Internet. Moreover, this
dissertation highlights a usually neglected phenomenon that researching the political
change or transformation in China can also be conducted form different aspects like
the impact of Information Communication Technologies on its political system. The
conventional approaches may be enriched thanks to the advent of new technologies
in the increasingly networked, globalised and marketised world.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
"Mao Zedong said that to have power you need two things: the gun and the pen... The
Communist Party has the gun, but the Internet is now the pen. If they lose control of it,
something will happen to challenge their authority. "—Quo Liang, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, Being.'
Section I
	
The Rise of Public Opinion
The Chinese political system is in transition. Commentators have focused on various
factors driving the changes: economic development, new generations of leaders, the
opening of the country to the outside world, increasing pluralism of sources of
information, and contestation from below. 2 One recent development that brings all of
these factors together is the advent of Information and Communication Technologies,
particularly the Internet, to the People's Republic of China (PRC). 3 At the core of the
information technology revolution is the Internet, which was originally developed in
the late 1960s for military and security reasons. Globalisation, backed by a
market-oriented economic philosophy—liberation, privatisation, and deregulation,
has helped boost the significant growth and diffusion of Internet technology in
established democracies and most developing countries. As the information
A Lin Neumann, "The Great Firewall," CPJ: Press Freedom Report, January 18, 2001, available
online at <http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/Chinajanol/Chinajan0l.html>, accessed on May 1,
2001.
2 See, for example, Yun-han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo and Ramon H. Myers, eds., The New Chinese
Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004); Yongnian Zheng, Globali_-ation and State Transformation in China
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Peter Nolan, China at the Crossroads (Cambridge:
Polity, 2004); Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and
Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
See, for example, Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China and the Internet: Politics
and the Digital Leap Forward (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Michael S. Chase
and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet and Beingc
Counter-Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
Emanuele Giovannetti, Mitsuhiro Kagami and Masatsugu Tsuji, eds., The Internet Revolution: A
revolution now sweeping across Asia has widen the ordinary citizen's access to
information,5 it impels academics to ponder whether the Information Technology (IT)
revolution, beyond its economic repercussion, may pose any impact upon other arenas
such as politics and society in Communist China, where popular opinion has been
thought to be under the strict control of the Party and government, and thus
manipulated by being limited to only official information sources.
Liu Xiayang, a Chinese media expert, contends: "...the interactivity of the
Internet is beginning to draw closer the general public, . . . and changing the way
people discuss state's affairs, and the way of supervision by public opinion." 6 In this
sense, Chinese Internet users can now express themselves more freely to a degree
never before experienced, in a country that prohibits mass gatherings and
demonstrations. Others refute this, arguing that the Internet, which may serve as a
catalyst for political change, is in reality only available to a small minority of the
population. This is identified as the digital divide, and they argue that Internet
activism is overwhelmingly dominated by an elite-based discourse. 7 Given these
arguments, the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) pointed out as early as 1996 that
". . .the value of the Internet so outweighs its potentially harmful
aspects—pornography and politically destructive information—that the Chinese
Global Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003);
Hilton L. Root, "What Democracy Can Do for East Asia," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1,
January 2002, PP. 118-119.6 
"Burgeoning Cyberspace Democracy in China," Peopler Daily, March 8,2001, available online at
<http://english1.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/08/eng20010308_64463  .html>, accessed on Aril 23,
2001.
Jason P Abbott, "Democracy@internet.asia? The Challenge to the Emancipatory Potential of the Net:
Lessons from China and Malaysia," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 2001, pp.
115-128.
2
government has approved its opening to the public." 8 Later on, as the People 's Daily
acknowledged, "China's Internet construction has gone through the process of
growing out of nothing, after several years of development, China's Internet, now
with a fairly solid foundation and significant strength, has played a positive role in
media coverage of public opinion and in major international media struggle."9 The
Chinese government is nonetheless determined to hang on to the "correct guidance of
public opinion." 0 Could public opinion and debates be guided or directed within the
context of globalisation of Information Technology?
The Chinese media in the 1990s has been the rising tension between the greater
degree of market competition and the media's political role—the propaganda.
Following the increasing commercialisation of the Chinese media, it has carved
newer spaces of public expression both for journalists and ordinary people. Absolute
media controls have given way to economic policies seeking to stimulate market
competition. Press subsidies have been cut down or suspended and the media
governing structures have been streamlined. These changes in the media sector have
resulted in the processes of de-centralisation of media governance, specialisation of
media contents, and multiplication of media production and distribution. Whether the
emergence of a commercialised media sector in China, in particular the Internet, has
Cited in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China: State Power versus the Internet," in Louise Williams and
Roland Rich (eds.), Losing Control: Freedom of the Press in Asia (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000),
P. 54.
Commentator, "Vigorously Strengthening China's Internet Media Construction," People r Daily,
August 9, 2000, P. 1.0 
"Journalists Told to Correctly Guild Public Opinion," People Daily, November 8, 2000, available
online at <http:llenglish.people.com.cn/englishJ2000 1 1/08/eng2000 11 08_5468 1 .html>, accessed on
March 14, 2001.
Joseph M. Chan, "Commercialization without Independence: Trends and Tensions of Media
Development in China," in Joseph Cheng Yu-Shek and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), China Review 1993
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), pp. 25.1-25.21.
3
been democratising in that it is closer to ordinary people, addressing at least some of
their concerns, speaking their language, treating them as protagonists, and providing
them with wider access to participate through their presence online, remains to be
systematically further examined. More specifically, is the Internet enhancing civil
discourse, through which public opinion on national or foreign policies can be
expressed, and is it facilitating the emergence of "public space" in China?
As Deng Xiaoping, Chinese former paramount leader bluntly put it:
Don't think that a little mental pollution doesn't matter much, that it's nothing to be
alarmed at. Some of its ill effects may not be immediately apparent. But unless we take
them seriously and adopt firm measures right now to prevent their spread, many people
will fall prey to them and be led astray, with grave consequences. In the long run, this
question will determine what kind ofpeople will succeed us to carry on the cause and
what the future of the Party and state will be. "(October 12, 1983)12
Deng's attitude towards potential public opinion indeed sheds light on further enquiry
into whether Internet-enabled public opinion could possibly influence the trajectory
of future China's political socioeconomic development.
Section II	 Why It Matters to Conduct this Project
From March 1993 the Chinese central government embarked upon a series of
so-called "Golden Projects" 3—including Golden Bridge, Golden Card, and Golden
12 Deng Xiaoping, "The Party's Urgent Tasks on the Organisational and Ideological Fronts," Selected
Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III (1982-1992), Peopler Daily, available online at
<http://english.peopledaily.com.Cn/deflgXp/Vol3fteXtJc1  I 60.html>, accessed on June 10, 2001.
13 The "Golden Projects" consist of several sub-projects, including primarily, Golden Bridge—a
national public economic information communication network aiming to connect ministries and
state-owned enterprises and to build the infrastructure backbone over which other information
services will run; Golden Card—an electronic money project which aims at setting up a credit card
verification scheme and an inter-bank, inter-region clearing system; Golden Customs—a national
Customs—to give it information on and control over the rapid decentralisation of
decision-making that was taking place as a result of the move towards a market
economy. The year 1993 can also be remembered as the formal start-up stage of
China's informatisation.' 4 On the one hand, this was aimed at laying the infrastructure
for the digitisation of China's telecommunications network, on the other hand, the
central government started indeed to utilise the infrastructure of the Internet to
improve its own administrative control over provincial and local offices, enhancing
its governing capacity and authority, as well as sociopolitical stability. In November
1998 the authorities further announced the "Government Online Project" whereby the
end of 1999 and 2000; at least 60 and 80 per cent respectively of China's government
offices and ministries were going online: all ministries and provincial authorities
would establish their own Web sites for citizens to consult.' 5 China even christened
1999 "The Government Online Year" 16 and 2000 the year of "Enterprise Online
One of the chief purposes of these moves is to modernise the decision-making
process, making administration more efficient and enabling Chinese companies to
foreign economic trade information network project; Golden Marco—a national economic macro
policy technology system; Golden Tax—a computerized tax return and invoice system project; Golden
Gate—a foreign trade information network aimed at improving export-import trade management;
Golden Enterprise—an industrial production and information distribution system; Golden
Intelligence—the China Education and Research Network (CERnet); Golden Agriculture—an overall
agricultural administration and information service system; Golden Info—a state statistical
information project, and Golden Cellular—a mobile communications production and marketing
project.
' Lu Xinkui, ed., Zhongguo Xinxihua (China's Informatisation) (Beijing: Electronics Industry
Publisher, 2002), p. 53.
5 ZhengJi Shang-wang Gongcheng: Huigu yu Zhanwang (Government Online Project: Reviews and
Persepcts), available online at <http://www.gov.cn/govonlinereview/6future/0l.htm>, accessed on
March 6, 2001.
6 
"1999: The Government Online Year," Peoples Daily, January 3, 1999, p.4.
"The Internet Timeline of China, Part II," China Internet Network Information Center, available
online at <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2003/12/12/2OO1.htm >, accessed on May 12, 2004.
5
catch up with competitors overseas. No thought seems to have been given to other
possible political consequences of these changes, such as transparent and accountable
governance. One important reason is that China's leaders have mainly parlayed their
success at transforming the mainland economically into a de-politicisation of the
masses that provides the necessary political legitimacy for the continued communist
Party rule. However, would the opening of information networks empower citizens to
hold the government accountable, and possibly even challenge them?
There is developed literature in the West, particularly in the United States, which
suggests that the Internet may fundamentally transform democracy by enabling
citizens to consult with each other and disseminate their own views in real time
without governments being able to stop them. Maybe it would even lay the foundation
for a kind of "strong democracy" advocated by Benjamin Barber.' 8 The assumptions
about the Internet's democratic potential were highly stressed in earlier literature.
More recently, an increasingly robust body of literature criticised this perspective and
suggested, instead, that the impact of the Internet upon the political system in the PRC
was likely to be less than that envisaged or hoped for by the pro-democracy activists.
At any rate, applying discourses of Internet-enabled public opinion to a case study
like China provides a lens through which we can further understand both the
(changing) nature of the Chinese political system, and also the efficacy of the
predominating discourses themselves in the context of China.
It is often the premise that technology can transform the mode of political
communication and that this in turn can change the nature of political participation, as
8 Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley and
London: University of California Press, 1984).
6
well as the milieu in which political discussions are made. In the case of China,
proponents of the Internet-derived democracy hold that the new media has
empowered grass-roots citizens to acquire, disseminate and exchange (alternative)
information from outside, which is usually unavailable from the official media. The
rise of online public opinion stands one spectrum of the Internet politics in China.'9
Yet sceptics argue that the Internet is either tightly controlled by the state or it is
merely a fresh communication tool exclusively for a small proportion of Chinese
people. Adding to the limited Internet access is what some argue that the Net's impact
on politics in China is insignificant because most Netizens are not much interested in
finding reactionary information available online to subvert the Chinese authorities. In
the meantime, China is "proactively guiding the development of the Internet so that
the medium serves state interests." 20
To verify the validity of these arguments, this research project is, as a result,
important to provide empirical evidence as well as in-depth discussions to reflect the
theme of new technologies and its impact and implications on the political systems,
and the extent to which Chinese experience may be compared with established
democracies and lessons learnt by other like-minded authoritarian states.
Section III Objective of the Dissertation
The primary objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of the Internet
upon Chinese political debates in China since 1993. In itself it would provide an
19 See, for example, Johan Lagerkvist, "The Rise of Online Public Opinion in the People's Republic of
China," China: An International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 119-130.
20 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes:
China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution," First Monday, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2001, available online
7
opportunity to examine the impact of this new technology upon a still undemocratic
country. Most of the literature on the political impact of the Internet has focused on
the opportunities for developing an already existing democracy. Yet some speculate
that the Internet may be more of a challenge for authoritarian regimes. For example, a
few articles have suggested that the Internet was a prime catalyst in the downfall of
the Suharto regime in Indonesia. 2 ' At the very least it is worth considering whether
something like the same processes are likely to take place in China. And one of the
most surprising dissident movements in China—the Falun Gong—have relied heavily
upon the Internet to organise themselves despite official hostility. 22 Though she is
basically sceptical of the role of the Internet to topple the Communist China, Shanthi
Kalathil still holds: "Although outside observers often believe the Internet in China is
wholly controlled by the central government, the reality is that the private sector plays
a larger role in determining what is and isn't acceptable, in accordance with how it
gauges the prevailing political wind."23
As it has been widely perceived, the Chinese government has conventionally
practised "a system of information control and censure, with an intricate grading
process for who at what level is allowed to see which kinds of information."24
Moreover, it is usually argued that the mass media in China are an extension of the
at <http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_8/kalathil/index.html >, accessed on September 4, 2001.
21 David 1. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy," Democraii:ation,
Vol. 7, No. 1, spring 2000, pp. 119-136.
22 See, for example, Stephen D. O'Leary, "Falun Gong and the Internet," Online Journalism Review,
June 15, 2000, available online at <http://ojr.usc.edu/content/story.cfm?id=390>, accessed on May 22,
2001.
23 Shanthi Kalathil, "Nationalism on the Net," The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2002,
available online at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa =view &id91 9>,
accessed on March 8, 2002.
24 Tony Saich, Governance andPolitics of China, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 306.
8
Party-state, or the so-called "mouth and tongue" 25 (hou- she) of the communist Party.
As a consequence, it is difficult to become the mediaspace for public discussions or
debates to be conducted.
Nevertheless, existing literature on the Internet' political effects has shown that
the increased availability and use of the Internet may pose a challenge to the state-run
media. For example, Li Xiguang and Xuan Qin note that the Internet-based chatrooms
are now fundamentally reversing the conventional news flows in China. It has
resulted in the government-imposed agenda "revised" or "reconstructed" because of
the Internet.26 In addition, public opinion and debates are witnesses on the Internet
that are pushing the authorities concerned into being more transparent and
accountable. For instance, the Jiangxi school explosion which caused a total of 38
deaths took place in March 2001. It was first reported by local official media with
coverage suggesting that a madman was responsible for this incident. Yet angry
villagers resentfully rejected it, making their alternative accounts appear online. Their
online opinion has actually drawn much attention from the international media as well
as the authorities in Beijing. The school explosion incident eventually caused the
former Premier Zhu Rongji to formally apologise and promise to re-examine. 27
 This
blast incident effectively marks the very first time that the Chinese government is
obliged to "respond to what is in part an Internet-facilitated outpouring of public
25 See, for example, Marlowe Hood, "The Uses and Abuse of Mass Media by Chinese Leaders during
the 1980s," in Chin-Chuan Lee (ed.), China's Media, Mediai China (Boulder and Oxford: Westview
Press, 1994), p. 39.
26 Xiguang Li and Xuan Qin, "Shei Zai Shezhi Jintian de Yicheng?—Dianzi Luntan zai Zhongda
Xinwen Shijian zhong dui Dangbao Yiti de Chonggou," (Who Is Setting the Chinese Agenda?—
Impact of Online Chatrooms on Party Press) in Li Xiguang and Zhao Xin-shu (eds.), Me iii de Liliang
(The Power of Media) (Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2002), pp. 156-169.
27 Craig S. Smith, "Chinese Premier Apologizes for Schoolhouse Explosion," The New York limes,
March 15, 2001; Craig S. Smith, "China Backs Away From Initial Denial in Schoolhouse Explosion,"
9
opinion.,,28
Indeed, it provides episodic evidence that the Internet has already made a
difference in China since its promotion from 1993 and with the initiation of Web
forums in 1999. In this respect, this incident reveals two significantly interwoven
implications: it shows on the one hand the increasing difficulty of constraining a story
when more and more Chinese Netizens are gaining access online, and on the other
hand, it shows that popular opinion in China today is not going to be as easily
controlled and manipulated as it was before the introduction of the Internet to the
mainland.
There is a further reason for tackling this subject. While China is considerably
more open than it was a quarter of a century ago, it is still relatively difficult to know
what ordinary Chinese think about politics. Not only does the state prohibit
independent social surveys by any foreign organisations and individuals without
government permission, 29 but the media is also particularly reticent on topics that are
politically sensitive. Although casual contact with individual Chinese shows that
there is a much greater diversity of political views than the leaders would
acknowledge, it is hard, if not impossible, to document public opinion in any way
systematically. If the Internet, described as "dianzi dazibao" (electronic versions of
the big-character posters that were allegedly the most efficient means of mobilising
The New York Times, March 16, 200, p. 1A.
28 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian regimes:
China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution, First Monday, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2001, available online at
<http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_8/kalathilt,  accessed on September 28, 2001.
29 See Shewai Shehui Diaocha Huodong Guanli Zhanxing Banfa (Temporary Measures for the
Management of Social Survey Activities Involving Foreign Nationals), China National Statistics
Bureau, August 15, 1998, available online at <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/gzjgfxwj/t20020424_
18337.htm>, accessed on May 15, 2004.
10
public opinion during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s) 3° provides
opportunities for individuals to air their political views in chat forums, on bulletin
boards, where previously they only talked among themselves, a study of this kind will
also present chances to gain a more systematic picture of public opinion on political
issues with documented examples. Without doubt, the topics that attract the liveliest
debate on bulletin boards may not always be the ones one would choose if one wanted
to build up a comprehensive picture of public opinion or civil discourse in
China—one is always dependent upon the messages that others post. Nevertheless, it
is possible to choose certain themes as illustrations. The significance will be increased:
if they are contrasted with what the official media were writing on the same subject,
and if the expected effect or outcome is not what the authorities initially envisaged.
Apart from that, as for their impact upon the political system, already it is possible to
identify a few cases where the wider access of individuals to online news and
information, and to subsequently comment on it through the Internet, has somewhat
forced the government to respond to public concerns in ways that previously were
thought unnecessary.
It has been suggested that official surveillance of the Internet discussions may be
especially tight at times of particular significance to the regime, e.g. the congresses of
the CCP, or sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC). The Sixteenth CCP
Congress in November 2002 and the Tenth NPC Congress March 2003, form part of
this project, devoted to an analysis of the discussions that appear on a bulletin board
30 The definition is cited from Xi Xiguang's work. See Xi Xiguarig, "ICT and the Demise of
Propaganda," Global Media Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2003, available online at
<http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/SubmittedDocuments/archivedpapers/Fa112003/pdf_filesllnt
ernet%20and%20democracy(xiguang).pdf, accessed on 12 March 2004.
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(the Strong Country Forum) around the time of these congresses, which was
contrasted with the reports that appear in the official People Daily. The comparison
should illustrate the political impact of the Internet upon Chinese political system. If
the Internet has an impact at these times, it can certainly be inferred that it will do so
on more relaxed occasions.
There is an interesting quote by former President Jiang Zemin, which was in
response to the question of how China would be changed by the Internet:
I'm getting old and sometimes I have trouble using a mouse. But my grandson is very
good at navigating the Internet. I tell him that there is a positive side to the Internet,
because it can help promote the spread of information and understanding. And there is a
negative side, which is when misinformation is spread. So I tell my grandson that he
should use the Internet to enrich knowledge, and he should not use it to visit
pornographic sites. But my grandson lives far away from me. I cannot tell him what to
do. Ican only advise him what to do.3'
It seems the Chinese leadership begin to realise that the Internet will be increasingly
difficult to administer despite its heavy-handed control, and the reality is often the
case that the authorities may only regulate and intimidate but not compulsorily direct
Internet users how precisely to navigate online. Besides, it has been suggested by
some commentators that the new media may bring about a potentially subversive
challenge to the communist rule in the future because the long-practiced information
control mechanism as one of its key pillars to maintaining political power has been
Walter Isaacson, "Going Online When the Emperor's Away," 1me (online edition), May 13, 2001,
available online at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/O,8599, I 09632,00.html>, accessed on
June 25, 2001.
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growingly confronted. 32 As Nina Hachigian notes, "If Internet use continues to grow
in China, and an economic or political crisis occurs, the Internet will suddenly become
both a field and a tool of battle."33 This assumption will be further tested in the
following contents, namely, chapter 5 (contingent incidents) and chapter 6 and 7
(pre-planned political events), to examine its validity.
Lastly and equally importantly, reviewing the existing literature on public
opinion in China, I noticed that there were surprisingly few publications tackling this
theme. In part this may reflect the sensitive political reality in China where posting
unauthorised information and opinions in relation to public affairs are largely
constrained. Alan Liu pointed out: "Until recently, U.S. scholars specializing in China
paid episodic attention to Chinese mass sentiments. The concept of public opinion did
not appear in the lexicon of contemporary U.S. Sinology until the 1980s."34 For that
reason, this work will also contribute to the general literature upon Chinese public
opinion, because the documented impact of the Internet upon Chinese political system
could be conducted through the openness of the information and network technology.
Would it be the situation that David Shambaugh depicts: "Despite its [China's]
continued grip over the Xinhua media system, the party has lost control of the key
Leninist device of controlling what people read, see, hear, and learn. Without control
over the media, the party can no longer control people's minds." 35 Or could the state
still separate politics from economics as they have been successful in doing for the
32 See, for example, Xiao Qiang, "Cyber Speech: Catalyzing Free Expression and Civil Society,"
Harvard International Review, Vol. 25, No.2, Summer 2003, pp.70-75.
" Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, p.
129.
Alan P. L. Liu, Mass Politics in the People's Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China,
(Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).
David Shambaugh, "The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era," in David Shambaugh (ed.), The
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last two decades? This dissertation aims to shed light on crucial questions which may
reshape Internet studies on politics in general and have a significant impact upon
public opinion in China in particular.
Section IV Research Questions
A. Basic Research Questions
This dissertation poses two basic questions.
Question 1: Is the Chinese government as much in control of public debates on the
Internet as it is of debates in other forms of media?
Question 2: Does the Chinese government still control and manipulate public opinion
as much as it has traditionally done?
Since public debates and public opinion are significant components within a
political system, it is important to analyse whether these primary bases have been
challenged or even changed on account of the adoption and use of the Internet.
B. Secondary Research Questions
I. How can one measure the impact of the Internet upon political debates?
2. How can one document the political impact of the Internet?
3. Why and how does it matter to focus on the impact of the Internet upon political
debates in China? And can we relate this subject to the broader theme of political
change in China?
Modern Chinese State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 179.
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Section V	 Analytical Framework and Research Methods
A. Analytical Framework
The figure 1.1 locates China in a circle where external (global) forces of information
technology, globalisation, and marketisation heavily impact on the PRC in
accelerating its economic integration with the outside world. The three external forces
are independent yet closely interrelated. The term "information technology
revolution" usually refers to the rapid technological advances in computer
technologies, communication tools, and computer software and infrastructures that
have led to a dramatic reduction in the cost of transmitting and processing
information.36
 The concept of globalisation can be thought of as:
a process (or set ofprocesses) which embodies a transformation in the spatial
organisation of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their
extensily, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of
power.37
In addition, marketisation usually refers to the "market-oriented philosophy." It is part
of the grand globalisation process which in turn stimulates the wider diffusion and use
of the information technology. 38 The information revolution has significantly
enhanced the scale and speed of globalisation. In other words, distant occurrences and
developments can "come to have serious domestic impacts while local happenings
36 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," in
Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (eds.), Governance.com:
 Democracy in the Information
Age (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 162-163.
David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations:
Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 16.38 Emanuele Giovannetti, Mitsuhiro Kagami and Masatsugu Tsuji, "Introduction," in Emanuele
Giovannetti, Mitsuhiro Kagami and Masatsugu Tsuji (eds.), The Internet Revolution: A Global
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can engender significant global repercussions."39
Figure 1.1 The Internet Impact upon Political Change
In consideration of the impact of the Internet at the national level, the medium of the
Internet is then treated as a mediating variable that may determine, but not necessarily
steer, the course of political change. Precisely, the mediating variable (the Internet)
may link with the dependent variable (political change) but it does not necessarily
imply causation because it needs to be examined in detail whether the medium is truly
employed as an effective means of political change. The politico-economic and
sociocultural settings in a given state can certainly exert a fundamental influence on
political change or transformation. They are methodologically dealt with as
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 1.
° David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction," in David
Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the
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independent variables and political change as the dependent variable as a result. In
short, the mediating variable is seen as one that links the independent and dependent
variables.
Within the Chinese context (inside the circle), the political factors, particularly
the role of the CCP, are so paramount that they can crucially affect the socioeconomic
development. In the economic domain, the state still largely controls the
(re)distribution process of economic resources, although its authority has been
weakened since the open door policy began in the late 1970s. In Susan Strange's
argument, ". . . the authority of the governments of all states, large and small, strong
and weak, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change and of
the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global market
economy."40
 The Chinese state is no exception. This analytical framework helps lead
to the scheme of the dissertation that I shall approach the research questions set.
B. Research Methods
In addition to official and policy documents analysis, two major research methods are
employed, i.e., case studies and interviews, into this research project.
Cases—in the study of the political impact of the Internet in China, it seems essential
to conduct empirical research on certain specific cases. As a consequence, a variety of
cases are considered to show different dimensions of the impact of the Internet on the
political system in China. The cases fundamentally form the contents of chapter 5 in
Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), p. 3.40 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Dfl'usion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge:
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which the case studies, such as the US spy plane incident and the SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak, took place unexpectedly, and the contents of
chapter 6 and 7 in which the political events (the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party
Congress, and the Tenth National People's Congress) were planned well ahead by the
authorities. The contrast of the nature of these incidents (planned and unexpected) is
to demonstrate the extent to which the Internet has had an impact on political systems
in China. This is to examine Hachigian's hypothesis that the Internet will have more
of an impact in China when accidents and contingent events occur. 41 Such a
comparison will indeed shed further light on the study of the significance of the
contingencies associated with Internet-induced change—the extent to which the new
media have impacted on the political system in a given national context.
Interviews were largely conducted with staff working for major Chinese Internet
portals, such as Sina.com
 and Soho.com, as well as private Internet entrepreneurs
(Internet café bars), based in large cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and
Guangzhou, as well as smaller cities like Chengde in Hebei province, Kunshan and
Suzhou in Jiangsu province, and Zhuhai in Guangdong province. A number of
interviews were also conducted with media and Internet scholars based at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, the Tsinghua University, and the Communication
University of China (renamed from Beijing Broadcasting University in early
September 2004). The interviews totalled about 20 cases to examine the major
argument of chapter 4—the existence of a relationship between the Internet
entrepreneurs and the Chinese government. The criteria to decide what questions to
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 13-14.
ask Internet entrepreneurs were largely based upon the explorations of the concept of
"government-business nexus" in the Internet sector with similar interview questions,
such as: "how do you cope with the government's regulations?", "How do you
monitor Internet, cyber chatrooms or cybercafes?" 42
 Interviewees were selected to
test the assumption that there exist variations of Internet law enforcement between the
North and the South, the big and small cities within China. Part of the interviewees
were randomly selected from the participants of the 2002 Forum on Chinese Internet
Media held in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, where more than 300 government officials,
mediallnternet entrepreneurs and experts took part in.
Section VI
	 Outline of the Dissertation
To approach the questions set out above, this dissertation begins with a literature
review (Chapter 2) of the Internet's impact upon political systems in established
democracies as well as developing ones. Following the general discussion of the
Internet's possible political impact, there is a specific review of works with regard to
the Internet's political impact in China. The dissertation will show how the literature
review has helped identif' the research agenda in this dissertation. Since this project
is also closely related to online data and information, a section discussing the
methodological issues of the reliability of information and knowledge on the Internet
is presented, so as to provide insights into the problems in relation to online research.
After general points about the need to be systematic when doing Internet research, I
will present my strategies to handle the potential problems against the backdrop of
Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs, p. 132.
42 See Appendix 9 for all the interview questions.
19
Chinese sociopolitical cyber environments.
In Chapter 3, the dissertation considers the fundamental issue of Internet
governance in China. As it is generally perceived, the increasingly availability of
information made possible by the global information revolution and systems,
including the Internet, has affected governance and the political process. In
authoritarian states like China, it is also true that Internet governance will influence
the creation, dissemination, availability, and use of information on the Internet in
global information systems. This project first considers the introduction of the
Internet into China and its diffusion therein. The dissertation will then review the
transitional Internet regulation regimes from the 1990s in order to better understand
the setting of Internet regulation and censorship. A section addressing the
countermeasures of Internet control is provided, demonstrating the 'virtual'
cat-and-mouse game of the Internet environment that users and governments in China
are now encountering.
Chapter 4 moves to the exploration of the relationship between Internet
entrepreneurs and the government in China. This chapter will first outline the setting
of the private economy in the wake of economic reform in the late I 970s, and the
exponential development of the IT sector from the 1990s, in particular. The hybrid
clientelist-corporatist complex is argued to illuminate the unique relations in China's
Internet industry, with case studies supporting the arguments. Such a relationship does
have implications for civil society in China because the Internet entrepreneurs have
helped unleash a more plural society.
Chapter 5 will consider the actual use of the Internet by Netizens in China. In
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Chapter 4, it shows that the Internet entrepreneurs might not boldly promote or even
fully realise Internet's political potential unless the directions or initiatives are guided
by the state. What in turn makes the Internet salient is how and to what extent the
medium is utilised by Netizens in China. This chapter then addresses the actual use of
the Internet, centring upon four separate yet intertwined dimensions of
Internet-mediated cases: (A) foreign relations: the U.S. spy plane collusion; (B)
domestic political issues: the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak;
(C) legal politics: the BMW incident; (D) dissenting politics: the Falun Gong
movement. The exploration of the cases under review has revealed the political
impact of the Internet upon a still un-democratic China. It also highlights the extent to
which contingency may be different from those of pre-planed events.
In Chapter 6, the focus shifts to the micro examination and analysis of messages
posted online. I contrast the official coverage of the themes, i.e., (A) corruption; (B)
the concept of xiaokang she hui (a moderately wealthy society) and income inequality;
(C) the theory of the "Three Represents" and the official accession of private
entrepreneurs into the CCP; and (D) political reform, that appear in the People s' Daily
with what appeared on the Qiangguo Lunlan (Strong Country Forum) during the 16th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2002. This chapter
serves to investigate the extent to which the Internet has facilitated the evolution of
e-social capital and the possible emergence of a public sphere.
In Chapter 7, this project will look at other empirical evidence garnered during
the first session of the 10th NPC and the National Committee of the CPPCC (Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference) held in March 2003. The case-study
2
centres on four categories of issues: (a) "san-nong": "non gye" (agriculture),
"nongcun" (village), and "nongmin" (farmers); (b) employment and social security; (c)
the role and reform of the NPC and the CPPCC; and (d) the rule of law. It is expected
that exploration of these discourses should illuminate the impact that these
discussions have had on China's politics in general, and public opinion and political
participation in particular.
In the final chapter, the dissertation will summarise the conclusions drawn from
previous chapters and re-emphasise some of the key points of the Internet and its
accompanying development of public opinion and political impact in China. The
concept of "prolonged stability, delayed Internet impact" is presented to integrate the
individual chapter's contentions, hoping to critically shed light on other Internet
research of political impact in authoritarian states. The limitations of this project and
an agenda for future work are identified so as to contribute to the existing literature.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Section I	 Literature on the Internet's Impact upon Political Systems in
General
According to Manuel Castells, we are now living in a network society that is
fundamentally different from those of the past. A number of processes converge in the
information age, including the restructuring of capitalism and the introduction of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT5). These processes have
effectively facilitated and reacted to globalisation.' As a consequence, there has been
an accelerating growth of a relatively sophisticated literature in the West, especially in
the United States, that researches widely on the impact of ICTs on societies and
political systems both in industrial democracies and developing countries. Research
on the relationship between ICTs and political impact has turned up ample evidence
mostly with regard to the established democracies, and to a lesser extent the yet
undemocratic ones. Their focus centres upon the political application and
implementation of ICTs, seeing them as primary tools in the working of a democratic
political system or the evolution of democratisation. Whilst the Net effect on
(un)democratic countries is hotly debated between social scientists, the conclusion
drawn is yet to be unanimous. As far as academic literature is concerned, there are two
broadly conflicting arguments on the likely impact of the Internet on modern political
domain. On the one hand, commentators hold optimistic views that the new
technologies will help improve existing democratic participation, facilitate more
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford: Blackwell, 1996);
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (Cambridge, Mass, and Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Manuel
Castells, End of Millennium (Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford: Blackwell, 1998); Manuel Castells, The
Internet Galaxy: Reflections on Internet, Business, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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direct, lower-cost, interactive and immediate participatory processes, so as to enhance
civil engagement in the political sphere, a greater degree of civic deliberation over
public issues, and to build a thicker electronic space of social capital as well as a
workable mechanism of horizontal communication networks. 2 A few observers
further advocate quantum leaps in the direction of direct democracy, synonymous
with digital democracy, cyberdemocracy, e-democracy, virtual democracy, calling for
a new era of more radical participatory polity and a fresh form of public participation
in the information age.3
On the other hand, some are more sceptical about the romantic thinking of
technological freedom and empowerment. They think the ICTs are increasingly being
utilised in a more vigilant way for national security purposes and the manipulation of
public opinion by commercial interests-based groups, which all serves the incumbent
political powers and elite groups to sustain the domination of the newer
communication tools.4 In addition, concerns have been articulated about a tendency
towards newer forms of divide, i.e., digital divide, thus creating a disparity between
technological haves and have-nots, and possibly incurring undesirable economic and
sociopolitical tensions. 5
 In this respect, the Internet and ICTs are regarded as
reinforcing the dominative positions of already existing interests, rather than radically
2001).
2 See, for example, Krishna Sen and David Hill, Internet and Democracy in Indonesia (London:
Routledge, 2003); Diana Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
See, for example, Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1984).
See, for example, Linda Main, "The Global Information Infrastructure: Empowerment or
Imperialism," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 2001, pp. 83-97; Philip E. Agre and
Marc Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT
Press, 1997).
See, for example, Mark Warschauer, Technology andSocial Inclusion: Rethinking the DigitalDivide
24
reversing pre-existing power relations. In this regard, the Internet is argued to be less
than a public medium that serves to advance liberation and pluralism but on the
contrary, the centralisation and consolidation of social class—those who possess
(certain) power or the financially better-off can monopolise it.
Both arguments have contributed to a better understanding of democratic theory
and the working of democratic and undemocratic political systems in the Internet age.
This literature review section is designed to examine the interrelated political issues
associated with the new technologies. Specifically, how the Internet may or may not
lead to increased participation of citizens in the making of policies in democratic
nations, strengthening social capital, enhancing e-government service delivery,
creating or reinvigorating civil society, broadening political discussion and reviving
the public sphere, promoting political campaigns, voting, and advertising, bridging
the digital divide, and lastly transforming authoritarian states? The contents that
follow will as a result briefly review and illustrate the current developments of
relevant literature.
A. Electronic Government (E-government)
The use of ICTs and related institutional arrangements are now impacting on the way
government works and the services delivered to its citizens. In this respect,
democratic governments, particularly in North America and Western Europe, are
increasingly turning to ICTs, such as E-mail, online discussion forums, and bulletin
boards, in order to support and enhancing the policymaking process. It is hoped that
through the new technology-enabled channels and official Websites governments
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 2003).
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nowadays can better reach out to their citizens and consequently gather public opinion.
The adoption of electronic government is arguably leading to more transparent,
interactive, open and accountable administration. For instance, Jane E. Fountain
contributes to the intellectual understanding of information technology in
organisational life with empirical evidence drawn from the federal administration in
the United States. She proposes a "technology enactment" framework-to describe the
way that new technologies, especially the Internet, are creating a new concept of
government organisation—a "virtual state," in which it is "...a government that is
organised increasingly in terms of virtual agencies, cross-agency and public-private
networks whose structure and capacity depend on the Internet and web."6
A comparative study of government Web sites for openness and accountability in
fourteen countries including major western democracies, along with China, Egypt,
and Japan, reveals that the introduction of the e-government may not necessarily lead
to a more accountable public sector as it is wished. The lesson learned from this study
is that there will be a limited success in enhancing accountability if the e-government
project in any specific case country is not accompanied by ". . .the corresponding
institutional reform of the civil service system and organisational reform of the
agency."7
Meanwhile, a policy-oriented publication from OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) provides lessons and experiences in
OECD member countries. This report presents several guiding principles for
Jane E. Fountain, Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), P.4.
Wilson Wong and Eric Welch, "Does E-Government Promote Accountability? A Comparative
Analysis of Website Openness and Government Accountability," Governance, Vol. 17, No. 2, April
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successful online consultation and citizens' cyber engagement in policymaking
processes, in the hope of fiuily exploiting the potential promised by the c-government
proponents. The guiding principles are 1.) start planning early; 2.) demonstrate
commitment; 3.) guarantee personal data protection; 4.) tailor your approach to fit
your target group; 5.) Integrate online consultation with traditional methods; 6.) test
and adapt your tools; 7) promote your online consultation; 8) analyse the results; 9.)
provide feedback; and 10.) evaluate the consultation process and its impacts. 8
 In
addition, five challenges to success of e-government are also identified as 1.) the
problem of scale; 2.) building capacity and active citizenship; 3.) ensuring coherence;
4.) conducting the evaluation of c-engagement; and 5.) ensuring commitment.9
B. Improving Governance (E-Governance)
For the past decades there has been a growing trend in Western democracies of
declining trust and support of the governed in government, particularly in the United
States. The mistrust between government and the governed is the subject of a
collected volume, Why People Don't Trust Government, in which a number of essays
provide an account of the roots of and explanations for mistrust in the context of the
United States.'° The mistrust also reveals a problem for the future of governance. La
Porte, Demchak and de Jone, for example, argue that the Internet has increasingly
2004, p. 291.
See OECD, Promise and Problems of E-Democracy: Challenges of Online CitL-en Engagement
(Paris, OECD, 2003), pp. 10-11.
Ibid., pp. 64-90.
tO Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King, Why People Don Trust Government
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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become the prime gateway for the public into government bureaucracies and their
services in the information age. Governance ought to adapt accordingly.'1
ICT has arguably made impact in the sphere of traditional institutions and
processes of governance. In this regard, e-governance is likely to impact the
productivity and performance of the public sector, empowering e-government to
boost and revive citizen involvement within the governing process.' 2 Yet some
political scientists articulate a cautious note about the assertions of the Internet's
transformation of governance, bureaucracy, institutions, elections, and civic life.'3
C. Enhancing Social Capital (E-Social Capital)
Since the publication of the provocative and influential 1975 work, The Crisis of
Democracy, there has been a growing concern about the health and fragility of
modern democracy in the "Trilateral areas"—North America, Europe, and Japan.
Existing democracies were at that time puzzled by a crisis of govemability.
Specifically, the crisis of states' capacity to effectively respond to the surging public
demands was also compounded by slower economic growth as well as the decline of
State authority.' 4 Such accounts of the sombre prospects for existing democracies
were shared by a number of other works from the same era, and Americans still
Todd M. La Porte, Chris C. Demchak and Martin de Jone, "Democracy and Bureaucracy in the Age
of the Web: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Speculations," Administration & Society, Vol. 34, No.
4, September 2002, pp. 4 11-446.
2 See Robert D. Carlitz and Rosemary W. Gunn, "Online Rulemaking: A Step toward E-governance,"
Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4, June 2002, pp. 389-405; Thomas B. Riley and
Rogers W'O Okot-Uma, eds., Electronic Governance and Electronic Democracy: Living and Working
in the Wired World (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000).
13 See, for example, Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Joseph S. Nyc Jr., eds., Governance.com:
 Democracy
in the Information Age (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002).
' Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press,
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expressed political cynicism in the post-Cold War in the 1990s.' 5 Particularly in his
book, Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam called attention to the general anxiety about
participatory democracy and the erosion of the sense of community.'6
The waning of social capital, characterised as consisting of social mistrust, the
lack of associational membership and political apathy, has engendered attempts
amongst academics to argue that social capital may be restored through the
convenience of ICTs, in particular the Internet. Peter Ester and Henk Vinken argue
that "the Internet is likely to be the ultimate tool for particularly younger generations
to gain and advance social capital, to build and take part in communities." 7 Barry
Weilman and others have presented evidence in the 1998 survey of 39,211 visitors to
the Web site of the National Geographic Society, investigating how the Internet
affects social capital. To assess the Internet's impact, they consider social capital as
social network contacts (known as network capital), organisational and political
participation (known as participatory capital), and community commitment. Their
results suggest that a subtle and mixed relationship exists between the Internet and
social capital: Internet usage supplements network capital, increases participatory
capital, but decreases community commitment.18
1975).
See, for example, Richard Rose, Challenge to Governance: Studies in Overload Polities (Beverly
Hills and London: Sage, 1980); Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citi:ens: Global Support for Democratic
Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds.,
Disaffected Democracies: What s Troubling the Trilateral Countries (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2000).
6 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican Community (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
17 Peter Ester and Henk Vinken, "Debating Civil Society: On the Fear for Civic Decline and Hope for
the Internet Alternative," International Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2003, p. 675.
IS Barry Weilman, Anabel Quan Haase, James Witte and Keith Hampton, "Does the Internet Increase,
Decrease, or Supplement Social Capital? Social Networks, Participation, and Community
Commitment," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 45, No. 3, November 2001, pp. 436-455.
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Keith Hampton and Barry Weilman have also demonstrated an empirical case
study on Internet's impact upon neighbourhood community. Based on a three-year
ethnographic survey in the wired suburb Netville near Toronto, their findings show
that Internet can enhance the sense of neighbourhood by facilitating
neighbourhood-based interactions and social contacts because "spatial, temporal, and
social barriers to community organising are overcome." 19
Yet there has not been a comprehensive survey from a comparative perspective
to help judge whether the new technologies will indeed facilitate the growth of social
capital; most of them are still experimental and relatively small-scale studies.
D. Promoting Political Campaigns, Advertising and Internet Voting
The debates with regard to the Internet's impact on political campaigning and
advertising explore whether the Internet can enhance the power of politicians to
conduct election activities on the one hand and enable citizens to make better choices
in elections because of more information-abundant news media and campaign Web
sites on the other hand?° Whilst the Internet may be able to play a bigger role through
election campaigns, electronic lobbying, and reducing the power of money associated
with traditional elections, the electorates may somehow confirm Thomas Jefferson's
' Keith Hampton and Barry Wellman, "Neighboring in Netville: How the Internet Supports
Community and Social Capital in a Wired Suburb," City & Community, Vol. 2, No.4, December 2003,
p. 305. See also Hans Pruijt, "Social Capital and the Equalizing Potential of the Internet," Social
Science Computer Review, Vol. 20, No.2, May 2002, pp. 109-115.
20 Lynda Lee Kaid, "Effects of Political Information in the 2000 Presidential Campaign: Comparing
Traditional Television and Internet Exposure," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 46, No. 5, January
2003, pp. 677-691; Dave D'Alessio, "Use of the World Wide Web in the 1996 US Election," Electoral
Studies, Vol. 16, No.4, December 1997, pp. 489-500; Thomas J. Johnson and Barbara K. Kaye, "Boost
or Bust for Democracy? How the Web Influenced Political Attitudes and Behaviors in the 1996 and
2000 Presidential Elections," The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 8, No. 3, July
2003, pp. 9-34.
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assertion that an informed citizenry is the foundation of a free society.
Bruce Bimber presents a historical account and conceptual approach for the
political use of information in the context of United States. He suggests that
information is a universally significant ingredient in political processes, and several
types of "information regimes" in the history of American politics have been affected
or interrupted by the information revolution. 2 ' Richard Davis holds that the Internet in
America is gradually set to promote electoral lobbying and "virtual" campaigns,
gauge public opinion, educate citizens, and achieve policy resolution. In his
observation, many political players are now well adapting to the new technology and
ensuring that this new medium benefits them in their ultimate struggle for political
power.22
 Yet Bimber and Davis in their joint work argue with a sceptical tone that the
effectiveness of the Internet-based political campaigns is still limited or constrained.
In their work, the four categories—opinion reinforcement, activism, fundraising, and
voter mobilisation—were adopted to investigate the actual use of the Internet
campaigning in the 2000 Presidential elections in the US.23
Graeme Browning provides empirical analysis of how various groups, including
advocacy groups and political organisations, have exploited the Internet to further
their policy interests and electoral campaigns. Browning suggests that better
designing personal Web sites may effectively disseminate political information and
elicit support through interactive participation of Internet users.24
21 Bruce Bimber, Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political
Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
22 Richard Davis, The Web of Politics: The Internet's Impact on the American Political System (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
23 Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis, Campaigning Online: The Internet in US. Elections (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
24 Graeme Browning, Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Transform American Politics
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In addition, some commentators consider whether "Internet voting" 25 may be
able to help improve lower election turnout amongst most Western democracies.
Susan Henry, for instance, investigates the results of the pilot electronic voting held at
five councils within 2002 UK local elections. Given that the voter turnout increased
by 3.5 per cent, she suggests that many more future pilots are required to make a more
conclusive judgement on the Internet's voting impact. 26
 Christos Bouras and others
present a detailed account, arguing that public administrations can additionally gather
public opinion through the use of Internet voting on several public issues, such as
public services delivering and environmental protection. This may in turn positively
help support government's decision-making process.27
On the other hand, a few observers have also raised a number of concerns,
including the security issues of online voting and public Internet accessibility across
racial and socioeconomic lines. 28
 As a matter of fact, the concept of e-voting is,
however, in its initial stage and there are surely lots of difficulties, technical and
conceptual, to be overcome in the near future.
E. Promoting Digital (Direct) Democracy and Reviving the Public Sphere
Marshall McLuhan was one of the first scholars to explore the effects of media and
(Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2002).
25 The Internet or electronic voting is in itself using electronic ballots that allow voters to cast their
votes to elect officials over the Internet. For a general discussion about remote Internet voting, see, for
example, R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, Point, Click and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
26 Susan Henry, "Can Remote Internet Voting Increase Turnout?" Aslib Proceedings, Vol. 55, No. 4,
July 2003, PP
.
 193-202.
27 Christos Bouras, N. Katris and Vassilis Triantafillou, "An Electronic Voting Service to Support
Decision-Making in Local Government," Telematics and Informatics, Vol. 20, No. 3, August 2003, pp.
255-274.
28 See, for example, Yurong Yao and Edward Watson, "Concerns and Solutions on Electronic Voting
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technology on humankind. In his seminal book The Medium Is the Message published
in 1967, McLuhan argued that people have historically associated messages with what
people are saying (their content), and have tended to ignore the importance of the
media. He reversed the traditional discourse of "content dominance over medium"
and held that the medium is of great significance because the environment can heavily
shape public messages. 29 Moreover, McLuhan's popular concept of the "global
village" highlights that technologies are extensions of human beings. In his
observations:
In the electric age, when our central nervous system is technologically extended to
involve in the whole of mankind and to incorporate the whole of mankind in us, we
necessarily participate, in depth, in the consequences of our every action.3°
His vision of "global village" has shed light on a number of aspects of later literature
about how the technological innovations may transform public lives, including the
changes in contemporary political systems. In Future Shock, Alvin Toffler examined
the overwhelming impact of technological advance in the 1970s upon human lives.
The society was undergoing a structural change from an "industrial society" to a
"super-industrial society."3 ' Toffler further considered the impact of the information
and knowledge revolution on society, which he called "the third wave" following the
second wave of the industrial revolution. In what he termed the "Twenty-first-century
democracy," he held that educated citizens could achieve "direct democracy" by
Systems Adoption," in Gerry Gingrich (ed.), Managing IT in Government, Business and Communities
(Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2003), pp. 127-146.
29 Marshall MeLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Message (New York: Bantam, 1967).
° Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge, Mass. and London:
The IMT Press, 1964), p. 149.
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"using advanced computers, satellites, telephones, cable, polling techniques, and
other tools"32
Toffler's visions have inspired others to explore the possibility of renewing the
classical model of Athenian democracy associated with regular mass participation in
public debate, consultation, and decision-making amongst the citizenry. In his
influential work Strong Democracy, Benjamin Barber demonstrates the weakness of
modern liberal democracy. He thinks that liberal democracy is a "thin democracy" in
which "democratic values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and
conditional." n Instead, he proposes "strong democracy"—a new form of
participatory politics for a new age. He states:
Strong democracy requires unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry. It
requires institutions that will involve individuals at both the neighbourhood and the
national level in common talk, common decision-making and political judgement, and
common action.34
The idea of the "television town meeting" can enhance, in Barber's thought, "direct"
public participation and citizen-powered decision-making process. In this regard, new
technology as an intermediary medium is essential to achieve the "strong democracy"
because citizens can conduct deliberative discussions and debate via the interactive
form of electronic town meeting amongst (local) communities, and thus to improve
Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (London: Pan Books, 1971).
32	 Toffler, The Third Wave (London: Pan Books, 1980), p. 439.
B Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, CA. and
London: University of California Press, 1984), p. 4.
Ibid., p.261.
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"thin" democracy.35
Indeed, one of the few practicable measures discussed in the 1980s was
electronic town meetings via local cable television networks by which local citizens
could discuss or debate local issues. 36 Yet this concept of electronic of town
conferences or electronic town hail meetings remains a more primitive and top-down
mode of communication which preceded the commercialised application of the
Internet. It was not until 1992 that the National Science Foundation of the United
States lifted the ban on commercial traffic on the Internet, 37 thereby the earlier debates
over "teledemocracy" encouraged a more innovative mode of mass participation in
public affairs. In this respect, the Internet emerged to open up newer prospects for an
Athenian democracy in the information age.
Ted Becker and Christa D. Slaton argue that a "new democratic
paradigm"—electronic democracy and teledemocracy—is coming into being, which
is characterised by the widespread application of advanced ICTs in present-day
democratic theory and practice. To achieve teledemocracy, the critical mass is urged
to synergise "scientific deliberative polling, comprehensive electronic town meetings
and the Internet."38
 Tony Kinder further presents the survey results of the application
of teledemocracy in 31 European cities. Focusing on teledemocracy at the local (city)
level, he argues that its adoption in those European cities under review has shown the
increased level of interactivity between citizens and local councils, improved quality
" Benjamin R. Barber, "Three Scenarios for the Future of Technology and Strong Democracy,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No.4, winter 1998, P. 583.
36 F. Christopher Arterton, Teledemocracy: Can Technology Protect Democracy (London: Sage
Publications, 1987).
See <http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/boucherinfotech.htm >, accessed on June 1, 2004.
Ted Becker and Christa D. Slaton, The Future of Teledemocracy (Westport, Conn. and London:
Praeger, 2000), p. 47.
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of services and enhanced services availability, which has beneficial effect on the
quality and legitimacy of local government.39
As a matter of fact, teledemocracy functions in a sense like neighbourhood
salons that help aggregate individual preferences into a collective choice. Online
democratic practice involves Internet users participating in rational and critical
deliberation and consultation, hence reviving the heated discussions about "public
sphere" in cyberspace.4°
Since Habermas's important publication, The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere, about the rise and fall of the liberal bourgeois public, his continuously
evolving theory of the "public sphere" has inspired numerous works on deliberative
democracy and a more democratic media system. 4 ' The notion of the Haberma's
theory of the public sphere is based upon the ideal of a "deliberative" as opposed to
merely "informed" public. It is a "public" space between the state and civil society in
which citizens can debate issues of common concern. As a result, a well-functioning
public sphere is dependant on both on access to pertinent information about the
actions of governmental institutions and opportunities for citizens to engage in
rational and critical deliberation that results in the formation of public opinion and the
shaping of governmental conduct. Empirical evidence of online activities in relation
to "public sphere" in the Chinese context will be further discussed and presented in
chapter 6 and 7.
Kinder, "Vote Early, Vote Often? Ide-democracy in European Cities," Public Administration,
Vol. 80, No. 3, autumn 2002, PP. 557-582.
40 See, for example, Lincoln Dahlberg, "Democracy via Cyberspace: Mapping the Rhetorics and
Practices of Three Prominent Camps," New Media & Society, Vol.3, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 157-177;
Antji Gimmler, "Deliberative Democracy, the Public Sphere and the Internet," Philosophy & Social
Criticism, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 2001, pp. 2 1-39.
' Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category
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In the Internet age, channels exist that provide debates and consultations to be
easily conducted over the cyber venues of Usenet, discussion boards, chat rooms,
e-mail lists, where participants are encouraged to conduct deliberative forms of
discussions and debates. For instance, the US Minnesota E-Democracy
<http://www.e-democracy.org/> is a citizen-based project whose mission is to
improve citizen interaction and participation in public issues through the use of
information networks. The Minnesota B-Democracy initiative is conceivably the best
known and oldest Web forum (1994) which attracts over 4,000 mailing-list
subscribers to its project updates sent out via e-mail, whose participants can take part
in discussion forums covering both nationwide and local political issues. UK Citizens
Online Democracy (UKCOD) <http://www.partnerships.org.uk/articles/ukcod.html >,
founded in 1996, is Britain's popularly known e-democracy service. Similar to the
US-based Minnesota one, the UKCOD aims to promote online discussion and debates
on national and/or controversial public issues, and to revive the deliberative
democracy by encouraging the general public to voluntarily participate in the
decision-making process. It is, however, relatively inactive when compare with the
Minnesota's B-Democracy.
In fact, some social scientists claim that the mode of computer-mediated
communications (CMCs) exploited by civic network groups shapes and facilitates
grassroots democracy, bringing people into the democratic participatory processes.42
The rationale is that with more and more people engaging in public discourse online,
the concept of government may transform into a regime, which is more accountable
of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1989).
See, for example, Damian Tambini, "New Media and Democracy: The Civic Networking
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and responsive to its people. In this sense, the Internet could have the potential to
become a more open online platform particularly for periphery groups to engage in
public discourse than that of traditional media. Roza Tsagarousianou and others have
further studied the empirical basis of electronic democracy by looking into the recent
establishment of city-based civic networks in the United States and Europe. Their
findings show how different understandings of democracy have led to different
approaches in bringing about an electronic incarnation of "electronic democracy" in
each city project.43
Ian Budge talks about the concept of "direct democracy" and explores the
technical feasibility in a society where the modern ICTs are widely available. Based
upon Anglo-American political development, his argument highlights the
significance of direct democracy and associated extended public participation as
remedies for the ills of present-day democracy. He thinks that direct democracy
creates opportunities to enhance social inclusion.44
There are nevertheless cautious voices articulated about the argument of
electronic democracy. Kevin Hill and John Hughes, for instance, have investigated the
political implications of the Internet and computer-mediated political communication
by looking at E-mail, Usenet groups, and Web pages in the context of the United
States. Their investigations show "the Internet is merely an extension of the fax
machine, the telephone, the postal system... in being a medium of political
Movement," New Media & Society, Vol. 1, No. 3, December 1999, pp. 305-329.
' Roza Tsagarousianou, Damian Tambini and Cathy Bryan, eds., Cyberdemocracy: Technology,
Cities and Civic Netivorks (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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communications." 45 As a result, they maintain that the Internet is, at best, "a
supplement to political discourse, not a gigantic paradigm shift."46
Jay Blumler and Stephen Coleman also note that the Internet possesses a
"vulnerable potential" to provide a democratic space that is open to all and connected
to real democratic institutions. In their words, "[a]n infrastructure for its proper
realisation is lacking." 47 In another article, Coleman focuses more on current
inadequacies about existing communication channels for democratic representation.
He suggests a mode of information-flows for e-democracy, i.e., "the creation of a
trusted online space for democracy; integration of e-democracy into constitutionally
recognised channels; the cultivation of meaningful interactivity between
representatives and the represented; the recruitment of traditionally excluded voices
to online public debate."48 These proposals, in the author's opinion, are criteria to
further assess the Internet's (democratic) impact beyond sheer speculation.
F. Bridging the Digital Divide
Some sceptics of the Internet's democratic impact have focused on the issues of the
"digital divide." The phrase generally refers to the disparity between those who have
and those who do not use or have no access to ICTs. The growing concern of
Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, Cyberpolitics: CitL-en Activism in the Age of the Internet
(Lanham, MD and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), P. 179.
46 Ibid.
Jay G. Blumler and Stephen Coleman, Realising Democracy Online: A Civic Commons in
Cyberspace (London: Institute for Public Policy Research/Citizens Online Research Publications,
2001), No. 2, p. 4, available online at <http://www.citizensonline.org.uk/pdf/realising.pdf, accessed
on June 8, 2004.
48 Stephen Coleman, "The Future of the Internet and Democracy Beyond Metaphors, Towards Policy,"
in OECD (ed.), Promise and Problems of E-Democracy: Challenges of Online Citizen Engagement
(Paris: OECD, 2003), p. 143, available online at <http://wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/
4204011 E.PDF> , accessed on February 12, 2004.
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inequalities in ICTs has spurred scholarly debates over the last decade since ICTs
commercially applied to the public domain in the early 1990s. 49 There are also serious
concerns about the enhanced economic disparities brought about by ICTs between
rich developed countries and less developed ones, reinforcing the nature and
development of inequality in the world economy. 5° Howard Rheingold particularly
refers to the question of digital divide when he assesses the relationship between
virtual (community) networks and the Internet-enabled democracy. He mentions that
". . . no discussion of technology-assisted democracy can begin without referring to the
key question of who can afford to take advantage of the new media."5'
As a result, the notion of a dichotomous digital divide of "haves" vs. "have-nots"
or to a lesser extent, the "information-rich" vs. the "information-poor," is famously
held by some commentators as an obstacle to the political discussion of
socioeconomic issues. As Kenneth Wilson and others caution that the digital divide
should not be seen as merely an issue of technology as such, but ought to be looked
upon as a complex of socioeconomic and politico- cultural issues.52
In addition, Paul Foley and others present a comprehensive research that addresses
the digital divide in big cities like London. Instead of employing the traditional approach
See, for example, Benjamin M. Compaine, ed., The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating a
Myth (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press, 2001); David J. Gunkel, "Second Thoughts:
Toward a Critique of the Digital Divide," New Media & Society, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 2003, pp.
499-522.
50 See, for example, William Wresch, Disconnected: Haves and Have-Nots in the Information Age
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996); OECD, Communications Outlook 1999
(Paris: OECD, 1999), available online at <http:llnor-kermit.colorado.edu/slingshotJebookeng.pdf,
accessed on March 12, 2004; and UNDP, Human Development Report 1999: Globalization with a
Human Face (New York: UNDP, 1999), available online at <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/globah
1999/en/default.cfm>, accessed on March 12, 2004.
' Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Cambridge,
Mass. and London: MIT Press, 2000), p. 377.
52 Kenneth R. Wilson, Jennifer S. Wallin and Christa Reiser, "Social Stratification and the Digital
Divide," Social Science Computer Review, Vol. 2 1,No. 2, June 2003, pp. 133-143.
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that regards socioeconomic factors, i.e., income, education, job, and technology skills,
the Foley-led team highlights a socio-personal approach that encompasses attitudinal
and behavioural factors of potential users, with a hope to better comprehend the nature
of digital divide. Their findings reveal that lower levels of interest, awareness,
understanding, and acceptance of ICTs are all contributing to the digital divide.53
Pippa Norris develops academic research on this subject, which had previously
been more empirical and evidence-based, in the direction of a more theoretical
perspective that is developed through a comparative multilevel research design
covering a wide range of political systems. For Norris, the concept of digital divide is
a composite phenomenon that encompasses three distinct aspects: the global divide
(the divide between industrial and developing countries), the social divide (the divide
within a nation, that is the divide between rich and poor), and the democratic divide
(the divide between those who do, and do not, use the Internet to engage, mobilise,
and participate in public life).54
As for the Internet's democratising potential or effects, Jason Abbott cautions,
while the new information technologies may be exploited in some countries as an
effective means to bring about political change, its democratising impact may be
significantly counteracted by severe digital inequalities and the growing trend of the
commercialisation of this medium. 55 To sum up, the issue of digital divide does
Paul Foley, Ximena Alfonso and Shazad Ghani, The Digital Divide in a World City, prepared by
IECRC and Citizens Online for the Greater London Authority, LondonConnects and the London
Development Agency, June 20, 2002, available online at <http://www.Iondon.gov.uklgla/publications/
e-london/digital_divide.rtf, accessed on June 2, 2004.
Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Jason P Abbott, "Democracy@internet.asia? The Challenges to the Emancipatory Potential of the
Net: Lessons from China and Malaysia," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 2001, pp.
99-fl4.
41
matters when considering ICTs' impact on politics. It is primarily because the Net's
impact will be limited and constrained if the new technologies are relatively confined
to a small proportion of users in a society where the majority still lacks the means of
access to a wider range of (alternative) information and knowledge. The problem of
the digital divide with respect to China will be further referred to in later chapters.
G Transforming Authoritarian States, Bringing in Democratisation
As ICTs are increasingly proliferating and utilised across the world, they spark heated
debates over the question of whether ICTs, particularly the Internet, may not only
bring forth new forms of mass participation and reforms of established democracies,
but also spread democracy to non-democratic countries. Specifically, the growing
body of literature, which addresses the Internet's impact on authoritarian states, also
known as cyber-democratisation or electronic democratisation, asks whether the
Internet will contribute to the disintegration of authoritarian regimes, fostering the
establishment of democratic practices by providing citizens and activists with the
tools to disseminate subversive or alternative information, coordinate and organise
sociopolitical movements to challenge and undermine incumbent governments.
Christopher Kedzie, for example, conducted a macro-level research of 144
countries with the aim of finding correlations between democracy (political freedom)
and the new communication media (network connectivity). Kedzie concludes that
democracy and networked communication are indeed positively correlated. 56 In their
investigations of the content of 2,500 messages in 41 Usenet groups worldwide,
56 Christopher R. Kedzie, Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent
Dictator's Dilemma (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997).
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Kevin Hill and John Hughes also reveal that the level of democracy is closely
associated with the electronic communications within a country. Their quantitative
analysis demonstrates that Internet messages about the countries with lower levels of
democratisation are far more likely to have anti-government content. 57 Michael
Mazarr, in his edited book, provides snapshots of the impact of digital media on
politics by investigating often-noted case studies, such as the use of the Internet by the
Zapatista National Liberation Movement and Army in Mexico; the use of mobile
telephones in democratisation process or conflict situations in Senegal, the
Philippines, and Congo; the Internet's impact on the development of politics and civil
society in China, Indonesia, and Iran; and the role of cybercafés and the
Internet-driven modernisation strategy in India. Yet the conclusion drawn is a mixed
message. In the case that authoritarian countries can successfully police and control
the Internet, it thus plays a role as a centralised propaganda tool. Besides, the Internet
will be used to promote the political mobilisation of alternative political content when
authoritarian states are incapable or ineffective in controlling the medium.58
Peter Ferdinand in his edited volume, The Internet, Democracy and
Democratization, provides assessments of the Internet's impact in various
sociopolitical settings. This volume looks at issues of political campaigns in the
United States, "virtual" party politics in Germany, the case study of the African
Americans political engagement in the US, anti-modern political movements of the
neo-Nazis in Germany and Taliban in Afghanistan, and the cases of Internet
Kevin A. Hill and John E. Hughes, "Is the Internet an Instrument of Global Democratization?"
Democrati:ation, Vol. 6, No. 2, summer 1999, pp. 99-127.
Michael J. Mazarr, ed., Information Technology and World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002).
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democratisation in Indonesia, Africa and Tibet. Whilst this work suggests that the Net
is unlikely to fundamentally transform politics, many authors in this volume remain
cautiously optimistic about future prospects of Net's repercussion on politics.59
Indrajit Banerjee's edited book Rhetoric & Reality provides a preliminary
critical overview of the actual use of the Internet in political discourse and practices
across nine Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This comprehensive study evaluates the role
and impact of the new media on political systems and structures of Asian countries.
Amongst other things, the regulation and censorship of governments, lower-level of
public access to the new media and the digital divide are identified to have largely
mitigated and influenced the political impact of the Internet in this region.6°
In addition, Jeffrey Winters holds that international media coverage of Indonesia
and the Internet has primary impact at the level of elite politics there. The Internet in
Indonesia serves not only as an alternative source of information, but also as a tool for
civic activism and coordination amongst an increasingly disenchanted opposition in
Indonesia.6 ' Some commentators argue that the Internet's impact upon authoritarian
regimes will consequently heighten political challenges in a crisis. Bruce Bimber, for
example, coins the phrase "accelerated pluralism" to show that the Internet will
facilitate grassroots mobilisation and civic organisation, and it will particularly
Peter Ferdinand, ed., The Internet, Democracy and Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
60 Indrajit Banerjee, ed., Rhetoric & Reality: The Internet Challenge for Democracy in Asia
(Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003).
61 See Jeffrey A. Winters, "The Political Impact of New Information Sources and Technologies in
Indonesia," Ga-ette, Vol. 64, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 109-119. See also David T. Hill and Krishna Sen,
"The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy," Democratization, Vol. 7, No. 1, spring 2000, pp.
119-136.
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accelerate the process of"... an intensification of group-centred, pluralistic politics."62
In other words, the Internet, in Bimber's observation, will accelerate an already
existing process of social pluralism.
H. Revisionist Literature on the Internet's Impact upon Politics
Yet there are counter arguments suggesting that the Internet may not simply function
as a catalyst for democracy and democratisation against authoritarian states. The
so-called revisionist literature that calls into question the conventional wisdom marks
a movement away from the technological determinism that has been the dominant
ethos for several years in Internet studies. Their research has reached a newer level of
sophistication of Internet studies. Central to the revisionist literature is the
fundamental question of whether new technologies such as the Internet may
undermine the power of authoritarian regimes. Instead of challenging or undermining
authoritarian states, the Internet may ironically be used by the state to strengthen its
ruling legitimacy, and thus limit or even prevent political democratic transformations
from taking place.
In Cyberpower, Tim Jordan evaluates several subjects in cyberspace, including
the "virtual" individual, the "virtual" social, and the "virtual" imaginary. One of his
great contributions to the general literature is that he furthers intellectual
understandings about the nature of power in cyberspace. And he demonstrates how
culture and politics are in essence shaped by the Internet. 63 In addition, Andrew
62 Bruce Bimber, "The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accelerated
Pluralism," Polity, Vol. 31, No. 1, Fall 1998, p 156.
63 Tim Jordan, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999).
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Shapiro provides an overview of the control revolution, which is now seriously
affecting almost every aspect of our lives, ranging from individual freedom online to
the limits of freedom imposed by the state and large corporations.TM
Lawrence Lessig builds an analysis of control force over hardware and software
that shape this new medium. Lessig contradicts the popular belief that the Internet
cannot be regulated by investigating how social norms, laws, markets, and physical
architecture have already moulded and affected behaviours both in real space and in
cyberspace. He cautions that the profit-oriented decisions of large software and
entertainment companies are likely to endanger our online privacy and even harm
democratic systems if there is no interference from the government.65 His warnings
relate to his latest work, in which he argues that the Internet appears over-controlled,
legally and technically, and in turn, ordinary people are deprived of the extraordinary
value of freedom.66
In specific country contexts, Garry Rodan investigates the Singaporean state,
revealing that the challenges to electronic media controls, including the Internet, have
been relatively limited and ineffectual. The Singaporean government, he argues, has
not only successfully contained cyberspace within which the reformist groups may be
empowered to form a civil society to organise collective political action to challenge
the "semi-authoritarian" regime, but has also actively refined Internet-related
legislation and promoted the project of a Singaporean "infocommunication hub" to
actively deter potential political threats. The existing structured dependence of the
Andrew L. Shapiro, The Control Revolution: How the Internet Is Putting Individuals in Change and
Changing the World We Know (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999).
65 Lawrence Lessg, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
66 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York:
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state-society relations in Singapore has also reinforced the relative success of the state
in harnessing the Internet for its commercial advantages whilst constraining the
medium's undesirable sociopolitical effects.67
Dismissing the idea of "blind optimism" about the Internet, Shanthi Kalathil and
Taylor Boas provide a critical assessment of the Internet's impact on several
authoritarian states—Egypt, Singapore, Burma, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. The analytical framework in their assessment
consists of four dimensions of Internet uses: civil society, politics and the state, the
economy, and the international sphere. Their comparative studies suggest that the
Internet may not necessarily transform authoritarian regime. The new media may
instead be exploited by the authorities as an effective tool to further strengthen their
governing capability in the information age.68
Nina Hachigian considers the power of the Internet and its relations with
one-party states in East and Southeast Asian—China, Malaysia, Burma, North Korea,
Singapore and Vietnam. Hachigian refutes the commonly held assumption that
one-party states will definitely attempt to contain or control online political activities
for the hope of regimes' continued survival. She argues instead that governments'
Vintage Books, 2002).
67 Garry Rodan, "Embracing Electronic Media But Suppressing Civil Society: Authoritarian
Consolidation in Singapore," The Pacflc Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 503-524. See
also Garry Rodan, "The Internet and Political Control in Singapore," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
113, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 63-89; and Terence Lee, "Internet Use in Singapore: Politics and Policy
Implications," Media International Incorporating Culture andPolicy, Vol. 2003, No. 107, May 2003,
pp. 75-88.
68 See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the
Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2003). Earlier analyses can be found at Shanthi Kalathil, "Dot Corn for Dictators," Foreign Policy, No.
135, March/April 2003, pp. 42-49; Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, "The Internet and State
Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China. Cuba, and the Counterrevolution," First Monday, Vol. 6, No.
8, August 2001, available online at <http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_8/kalathil/index.html >,
accessed on September 4, 2001.
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attitudes towards the Internet use vary in Asia, resulting in no clear conclusion that
can be drawn about what approach will be most effective or successful in promoting
regime longevity. She suggests that those one-party states who embrace the Internet
are not more likely to fail than those that attempt to constrain the medium.69
In summary, much of the literature reviewed above tends to suggest that there is
indeed a potential for the new media to affect politics in general, although there are
cautious voices about how and to what extent the Internet may effectively transform
politics. Much of the work remains in an exploratory and primitive stage that requires
more cases of individual-based literature to help generalise the Net's impact upon
politics. The following section will provide a review of current literature on the
Internet's impact in the Chinese context.
Section II Literature on the Internet's Impact upon China's Political System
The extrapolation of the Internet's political impact has to some extent been inspired
and strengthened by the fall of communism in the Former Soviet Union and East
Central Europe, where the authoritarian communist states were arguably incapable of
reining in the electronic flow of subversive information. 70 Communist China in this
regard serves as an illuminating case that may shed light on the further study of the
Internet's political impact upon still developing and undemocratic nations. It is also
partly because China, like many developing countries, has deepened economic reform
69 Nina Hachigian, "The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States," The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, summer 2002, PP. 41-58. See also Nina Hachigian, "Telecom Taxonomy:
How Are the One Party States of East Asia Controlling the Political Impact of the Internet?" in Junhua
Zhang and Martin Woesler (eds.), China c Digital Dream: The Impact of the Internet on Chinese
Society (Bochum: The University Press Bochum, 2002), pp. 35-67.
70 See, for example, Frank Ellis, From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia New Infosphere (London:
Macmillan Press, 1999).
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and aggressively promoted ICT developments, in the hope of stimulating economic
growth. As a result, much of the literature in the study of the Internet's impact on
China has often focused upon the ambiguity between the Chinese government's
promotion of ICT developments on the one hand, and its vigorous attempt to contain
the arguably inherently democratising impact of the new technologies on the other
hand.
Observers like William Foster, Seymour Goodman and others have provided a
comprehensive overview of technical and infrastructural features of Internet
development in China.7 ' Peter Lovelock presented an earlier account of China's IP
telephony market and the Internet development.72 Xing Fan provided analyses of the
Chinese communication and information sectors, centring on issues of initiatives and
characteristics of the sectors, policy and regulatory frameworks, strategies and foreign
involvement. 73 When comparing Internet development in India and China, Larry
Press and others argue that the Chinese government can accelerate Internet diffusion
by administrative decree rather than consensus building followed by legislative and
' William Foster and Seymour E. Goodman, The Djffusion of the Internet in China (Palo Alto: Center
for International Studies and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2000). See also Wei Lu, Jia Du, Jin
Zhang, Feicheng Ma and Taowen Le, Journal of Information Science, Vol. 28, No. 3, June 2002, pp.
207-224; Jinhong Tang, "Recent Internet Developments in the People's Republic of China: An
overview," Online Information Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, April 2000, pp. 3 16-321; Richard Cullen and
Pinky D. W. Choy, "The Internet in China," Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring
1999, PP. 99-134; Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan, China in the Information Age:
Telecommunications and the Dilemmas of Reform (Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger. 1997),
chapter 5 (pp. 81-99); Hongxin Zhao, "Rapid Internet Development in China: A Discussion of
Opportunities and Constrains on Future Growth," Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 44,
No. 1, January/February 2002, pp. 119-138.
72 Peter Lovelock, China: IP Telephony and the Internet, paper presented at International
Telecommunication Union IP Telephony Workshop in Geneva between June 14-16, 2000, available
online at <http://www.itu.intJosg/spuJni/iptel/countries/chinaJchina-iptel.pdf,  accessed on June 7,
2003.
Xing Fan, Communications and Information in China: Regulatory Issues, Strategic Implications
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001).
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regulatory reform. 74 This has somehow confirmed what Dali Yang has noted, "once
the Chinese leaders became convinced of its significance [in enhancing China's
economic prosperity and growth], they began to play critical roles in unleashing its
potential." Zixiang Tan and others argue that the Chinese government has
maintained a "state-coordinated Internet infrastructure"—a "hierarchy of
responsibility" over the Internet networks, accompanied by a "certain degree of
competition and decentralised decision-making." 76 This has greatly assured that the
Internet development is hardly evolved beyond state control.
Xiudian Dai maintains that the Internet is a double-edged sword for China:
indispensable for economic prosperity but also confronting the Chinese authorities
with unprecedented challenges. To better comprehend the Internet's impact on the
Chinese political system, he suggests it should be examined in a long-term
perspective.77 Jianhai Bi notes that cyberspace power presents the greatest challenge
and threat to the Communist regime. The Chinese government should not
underestimate public opinion as an increasing number of Chinese Internet users are
now empowered by the new technologies to challenge and influence the regime. In
other words, Internet users have indeed compelled the government to pay heed to
what the messages have allegedly said. 78 Ronald Deibert assertively holds that the
[Internet] doors are being opened, and path dependencies created, that cannot
' Larry Press, William Foster, Peter Wolcott and William McHenry, "The Internet in India and
China," Information Technologies and international Development, Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 2003, pp. 4 1-60.
Dali L. Yang, "The Great Net of China," Harvard InternationalReview, Vol. 22, No.4, Winter 2001,
64-69.
6 Zixiang (Alex) Tan, William Foster and Seymour Goodman, "China's State Coordinated Internet
Infrastructure," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 42, No. 6, June 1999, p. 44 & 52.
Xiudian Dai, "Chinese Politics of the Internet: Control and Anti-control," Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 181-191.
78 Jianhai Bi, "The Internet Revolution in China: The Significance for Traditional Forms of
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easily be reversed."79
The work highlighted above nonetheless pays little attention to the
demographics of Internet users in China. A handful of works have empirically
investigated Internet users' behaviour in cyberspace, including their online usage
patterns, attitudes and characteristics. Jonathan Zhu and Zhou He, for example, have
developed a theoretical framework centring on perception, motivation and social
context to account for the adoption and use of the Internet in China. 80 The China
Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC) has on a semi-annual basis released
comprehensive surveys on the development of China's Internet under the
authorisation of the Ministry of Information Industry since October 1997.81 Guo
Liang and Bu Wei, Internet observers based in the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, have also surveyed Internet usage and its impact in several cities in China,
under the auspices of the UCLA World Internet Project and with the Markie
Foundation.82
In addition, some commentators continue to consider the Internet's impact on
Communist Control," International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, summer 2001, pp. 421-441.
' Ronald J. Deibert, "Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and Chinese Security Policy,"
Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 58, no. 1, January 2002, pp. 143-159, and p. 155.
80 Jonathan J. H. Zhu and Zhou He, "Perceived Characteristics, Perceived Needs, and perceived
Popularity: Adoption and Use of the Internet in China," Communication Research, Vol. 29, No. 4,
August 2002, pp. 466-495. In another article, the authors consider how access to the Internet and other
sources of information, perceived credibility of the Internet and conventional media, and cognitive
sophistication relate to value orientations of Chinese Internet users and non-users. See Jonathan J. H.
Zhu and Zhou He, "Information Accessibility, User Sophistication, and Source Credibility: The
Impact of the Internet on Value Orientations in Mainland China," Journal of Computer-Mediated
Communication, Vol. 7, No. 2, available online at <http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol7/issue2/china .
html>, accessed on June 11, 2002.
81 See <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/indexlOE/OO/Il/index.htm >, accessed on June 17, 2004.
82 See Guo Liang and Bu Wei, Hulianwang shiyong _-huangkuangji yingxiang de diao-cha baogao
(Investigative Report on Internet Use and Its Impact), (Beijing: Center for Social Development,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2001), available online at <http://www.chinace.org/itre >,
accessed on September 2, 2001; and Guo Liang, Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Twelve
Chinese Cities (Beijing: Research Center for Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, 2003), available online at <http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/chinainternet_
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China's political development. Geoffry Taubman, for instance, maintains the "built-in
incompatibility" between the Internet and undemocratic regimes. He relates his
contentions to the Chinese context and argues that the pillars of undemocratic rule of
information control are seriously challenged. He holds that the CCP's dominance over
the domestic affairs will be diminished despite the Beijing government implements
stringent censorship measures and regulations to keep online contents or messages
politically reliable.83
A 2001 report from the United States Embassy in Beijing notes that the Internet
is now fundamentally ". . . revolutionising the way [in which] Chinese interact and
communicate." 84 The report sees that as long as China's market economy keeps
developing, the seemingly irreversible trend is that the Internet will become ". . . a
more important, positive force in facilitating the rights of Chinese users to be
informed, and to be heard." 85 In addition, Randy Kluver and Jack Linchuan Qiu
provide snapshots of the Internet's impact on democracy in the PRC. They argue that
the Internet does "...bring a new force into the country and break the traditional
power structure in which previously media regulators exerted omnipresent control."86
usage.pdf, accessed on October 2, 2003.
S3 Geoffry Taubman, "A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to
Nondemocratic Rule," Political Communication, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 1998, pp. 255-272. See also
Geoffry L. Taubman, "Keeping Out the Internet? Non-Democratic Legitimacy and Access to the
Web," First Monday, Vol. 7, No. 9, September 2002, available online at <http://www.firstmonday.org/
issues/issue7_9/taubman/index.html>, accessed on June 13, 2003.
84 Embassy Beijing, Kids, Cadres And "Cultists" All Love It: Growing Influence Of The
Internet in China, March 2001, available online at <http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/
sandtlnetoverview.html>, accessed on June 12, 2004. There are two more reports published by the U.S.
Embassy Beijing, one in 2000, and another 1998.
Ibid. See also American Embassy Beijing, China's Internet "information Skirmish," available
online at <http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/webwar.htm >; American Embassy Beijing, PRC
Internet: Cheapter More Popular and More Chinese, available online at <http://www.usembassy-
china.gov/english/sandt/Inetcawb.htm>, both accessed on February 12, 2001.
86 Randy Kluver and Jack Linchuan Qiu, "China, the Internet and Democracy," in Indrajit Banerji (ed.),
Rhetoric & Reality: The Internet Challenge for Democracy in Asia, p. 54.
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Xiguang Li, a Beijing-based media scholar, even holds that the Internet and associated
online forums and chatrooms have changed the fundamental flows of news and
information in China, resulting in the increased inability of the party-controlled press
and media to set the public agenda and shape public opinion.87
Li's claim has generally reflected upon the concerns shared by Chinese media
scholars about the Internet's unfavourable influence over "thought work" in China.88
There are, nevertheless, few domestic Internet studies addressing the Internet's impact
upon China's politics. It is a stark contrast when compared with the ample studies on
electronic commerce and Internet technical development in China. One of the few
official works on the Internet's impact on politics in China is a two-volume
publication edited by China Central Television (CCTV), which acknowledges the
rising power of the new medium, and most importantly, urges a greater degree of
social responsibility from Internet media practitioners. 89 Additionally, the
recommendation during the third Forum on Network Media held in Beijing in
87 Xiguang Li and Xuan Qin, "Shei Zai Shezhi Jintian de Yicheng?—Dianzi Luntan zai Zhongda
Xinwen Shijian zhong dui Dangbao Yiti de Chonggou,"(Who Is Setting Chinese Agenda?—Impact of
Online Chatroom on Party Press) in Li Xiguang and Zhao Xinshu (ed.), Meiti de Liliang (The Power
of Media) (Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2002), pp. 156-169; Xiguang Li, "ICT and the Demise of
Propaganda in China," Global Media Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2002, available online at
<http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/
ccalgmj/SubmittedDocuments/archivedpapers/Fa112003/pdf_filesflnternet%2oand%2odemocracy(xi
guang).pdf, accessed on June 2, 2004; Xiguang Li, Xuan Qin and Randolph Kluver, "Who Is Setting
the Chinese Agenda?—The Impact of Online Chatrooms on Party Press in China," in K. C. Ho,
Randolph Kluver and Kenneth C. C. Yang (eds.), Asia.com: Asia Encounters the Internet (London and
New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 143-158.
88 See Jian Wang and Zhuoying Li, "Hulianwang dui Sixiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo de Yingxiang ji
Duice" (The effects of the Internet on political thought work and its strategies), Changbai Xuekan
(Changbai Journal), Vol. 2001, No. 2, February 2001, pp. 20-22; Haiguang Xie, ed., Hulianwangyu
Sixiang Zhenghi Gonguo Gailun (Introduction to The Internet and political thought work),
(Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000); Haiguang Xie, ed., Hulianwang yu Sixiang Zheng:hi
Gong:uo Anli (Case Studies of The Internet and political thought work), (Shanghai: Fudan University
Press, 2002); Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China: State Power versus the Internet," in Louise Williams and
Roland Rich (eds.), Losing Control: Freedom of the Press in Asia (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press at the
Australian National University, 2000), pp. 37-57.
89 Lianxi Liu, ed., Jueqi de Liliang: Zhongguo Wangluo Meiti, 1995-2003, Volume I & II (The Rising
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October 2003 was highlighted in the "Beijing Declaration" that particularly stressed
media's social responsibility.90
Meanwhile, Wenfu Liu has introduced a number of concepts in relation to
Internet politics but with little reference to the actual situations in China. 9 ' Similarly,
Chuangang Chen and Yongliang Xie present an introductory discussion on political
security in the Internet age, including cyber nationalism and terrorism, religious
online activism, and cyber culture clash. 92 It is striking, but perhaps not surprising,
how much domestic studies have avoided the Chinese context except for the themes
that are basically in line with the government's policies, such as the clampdown on
online activism of the Falun Gong. 93 Nevertheless they mention in passing that
Chinese Internet research is increasingly integrated into worldwide Internet media
studies. This opens the door to more political-neutral and policy-oriented research
themes.94 Weixing Chen, for instance, has addressed the impact of the Internet on
social development, such as Internet pornography, "virtual" communities, and digital
divide issues.95
Moreover, Junhua Zhang looks at Internet use by the Chinese government. He
Power: China Internet Media, 1995-2003) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2003).
90 The forum focuses on the social responsibility of Internet media. The Declaration urges that under
the market economy, the Internet has to make a balance between commercial interests and social
responsibility.
Wenfu Liu, Wangluo Zheng:hi: Wangluo Shehuiyu Guoj ia ZhiIi (Internet Politics: Network Society
and State Governance) (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2002).
92 Chuangang Chen and Yongliang Xie, Wangluo Shidai de ZhenghiAnquan (Political Security in the
Age of the Internet) (Zhengzhou: Zhongyuan Nongmin Press, 2000).
See, for example, Hanqi Fang, "Falungong yu Hulianwang" (Falun Gong and the Internet), Xinwen
yu Chuanbo Yanjiu (Journalism and Communication Studies), Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2002, pp. 1-12.
See, for instance, Jie Lu, Wangluo Shidai de Xinxi Anquan (The Information Security in the Age of
the Internet) (Zhengzhou: Zhongyuan Nongmin Press, 2000); Yuanzheng Luo and Baowen Jiao,
Zhongguo Dian-i ZhengJii de Tansuo yu Shian (The Explorations and Practices of Electronic
Government in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Press, 2003).
Weixing Chen, ed., Wangluo Chuanbo yu Shehul Fahan (Internet Communication and Social
Development) (Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, 2001).
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argues that the implementation of electronic government project is an integral part of
China's recent modernisation and informatisation efforts. It is also designed to
maintain "technical legitimacy," aiming to boost economic prosperity and thus
extensively improve the general public's living standards. Zhang holds that the
introduction of e-government will in the long term inevitably lead to a breakthrough
in both the political system as well as in the citizens' and governmental thinking and
behaviour. He is yet cautiously optimistic in claiming that e-government has the
possibility to accelerate the process of a peaceful revolution.96
Guobin Yang presents discourse analysis of the online forum Qiangguo Luntan
(Strong Country Forum), and a cyber-ethnographic study of Huaxia Zhiqing (Chinese
Educated Youth). Yang argues that the Internet and civil society co-evolve in the
Chinese context. In his presentations he states that whilst the Internet offers newer
possibilities for facilitating the rise of civil society through mass participation, civil
society in turn reshapes the Internet development and accordingly enables citizens
and societal organisations to effectively interact and communicate in the
cyberspace.97
Christopher Marsh and Laura Whalen note that the Internet and cyberspace
allow for a new and unique form of social organisation to be generated online, dubbed
Junhua Zhang, "Will the Government 'Serve the People'? The Development of Chinese
E-government," New Media & Society, Vol.4, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 163-184; Junhua Zhang, "China's
'Government Online' and Attempts to Gain Technical Legitimacy," ASIEN, July 2001, available
online at <http://web.syr.edu/—ztan/Gov2.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2001; Junhua Zhang, "A
Critical Review of the Development of Chinese e-Government," Perspective, Vol. 3, No. 7, December
2002, available online at <http://www.oycf.orgfPerspectives/1  9_I 231 02/eGovernment.htm>,
accessed on February 15, 2003.
Guobin Yang, "The Co-evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 43,
No. 3, May 2003, pp. 405-422. See also Guobin Yang, "The Internet and Civil Society in China: A
Preliminary Assessment," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36, August 2003, pp.
453-475.
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"e-capital." Given that Internet use in China is not yet widespread, they are optimistic
in believing that current Internet users have already undermined state control and
contributed to the forming of a civil society in China. He believes the Internet's
political impact will be likely realised in the future. 98 Kathleen Hartford, nonetheless,
wan-is us that incomplete Internet control does not necessarily spell greater freedom in
China. The assertions between Internet's subjection to government control and
Internet's democratisation effects will be decided ultimately by the Internet users
rather than by the technology itself
Furthermore, there are a number of articles discussing regulation and control of
the Internet in China with regard to the political implications of the medium)°° For
example, Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark demonstrate the evolutionary development
of political control over Internet infrastructure and content in China. They argue that
government control over the physical network and contents come from their intention
to tap the lucrative Internet industry.' 0 ' Assafa Endeshaw describes the dilemmas of
Internet regulation in China as a ". . . never-ending cat and mouse game." He maintains
that China's crackdown on the Internet will only shorten the days of the
Christopher Marsh and Laura Whalen, "The Internet, e-Social Capital, and Democratization in
China," American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 2000, pp. 61-81.
w Kathleen Hartford, "Cyberspace with Chinese Characteristics," Current History, Vol. 99, No. 638,
September 2000, pp. 255-262.
For an overview of China's Internet regulation, see, for example, Greg Walton, China Golden
Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People Republic of
China, The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2001, available
online at <http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/goldenShieldEng.html >,
accessed on March 12, 2002; Reporters Without Borders, The Internet under Surveillance: Obstacles
to the Free Flow of Information Online, 2003, available online at <http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/
doc-2236.pdf', accessed on December 2, 2003; and Lokman Tsui, "The Panopticon as the Antithesis
of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet in China," China Information, Vol. 17,
No. 2, 2003, pp. 65-82.
'°' Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark, "Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political Control over
Network Infrastructure and Content," Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3, May/June 2001, pp. 377-408.
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dictatorship.'°2 Daniel Lynch also presents an overview of Internet control pertaining
to propaganda in China, focusing on ways in which Internet users can circumvent
government cyberwalls to access foreign Internet sites. 103 Anne-Marie Brady,
however, holds that current Chinese propaganda work has incorporated innovative
approaches like the Internet to strengthen the work of preserving the positive images
of the Party and government, and effectively "regiment the public mind." 104 Still,
Jason Lacharite claims that digital censorship in China is vulnerable, and can be seen
as "nothing more than a reactive attempt to control an information medium that is
typically beyond absolute control."°5
Yet there are works raising deep concern of the government's rigorous control
over the Internet medium when judging the Internet's impact in China. For example,
Michael Chase and James Mulvenon reveal new forms of countermeasures by the
Beijing government against Internet challenges to its rule, ranging from Internet
hacking to brute intimidation. These are sophisticated strategies of Internet censorship
and regulations, which has proved relatively successful in containing various
sociopolitical dissident groups within and outside China, such as the Falun Gong and
various human rights organisations.'° 6 Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman of
the Berkman Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School present one of the
102 Assafa Endeshaw, "Internet Regulation in China: The Never-Ending Cat and Mouse Game,"
Information & Communications TechnologyLaw, Vol. 13,No. 1, March 2004, pp.41-57.
'° Daniel C. Lynch, "Dilemmas of 'Thought Work' in Fin-de-Siecle China," The China Quarterly,No.
157, March 1999, Pp. 173-201.
'° Anne-Marie Brady, "Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernization of Propaganda in the
PRC," International Journal, Vol. 57,No. 4, autumn 2002, pp. 563-578.
'° Jason Lacharite, "Electronic Decentralization in China: A Critical Analysis of Internet Filtering
Policies in the People's Republic of China," Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 2,
July 2002, pp. 336-345, esp. 345.
106 Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the
Internet and Being 'S Counter-Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).
57
few quantitative surveys of the scope of Chinese government's blocking. Their
technical focus on Internet filtering in China shows that more than 10 per cent of
studied Web sites are regularly blocked) 07 Wenzhao Tao provides a quantitative
estimate of Internet censorship rate by looking at Qiangguo Luntan. The internal data
he acquired shows that the censorship rate was between 1 and 2.5 per cent of those
posted messages that were blocked and weeded out in the period from September
1999 until August 2000.108 Jack Linchuan Qiu argues that the Beijing government has
exerted a wide range of regulatory constraints upon online political communication,
and indeed transformed the Internet to serve their expected interests. The "virtual
censorship" imposed on the Internet is, in his observation, limiting the liberalising
impact of the new medium upon China's politics.'09
Nina Hachigian argues that the three-pronged strategies of the CCP to maintain
its authority in an increasingly networked society—sustaining economic growth and
some personal freedoms, managing the negative impact of the Internet, and
harnessing the Internet's commercial potential—have proved relatively effective and
successful. Instead of becoming a political threat, she holds that the Internet is in fact
strengthening the Party's rule at least in the short term. Yet, she also acknowledges the
Internet's power to galvanise anti-party sentiment on a large scale in the wake of
politico-economic crises when the Internet penetration is potentially far more
107 Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China,
available online at <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/>, accessed on March 5, 2004.
08 Wenzhao Tao, "Censorship and Protest: The Regulation of BBS in China People Daily," First
Monday, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2001, available online at <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues-
issue6_l /tao/index.html>, accessed on March 8, 2001.
09 Jack Linchuan Qiu, "Virtual Censorship in China: Keeping the Gate between the Cyberspaces,"
International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, No. 4, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 1-25.
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pervasive in the longer term.110 Yuezhi Zhao and Dan Schiller note that whilst China
is continuously assimilating jtO an evolving transnational network of electronic
capitalism, the digital divide between the well-off urban elites and the countryside
disenfranchised, together with cumulative efforts of political censorship on the Net,
have not yet fanned the flames of freedom in China.'11
Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas maintain that the state has, on the one hand,
successfully harnessed the Internet to limit its undesirable sociopolitical impact, and
on the other hand, utilised it to serve the state's imposed agendas and interests.
Meanwhile, a series of rigorous Internet measures and regulations are also
implemented to ensure that the Net's impact is not beyond state's control. On the basis
of their four-tier framework for research, i.e., Internet use in the civil societal, political,
economic, and international spheres, they conclude that "Internet use is unlikely to
launch the dawning of a new political age in China." 112 An article by Shanthi Kalathil
specifically examines the interplay between Internet entrepreneurs and the Chinese
state in the information age. She notes that Internet businesspeople in China have to
respond to the growing market demand for timely news and information. In the
meantime, they need to closely co-operate with the Beijing government to provide
information that is deemed politically reliable by the authorities. Contradicting the
conventional wisdom in which the rise of autonomous and self-interests business
elites are believed to bring forth a civil society, she argues that foreign and domestic
110 Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp.
118-133.
Yuezhi Zhao and Dan Schiller, "Dances with Wolves? China's Integration into Digital Capitalism,"
Info, Vol.3, No. 2, April2001, pp. 137-15 1.
Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet
on Authoritarian Rule, p. 42.
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Internet companies are likely to play a rather limited role in promoting political
liberalisation. She explains it is largely because the central government prevails in
pre-emptive strategies, compounded by the Internet entrepreneurs' stance of
self-censorship and their cooperative measures vis-à-vis the state over information
they provide)'3
Christopher Hughes and Gudrun Wacker present a book-length treatment calling
into question the conventional wisdom associated with sociology of technology,
dubbed "technological determinism," which was reinvigorated from the 1990s in the
wake of proliferation of ICTs. Their original intention was to assess the political and
economic impact of ICTs on Chinese society on the one hand, and to examine the
prospects for achieving digital economic "leapfrogging" on the other hand. They
appear sceptical of the "wishful" wisdom, arguing there is ". . . little evidence to
support the thesis that the Chinese state is being eroded in any special way by
ICTs." 4 Instead, they suggest that States across the globe have been relatively
succeeded in harnessing this new medium. Investigating the atrocities committed
against ethnic Chinese during the riots that swept Indonesia in May 1998 as a case
study, Christopher Hughes finds that popular campaigns on the Internet have to date
been closely associated with online nationalism. In his argument, the Chinese
cyberspace is increasingly becoming an important venue for nationalist activities,
rather than a cyberspace breeding liberal democracy that is widely wished by
outsiders. In other words, he is suspicious about the claim that the spread of the
" Shanthi Kalathil, "China's New Media Sector: Keeping the State in," The Pacf/Ic Review, Vol. 16,
No.4, December 2003, pp. 489-501.
14 Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China and the Internet: Politics and the Digital
Leap Forward (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 2.
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Internet will necessarily lead to the path of political democratisation." 5 Randy Kluver
has also examined the 2001 Sino-US crisis over the crash of an American spy plane
with a Chinese fighterjet. He observers that the subsequent Chinese-US cyberwarfare
exemplifies that "the Internet is as conducive to increasing hostility [of extremist
nationalist sentiment] as it is to peacemaking."6
In summary, the literature review has critically helped identif' the research
agendas in this dissertation that will be further examined in the chapters to come:
First, is the Internet censorship in China foolproof or porous? If the latter, how
and to what extent will the incomplete Internet control over the medium bring about
political impact on the political systems in China?
Secondly, is it a valid statement as claimed by Shanthil Kalathil and others that
foreign and domestic Internet entrepreneurs are likely to play a rather limited role in
bringing forth a civil society to China?
Thirdly, as argued by Nina Hachigian and others the Internet may augment its
own ability to impact political system in China in the wake of a major political and
socioeconomic crisis. It is important to test whether the Net's impact is greater in
those contingent incidents such as the spy plane collision incident rather than in
non-contingent events such as the various congresses?
Fourthly, is the "digital divide" a crucial factor that affects and explains the
political impact of the Internet in a populous country like China where inequality in
Christopher R. Hughes, "Nationalism in Chinese Cyberspace," Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 8, No.2, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 195-206.
116 Randy Kiuver, "New Media and the End of Nationalism: China and the U.S. in a War of Words,"
Mots Pluriels, No. 18, August 2001, available online at <http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPlurielsl
MP1801ak.html>, accessed on January 12, 2002. See also Jack Linchuan Qiu, "Chinese Opinions
Collide On-line: U.S.-China Plane Collision Sparks Civil Discussion on the Web," On-line Journalism
Review, April 12, 2001, available online at <http://ojr.usc.edu/contentistory.cfm?id  561>, accessed
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terms of access to information technologies is obvious?
Finally, has the Chinese cyberspace so far been linked largely to sentiments of
nationalism as argued by Christopher Hughes and others?
Section III Methodological Issues Concerning the Reliability of
"Information" and "Knowledge" on the Internet
With the widespread usage of the World Wide Web (WWW), the Internet has
increasingly developed into an alterative hub of source of information and reference
in addition to traditional models. As Peter Ferdinand observes, individual user can
now surf the Web and acquire a great deal of information without physically going to
a library. It implies it is now relatively easy to secure and retrieve information as one
goes online. Yet he also notes that the problems of the reliability of information are
often being underestimated, given the wealth of information in Indeed,
as Alan Jarman sees it, ". . .the concept of reliability is beginning to take on new
meaning as Information Technology becomes pervasive in both the private and public
sectors." 118 This issue ought to be addressed and deserves more attention.
In other words, the issues of reliability of electronic information and knowledge
on the Internet have particular saliency which is largely induced by the growing
availability of on-line information. As noted, there are a number of reasons why
Internet systems can usually have limited reliability, including errors on Web pages,
on April 20, 2001.
II? Peter Ferdinand, "The Internet, Democracy and Democratization," Democrat i:ation, Vol. 7, No. 1,
September 2000, p. 2.
s Alan Jarman, "Reliability' Reconsidered: A Critique of the HRO-NAT Debate," Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2001, p. 98. See also Richard A. Spinello,
"Information Integrity," in Duncan Langford (ed.), Internet Ethics (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.
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errors with search engines, ontological differences, asymmetric knowledge between
database users and developers, developers' motives, limited resources and expertise,
limited accountability and changes in referenced pages.'19
In the meantime, given the ways in which information is communicated,
accessed and disseminated is changing in the information technology age, it needs to
be critically pointed out that information is not necessarily transferable into
knowledge. With information flowing relatively more freely in cyberspace than in the
conventional media, attention and emphasis ought to shift gradually away from
acquiring and/or administering archives or databases to managing knowledge. It is not
only becoming a pressing agenda within industrial democracies, but also authoritarian
regimes like Communist China.
Whilst the administration of archives and databases has to do with acquiring,
assessing, searching, retrieving, storing and indexing documents/files records,
knowledge management raises a bigger intellectual challenge. It is primarily because
knowledge concerns the realising, rationalising and comprehending processes from
information secured in a way that eventually could help and support to make a
rightful/optimal decision and/or prevent any previous failures from taking place again.
As Gordon Graham puts it:
In the expression "digital information" the word "information" is used in its barest
sense and means no more than a set of electronic impulses which can be made to
produce text and images on a screen. Information in this technical sense has no
epistemological implications: it does not imply that such information conveys any
174- 176.
Daniel E. O'Leary, "Internet-based Information and Retrieval Systems," Decision Support System,
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genuine knowledge. This is what makes it misleading, because in normal speech
"information" is an epistemologically normative term. to be newly possessed of
information implies that we now know something we did not know before. But "digital
information" can store misinformation in the ordinary sense as much as it can store the
truth, so that the text or image it generates may be wholly misleading and produce
erroneous belief rather than knowledge.'2°
On the other hand, knowledge does carry some weight and matters a lot particularly
when a country is increasingly networked by the power of globalisation and
information technology. Nazli Choucri argues that knowledge-networking has
resulted in two mutually reinforcing dual outcomes: globalisation of knowledge via
greater diffusion and localisation of knowledge via presentation. Above all,
"...the diffusion of knowledge-networking practices now makes it possible to engage in
multidirectional and multiparly interaction (that is, top-down as well as bottom-up) and
enables the flow of knowledge generated bottom-up into domains at the top, both within
and across societies that greatly enhance inputs into decisions. ,,121
In summary, the Internet has enhanced both the mobility of information and
sophistication of information management in the networked environment, which in
turn inevitably augment difficulties involved in managing and assuring the reliability
of information. As Gordon Graham has suggested, "The Internet is a valuable source
of knowledge and information only in so far as we are able to subject what we find on
it to all the normal checks we customarily use in the case of other sources." And it is in
Vol. 27, No. 3, December 1999, pp. 320-322.
'° Gordon Graham, The Internet: A Philosophical Inquiry (London and New York: Routledge, 1999),
p. 89.
121 Nazli Choucri, "Introduction: CyberPolitics in International Relations," International Political
Science Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2000, p. 259.
64
essence that "Internet is as reliable and as unreliable as the sources from which it
comes." 22 It is, as a result, important to understand that information provided by the
Internet technology is not synonymous with reliability, nor can information be
naturally translated into knowledge.
In view of the critical role in ensuring reliable information in cyberspace, some
intellectual deliberations are instrumental, if not necessary, in better comprehending
the Internet technology in general and shedding light on further Internet-based
research in particular. This section will not go into details about the philosophical
debates associated with issues of ontological and epistemological meanings of
"information," "truth" and "knowledge." Instead, it is mainly concerned with
methodological issues related to the reliability of information on the Internet with
special reference to messages posted in cyber chat rooms in China.
A. Building a "Reliable" Networking Information Environment in Cyberspace
To begin with, a noticeable feature of electronically held "information" or "data" 23 is
its high volatility. In general, information changes on a daily, weekly or monthly basis,
depending on the management and maintenance of a particular Web site. In the case of
Chinese cyber chat rooms, information (literally, posted messages) piles up daily.
Keeping the maximum accurate and detailed records of the online messages may help
establish a knowledge base of reliable information for ongoing and future study.
122 Gordon Graham, The Internet: A Philosophical Inquiry, p. 91.
123 There is no broadly accepted definition of the terms of "information" and "data." For the purposes
of this dissertation, "data" means a representation of facts, concepts or instructions in a formalised
manner suitable for communication, interpretation or processing by human beings or by automatic
means. "Information" is the meaning assigned to data by means of conventions applied to that data.
See OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems: Towards A Culture of Security (Paris:
OECD, 2002), available online at <http://www.oecd.org/documentil 9/0,2340,en_2649_34255_
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Considering the convenience of conducting Web-oriented research and for the
purpose of information verification, it is crucially important to archive/save or print
the messages/information that is being studied, other than creating bookmarks. This is
to guarantee researchers against all loss of messages if the particular piece of
information disappears and/or weeded out at a later time for whatever reasons. After
all, a researcher is still able to retrieve and (re)locate datalinformation from his or her
archival database and use or quote the information needed in the research project.' 24 It
is especially valuable and expedient when doing Internet research in China since the
government may single out specific messages/information deemed subversive and
provocative and delete them as a result.
Secondly, visiting Web sites or topical chat rooms on a regular basis is required
for the sake of consistency and stability in data collection within the research period.
This should maximise the integrity and accuracy of information collected as identical
collecting time and procedures are employed. This can in turn help ensure that the
information used can be checked for accuracy. It is essential that the collection of
information/data be carried out in similar and defined ways. Procedures for data
collection that are not clearly defined may be inconsistent and result in erroneous
outcomes. In the Chinese context, because the Web masters are held responsible for
1815059_i 19820_i_i_I, 00.html>, accessed on June 25, 2004.
24 Ananda Mitra and Mitra Cohen have also reminded us that because of impermanence of the
messages/texts studied in cyberspace, the researcher should retain records of the texts being examined.
They held that even though there might be traces left as saved files and/or hard copies, the text
(message) is without much meaning if it cannot be accessed by anyone on the Web. The researcher has
little control of this process, other than making it clear in the analysis that the result of the analysis is a
snapshot of cyberspace. Given the textual characteristic, they suggest two principal solutions: first, the
research needs to demonstrate that a trace of the text/message was maintained; and second, the
researcher needs to be able to dei-nonstrate that the implications of the text's disappearance were
considered. See Ananda Mitra and Mitra Cohen, "Analyzing the Web: Directions and Challenges," in
Steve Jones (ed.), Doin,' internet 1?c.vearch: Critical Issues and Methods for Examining the Net
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any messages and information appearing on their Web pages, they usually adopt a
policy to monitor online messages and censor "inappropriate" opinions. It is thus vital
for a researcher to check and visit the studied Web site(s) on a regular basis so as to
minimise the data collection variations, chiefly because we may never know when the
Web site moderators delete messages. On the other hand, a researcher usually cannot
non-stop surf and observe the complete online activities during the research period. In
this regard, adopting an acceptable measure seems both methodologically necessary
and beneficial.
Thirdly, as far as reliability of information gleaned in cyberspace is concerned,
the issue "...has to do with the reproducibility of the result, and marks the degree to
which a given procedure for transforming a concept into a variable: producing the
same results in tests repeated with the same empirical tools (stability) or equivalent
ones (equivalence)." 2 Anton Vedder and Robert Wachbroit have contended that
researchers need to distinguish "content" and "pedigree" criteria of reliability.
Whereas "content criteria," also known as primary epistemic criteria, mean ". . .the
conditions or criteria of reliability that are a function of the content of the information
itself," the "pedigree criteria," also known as secondary epistemic criteria, is ". . . the
conditions or criteria of reliability that are a function of the source of the
information." 26 To be specific, the content criterion includes two categories of
criteria: criteria of evidence and logical criteria. Whilst the criteria of evidence imply
that whether some information is reliable will ultimately depend upon the available
(Thousand Oaks and London: Sage. 1999), p. 198.
125 Piergiorgio Corbetta, Social Research: Theory, Methods and Techniques (London and Thousand
Oaks: Sage, 2003), translated from the Italian by Bernard Patrick, p. 81.
26 Anton Vedder and Robert Wahbroit, "Reliability of Information on the Internet: Some
67
evidence and how that evidence supports the information, the logical criteria means
that if some information is inconsistent or even entails an absurdity, then the
information cannot or should not be trusted and used. On the other hand, "pedigree
criteria" are usually established by the third party which is intermediary
credibility-conferred by institutions, mostly academic institutions and persons, and
partly by newspaper and journal organisations.' 27 The two approaches shed light on
clarifying discussions on the topic of reliability of information on the Internet and
facilitate how to measure it. In summary, people who are experts in or at least
somewhat familiar with the field or subject of the information may use the primary
criteria. On the other hand, people may have to turn to secondary criteria if there are
no signs of authoritative sources or the credibility of intermediaries is in question.'28
Internet users need to cultivate critical and robust thinking when assessing the quality
of information in
Last of all, the information, data or messages on a particular Web site may
usually have an economic and/or sociopolitical agenda. This may be found in
cyberspaces of Western democracies, but is much more frequent in the cyberspaces of
authoritarian regimes such as China. Take Qiangguo Luntan for instance. Whilst in
large part, extremely pro-government and Party points of view will be aired, a band of
Distinctions," Ethics and Information Technology, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003, p. 212.
127 Ibid., pp. 212-213.
128 Vedder, "Reliat!ity of Information," in Frances S. Grodzinsky, Richard A. Spinello and
Herman T. Tavani (eds.), Computer Ethics in the Post-September 11 World: Proceedings for Computer
Ethics Philosophical Enqni,y (Boston: Boston College, 2003), pp. 144-157, available online at
<http://rechten.uvt. nl/veUder/Docs/vcdderboston.pdf, accessed on May 2, 2004.
129 Vedder raises concerns about the problem that the second criteria mentioned above cannot easily be
applied to information on the Internet, and, therefore, a serious ethical reflection is called for to come
to terms with it. See Anton Vedder, "Misinformation through the Internet: Epistemology and Ethics,"
in Anton Vedder (ed.), EiIl/s and the Internet (Antwerpen-Groningen and Oxford: Intersentia, 2001),
p. 129, available online at <http://rechten.uvt.nh/vedder/Docs/wrdreli.pdf,  accessed on May 2, 2004.
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opposite extremist opinions might also be seen, even though it is just for a short while.
Not only the remaining messages located in the middle of the political spectrum are
meaningful, but the extreme views expressed in the political spectrum have certain
implications as well. The overall online messages demonstrate a significant yet often
overlooked cyber phenomenon—a hidden sociopolitical agenda, which is an
unprecedented indication in the mainstream of Internet culture in China.
Consequently, it is usually critical to bear in mind that when evaluating information
found on the Internet, the author's motivation for placing the specific
information/message on the Net must always be considered, even if it is usually
impossible conclusiv&y to determine what it is. Besides, it is also crucial to be alert
when examining who is the provider of the "information" (or message), and what
their opinion or bias night be. Partly it is because cyberspace is becoming an ideal
venue where the virtual identity of participants is usually anonymous and it is partly
growing to be a prime sociopolitical marketing and advertising tool. In a word, in the
light of these methodological concerns, online characteristics are open to highly
"interpretative" use of' information and messages, and hence a researcher needs to be
heedful of hiddenlexpiicit sociopolitical agenda behind information and data when
researching information and opinions found on the Internet.
B. Strategies to Tackle Problems Associated with Cyber Research in the
Chinese ConicU
First, since the messacs posted online are highly volatile, particularly when they are
"inappropriate" opinions, it is important to check and visit the studied Web site on a
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regular basis during the research period. During the various congresses of the CCP,
NPC and CPPCC, the author paid regular visits to the Qiangguo Luntan twice a day:
9:30'-i 1:30 AM and 1 :00-2:00 PM in GMT (Greenwich Mean Time). (The Forum is
open to the public to post messages from lOAM to 10PM, China time.) The main
reason for adhering to these time slots is that it is virtually impossible to observe the
online messages at all time, so it seems methodologically acceptable to adopt a
procedure of identical visiting time. It was designed to minimise the data collection
variations.
Secondly, when visiting the studied Web site, the posted messages as well as
Web pages were archived, lest some of them might be deleted for whatever reason.
This would ensure that the obtained data could be checked for accuracy and
authenticity in the future. When referring to a specific piece of information, a relevant
Web site is provided together with the date visited. As noted, "...it is always important
to date references to websites..." because ". . . it would be possible for an unscrupulous
researcher to attempt to make false claims."130
Thirdly, in practice, it is more likely when doing Internet research in China to use
pedigree criteria for bulletin board discussions chiefly because the messages are
usually neither easily judged by common-sense nor by the specification of logical
reasoning. The contributors to bulletin boards mostly adopt noms de plume and some
even float ideas that they do not themselves necessarily completely believe in. 131 A
130 Peter Burnharn, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics
(New York: Paigrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 190.
131 Caroline Straathof, "New Media and Democracy: Case Studies—China," Are the New Media Good
for Democracy?—Media Round Table Report (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2001), pp. 24-25,
available online at <ttp://www.idea.intJ2001_forum/media/mrtpapers/round_table_report.pdf,
accessed on May 15, 2002.
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researcher with fluent Chinese proficiency is indispensable and with the cyber culture
against the backdrop of China's political traditions is a plus in order to better
comprehend and read between the lines of the online messages. It is, as a result,
reasonable to use the pedigree criteria in determining the reliability of the studied data
and information.'32
Fourthly, the messages posted online may usually have a sociopolitical agenda. It
is especially true in the Chinese cyberspace where there is a widespread online
censorship under China's political traditions. It thus makes it more difficult and even
complicated to judge precisely what views that were posted online are noteworthy,
since an outside researcher is usually barred from access to Netizens' credentials and
their motivation when engaging in the cyber activities. Still, the nuanced wording and
the context within his or her view may suggest a hidden agenda.
This literature review chapter has critically contributed to the overall
development of this dissertation primarily by identifying the research agenda that I set
out to do in this project. This is clearly stated at the end of the first section of this
chapter. In chapter 3, I will first investigate the Internet governance in China, laying
the foundation for the future discussions of the Internet's impact upon China's
political system.
132 It should be acknowledged that it is still difficult for a researcher to judge Internet users' pedigree if
they use assumed names.
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Chapter 3 Governing the Internet in China
Section I	 The Introduction of the Internet into China and Its Diffusion
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is now an integral part of the
whole realm of human activities. Manuel Castells notes that we have seen that ICT is
(re)shaping the material basis of society at an accelerated pace. He argues that the new
information-centred technological revolution is now fundamentally altering every
aspect of our lives.' In other words, it seems we live in a world, that in the expression
of Nicholas Negroponte, has become "digital."2 In another work, Castells goes on to
describe work the specific role of the Internet as "the fabric of our lives," adding that,
"... f information technology is the present-day equivalent of electricity in the industrial
era, in our age the Internet could be likened to both the electrical grid and the electric
engine because of its ability to distribute the power of information throughout the entire
realm of human activity. "
This chapter does not, however, suggest that technology absolutely determines social
activity, nor does the realm of society and politics condition the entire course of
technological change. Instead, it is likely to be a two-way interaction between the
technology and sociopolitical development.
In the Chinese context, as mainland China is gearing up to transform its economy
from central planning into one of the world's key IT-driven economies, it provides a
crucial test case for other like-minded regimes—Vietnam and North Korea,
particularly—as to the ways in which governments may handle the threat or grasp the
'Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), second edition, p. 1.
2	 Negroponte, Being Digital (London: Coronet Book/Nodder & Stoughton, 1995).
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economic opportunities from cyberspace. As Hu Angang, a renowned Chinese
scholar, enthusiastically holds, China, under economic globalisation, ought to adopt
the knowledge-driven strategy as its most significant national development approach
in the twenty-first century. He explains that the application of ICTs can not only
"bridge the divide between China and developed countries in terms of knowledge
development, but also shrink the digital gap between hinterland and coastal China."4
To date, Internet access has been expanding rapidly and extensively chiefly due to
direct support and promotion by the Chinese government. As we may observe in the
recent semi-annual survey report on the development of China's Internet, released by
the quasi-official China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC), the estimated
total number of Internet users by January 2004 was 80 million, the world's second
largest Internet market after the United States.5 Table 3.1 illustrates this.
Undeniably the Chinese government has acted as a vital driving force for
boosting Internet and e-commerce diffusion. Anyhow, such an amazing achievement
within a rather short period of time coincides with Dali Yang's argument that,
although China is a latecomer to the Internet world, the government can act swiftly to
play a key part in unleashing the Internet's economic potential.6
Table 3.1 Internet Growth in China
Computer	 Internet Users Domain Names Web Sites 	 International
1-losts	 (.cn)	 Bandwidth (1
Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 1.
Hu Angang, Zhongguo Zhanlue Goux fang (Strategy of China) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin
Chubanshe, 2002), p. 15.
See <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2004/02/03/2114.htm >, accessed on March 2, 2004.
6 Dali L. Yang, "The Great Net of China," Harvard Internati onal Review, Vol.22, No.4, winter 2001,
p. 65.
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Nov 1997 299,000
	
620,000	 4,066	 1,500	 18.64
July 1998 542,000	 11,750,000	 9,415	 3,700	 84.64
Jan. 1999
	 747,000	 2,100,000	 18,396	 5,300	 143
Ju1y 1999 1,460,000	 4,000,000	 29,045	 9,906	 241
Jan. 2000
	 3,500,000	 8,900,000	 48,695	 15,153	 351
July 2000 6,500,000	 16,900,000	 99,734	 27,289	 1,234
Jan. 2001
	 8,920,000	 22,500,000	 122,099	 265,405	 2,799
Ju1y 2001
	 10,020,000	 26,500,000	 128,362	 242,739	 3,257
Jan. 2002	 12,540,000	 33,700,000	 127,319	 277,100	 7,597.5
July 2002 16,130,000	 45,800,000	 126,146	 293,213	 10,576.5
Jan. 2003
	 20,830,000	 59,100,000	 179,544	 371,600	 9,380
lu1y 2003 25,720,000	 68,000,000	 250,651	 473,900	 18,599
Jan. 2004 30,890,000	 79,500,000	 340,040	 595,550	 27,216
Source: Zhongguo Hulianwangluo Fazhan Zhuangkuang Tongji Diaocha (Statistical Reports
on the Internet Development in China), several years, China Internet Network Information
Center, available online at <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/OE/OO/ll/index.htm>
Section II	 The Transition of Regulatory Regimes in the Internet Sector
China has vigorously implemented ICTs to foster ongoing informatisation
accompanying industrialisation as a crucial pillar to drive its future economic
development. The unfettered perspective on the free use of the Internet has been
challenged because the Chinese authorities at all levels have aggressively regulated
public use of the Internet, in particular through control over the political and dissent
use of the Net. Many measures as well as legalisations have been enacted with the
purpose to make the Internet behave like any other form of mass media under its firm
control.
It is vital to understand how the Internet is being governed if we are to better
comprehend its impact on China's political system. To facilitate discussions, the
regulatory regime of the Internet governance in China may be divided into three
stages since its inception from the late 1980s: the experimental and fragmented period,
which was before 1994; the transitional regulatory period, which ranged between
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1994 and 1998; and the current period since 1998.
The establishment of the Economic Information Joint Committee in 1993
marked a milestone in the development and regulation of the Internet in China. It is
primarily because it shifted focus from initially "formulating policies for the
development of a national information infrastructure," 8 to a more particular attention
to the Internet medium. With the increasing development of the Internet over the
following years, the Committee was later in 1996 developed into the State Council
Steering Committees on National Information Structure (SCSCNII). The set-up of
SCSCNII reflected several competing and rival bureaucracies, such as the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MET),
the Ministry of Broadcasting, Film and Television (MBFT), the Ministry of Public
Security, and the Xinhua News Agency, which was actively involved in formulating,
and implementing Internet policy. Amongst them, the MPT enjoyed enormous
commercial and political advantages over its rivals as a result of its historical status as
Internet operator and regulator. The main competitor of the MPT came from the MEl,
especially from late 1993 when the MEl created a separate but affiliated corporation
called "Ji Thng" (the Auspicious Telecommunications Company). One of the main
tasks Ji Tong commissioned was the so-called "Golden Projects," in which they
promoted the wider linkage of financial institutions and government agencies with
digitalised communications and information networks. Given there had not been any
paralysis in the Internet development, some real regulatory problems arose mainly
Zixiang (Alex) Tan, "Regulating China's Internet: Convergence toward a Coherent Regulatory
Regime," Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, April 1999, pp. 265-270.
8 Paul S. Triolo and Peter Lovelock, "Up, Up, and Away—With Strings Attached," The China
Business Review, Vol. 23, No. 6, November/December 1996, p. 28.
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between MPT and MEl. A Steering Committee was accordingly required to
coordinate and oversee the Internet development.
The bureaucratic body of SCSCNTI under the State Council had the following
major
1. To formulate guiding principles, policies, rules and regulations in the
developing process of national informatisation;
2. To formulate the strategy for developing national informatisation and its
overall and stage-by-stage plans;
3. To organ ise and coordinate the construction of important information
projects;
4. To be responsible for the coordination of and solutions for important issues
arising from the computer networks and the internet, and
5. To establish the standards for the technology and application related to
inform atisation.
The new Ministry of Information Industry (MIII) was approved in March of 1998 by a
decision of the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC). This was against the
backdrop of the Asian financial crisis (1997), political succession issues (1997-98),
and the restructuring of government bureaucracy (1998). The lviii was basically set up
by merging the MPT with the ME!, while the MIBFT was converted into a "general
bureau" (zongju) under the State Council. The major task for MIII was, as officially
announced, to administer the national manufacturing of IT products, national
9 For details on the conflict between the MPT and MEl, see, for example, Eric Harwit, "China's
Telecommunications Industry: Development Patterns and Policies," Pacj/Ic Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2,
summer 1998, pp. 175-194. For confrontation between the MPT and the State Administration of Radio,
Film and Television (SARFT), see Junhua Zhang, "Network Convergence and Bureaucratic Turf
Wars," in Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker (eds.), China and the Internet: Politics of the
Digital Leap Forward (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 85.
'° Richard Cullen and Pinky D. W. Choy, "The Internet in China," Columbia Journal of Asian Law,
Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 1999, p. 116.
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communication and software industries, facilitating the informatisation of the national
economy and social services.1'
The set-up of such a super-ministry was in a sense to ". . . reduce jealousies
between the MPT and MEl so that genuine competition within the
telecommunications industry could finally be introduced." 12 In this aspect, the
institutional and legal reforms involved were initiated and put into practice in order to
meet the increasing demand for technological convergence and the negotiations for
the expected entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Above all, it implies
that the authorities in Beijing intended to restore administrative control over the
telecommunications sector from previous stages of devolution, which had resulted in
fragmented governance and intensified pluralisation in terms of efficient flow of
information among several telecommunications service providers. Philip Sohmne
notes, "Although the SCSCNII is in theory a superior body to the MIT, in practice it
seems as if the Mu is responsible for policies up to the highest level."13
As a matter of fact, the intrinsic characteristics of the bureaucratic rivalry among
the competing parties in the Internet industry since the 1990s have been to take
respective organisational interests in consideration. Regulatory control of the Internet
is complicated: the Mu has been assigned to superintend the general development of
the Internet but specific authority has been divided between the Internet Services
Providers (ISPs) and Internet Content Providers (ICPs). Whilst the Mil oversees ISPs
Ministry of Information Industry (China), available online at <http://www.mii.gov.cnlmii/bmjs .
htm>, accessed on September 10, 2003.
12 Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 173.
13 Philip Sohmen, "Taming the Dragon: China's Efforts to Regulate the Internet," Stanford Journal of
East Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 18.
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and their related infrastructure, the Internet Information Management Bureau under
the State Council Information Office is in charge of supervising the ICPs. In addition,
the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the Ministry of
Culture are still enthusiastic in sharing the development and management of the
Internet, as is the Netnews Bureau of China Internet Information Center.' 4 Barry
Naughton vividly notes that the current economic decisions in China are made by a
"broad and diverse group of economic agents."5
Simply put, the processes of the de-concentration prior to 1998 and
concentration course from 1998 onwards simply exhibit the competitive tension
between the forces, with each "respectively supporting either centralised control or
the break-up of the monopoly." In other words, both ideas are based on self-interest of
the respective group.' 6 The rationale behind the de-concentration process is basically
in line with the greater political economy setting: de-concentration of
decision-making authority over economic policies. Accompanied by the ideological
decompression of the post-Mao period, and the rapid diffusion of new
communications technologies, these have all contributed to produce significant
administrative fragmentation.
14 Kay Hearn and Brian Shoesmith, "Exploring the Roles of Elites in Managing the Chinese Internet,"
paper presented at Euricom Colloquium: Electronic Networks & Democracy, October 9-12, 2002,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands, available online at <http://oase.uci .kun.nl/ —j ankowlEuricomlpapers/
Hearn%20and%20Shoesmith.pdf', p. 7, accessed on March 3, 2003.
15 Barry Naughton, "The Patterns and Logic of China's Economic Reform," in the Joint Economic
Committee, Congress of the United States (ed.), China's Economic Future: Challenges to US. Policy
(New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 1.
16 See Yousun Chung, Anatomy of the Decision-Making Process in China: (De)Concentration of the
Internet Industry, p.55. Unpublished MA thesis. Graduate Interdisciplinary Programme in Area
Studies, Seoul National University, South Korea, February 2002.
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Section III Internet Censorship and Control
What are the online contents deemed undesirable by the Chinese authorities? This is
exemplified in the "Measures for Managing the Internet Information Services
(Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa), which holds service providers responsible
for contents they display on the Net. In practice, the ISPs, ICPs and Internet café
owners have set up their own monitors, known as "Big Mama", to censor the
chatrooms and bulletin boards and to delete materials that are not in line with the laws
which are broadly decreed. Nine categories of information are banned in creating,
replicating, retrieving, and transmitting:'7
1. Materials that oppose the basic principles established by the Constitution;
2. Materials that jeopardise national security, reveal state secrets, subvert state
power, or undermine national unity;
3. Materials that harm the prosperity and interests of the state;
4. Materials that arouse ethic animosities, ethic discrimination, or undermine
ethic solidarity;
5. Materials that undermine state religious policies, or promote cults and feudal
superstitions;
6. Materials that spread rumours, disturb social order, or undermine social
stability;
7. Materials that spread obscenities, pornography, gambling, violence, murder,
tenor, or instigate crime;
8. Materials that insult or slander others or violate the legal rights and interests of
others;
" Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa (Measures for Managing the Internet Information Services)
was promulgated on October 1, 2000 by the State Council. For full text, see
<http://past.people.com.cn/GB/channel5/28/20001001/257566.html >, accessed on February 12,
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9. Materials that have other contents prohibited by laws or administrative
regulations.
In the second item relating to "state secrets," other laws are specified. It declares that
". . . state secrets are all issues relating to the security and interests of the nation,
determined in accordance with legally defined procedures, the knowledge of which is
restricted to a defined scope of personnel for a defined length of time." (Article 2) As
a result, state secrets include (Article 8):
I. Secret issues in significant decisions in national affairs;
2. Secret issues in the activities of national defence building and the strength of
the armed forces;
3. Secret issues in the activities of diplomacy and foreign affairs;
4. Secret issues in the economic and social development of citizens;
5. Secret issues in scientific technology;
6. Secret issues in activities of maintaining national security and the
investigation of criminal activity;
7. Any other state secret issues which the national secrecy protection work
agencies determine should be preserved.
Those illustrations of "state secrets" or a broader definition of "state security" matters
could deter Netizens' online activities for fear of breaching the laws. They serve to lay
down warnings about the comprehensive limits to online activities and to deter
potential offenders. It defacto deprives a significant portion of legal defence for cyber
actions, such as virtual political debates and consultations against governments or
authorities, since such conduct can be deemed illegal.
2004.
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A. Great Net Firewall, Censoring and Blocking Websites
The Chinese government has also maintained its control over the Net by means of
physical Internet infrastructures. The four national networks,' 8 for instance, require
all direct international networking traffic to use international incoming and outgoing
channels provided by China Telecom (Article 6), which functionally serves as a sort
of "Intranet" that connects all ISPs within the country. Legally speaking, the
Provisional Regulations on the Administration of International Interconnection of
Computer Information Networks, enacted in February 1996 and amended later in May
1997, have formalised the control of "computer information network" (jisuanji xinxi
wan gluo). These government-led Internet gateways to the world are based in the
metropolitan cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. In other words, the
requirement that all ISPs must be registered with one of the four major networks is to
ensure their global Internet access services, as opposed to home Internet (Chinese)
contents, pass through the packet-level filtering software installed on the
interconnecting networks.' 9 Without doubt, the Chinese government has set up an
ostensibly solid "great firewall," aiming to exert a tight grip on information to
The four interconnecting networks are (1) CHII'4ANET (Zhongguo GongyongJisuanji Hulianwang;
China Network), (September 1994) formerly owned by the MPT and now by Mu since 1998; (2)
CSTNET (Zhongguo Keji Wang, China Science and Technology Network), (April 1995) owned by the
Chinese Academy of Sciences. (3) CERNET (Zhongguo Jiaoyu he Keyan Jisuanji Wang, China
Education and Research Network), (July 1995) owned by the State Education Commission and (4)
CH[NAGBN (Zhongguo Jinqiao Xinxi Wang, China Golden Bridge Network) (September 1996)
formerly owned by the MEL, but now by Mu. See Article 7 of the Provisional Regulations. It has been
expanded into eight international Internet gateways, including additional four networks, CIETNET
(Zhongguo Guoji .Jingji Maoyi Hulianwang, China International Economy and Trade Network)
(January 2000), owned by China International Economy and Electronic Commerce Center (Zhongguo
Guoji Jingji Diani Shangwu Zhongxin)
19 Remarks made by Michael lannini, general manager of Nicholas International Consulting Services
Inc. in Beijing. Cited from Greg Walton, "Great Wall, Small World," CECC Open Forum, March 10,
2003, available online at <http:!/openflows.or-jamyangIGREATWALLsamllworId.htm>, accessed
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constrain what it perceives to be adversely liberalising Net effects.
Besides, the Chinese government has allegedly begun to exploit the system of
automated packet filtering from October 2002 that results in the slowdown of
international connections as an extra stopover for each transmission is required.2°
Specifically, the "packet-sniffer" software is integrated into the
government-controlled international Internet routers that can re-direct Internet users
trying to access certain domains that are deemed "inappropriate" to other "safer" or
"politically neutral" web sites. This move is obviously to embed a more centralised
and sophisticated filtering device/software into policing global online contents. An
Internet consultant based in Beijing described the current end-user impact of the
"closed" routers as being as if all of China's online population were ". . . breathing
through the same tiny air hole."2'
The Chinese authorities have also allegedly employed and trained more than
40,000 cyber police, 22 including students, to constantly monitor the content and usage
of the Web, in addition to tracing cyber dissidents. The official People 's Daily
acknowledges that the special cyber police force is intended ". . . to intensify real-time
monitoring, to intercept and delete harmful information and to capture and check
illegal server data." 23 Additionally, it has often been claimed that the government
on March 26, 2003.
20 
"Net Users Angry Over Slow Connections," South China Morning Post, March 5, 2003; "China's
Web Surveillance Slows Access even as Government Promotes Internet Use," The Associated Press,
March 5, 2003.
' Cited in Greg Walton, Great Wall, Small World, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
(CECC), CECC Open Forum, March 10, 2003, available online at <http:f/www.cecc.gov/pages/
roundtables/03 I 003JwaIton.php#_ftn 11>, accessed on July 2, 2003.
22 Paul Mooney, "China's 'Big Mamas' in a Quandary," YaleGlobal, 12 April 2004, available online at
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id3676 >, accessed on June 12, 2004.
23 
"China Seeks to Build Boundary on Internet," People s Daily, April 1, 2003, available online at
<http:llenglish.peopledaily.com.cn1200304/0 l/eng2003040 1_I 14386.shtml>, accessed on May 17,
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practises comprehensive Internet censorship and has already blocked many Web sites
deemed subversive and undesirable. The first source to argue this in any systematic
way was the December 2002 study by Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for
Internet and Society. With the help of a computer programme, the Study showed that
some 50,000 out of 200,000 Web sites were inaccessible from China on at least one
occasion.24
B. Breach of Privacy and Criminal Penalty
National security, as well as concern of public security, has historically overridden
efforts to protect the privacy of personal communications not merely in communist
countries such as China. 25 As Jose Caral observes, there has been a steady increase in
government regulation of the Internet in the US since 1996. "Civil libertarians are
disturbed by the intrusive nature of emerging Internet regulation, particularly those
granting security agencies wider powers of surveillance." 26 As information and
communications technologies advance rapidly, Internet users' privacy—the collection,
storage, dissemination, communication and the use of information—is to a varying
degree violated when a state's security is at stake. 27 The breach of individual privacy,
2003.
24 Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China,
available online at <http://cyber.law.harvard.eduIfiltering/chinai5, accessed on March 5, 2004.
25 Marcia Coyle, for instance, argues that even a democratic country like the United State has few
provisions currently in place protecting American citizens from unconstitutional forms of surveillance.
Such situation may be further deteriorating in the wake of the September 11(2001) terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. See Marcia Coyle, "September Attacks Prompt Sharp
Debate on Scope of Surveillance Law," Law.com, October 1, 2001, available online at
<http://wwwjaw.com/cgi-binl
 nwlink.cgi?ACGZZZ 1NUCI6SC>, accessed on December 18, 2003.
26 Jose MA. Emmanuel A. Caral, "Lessons from ICANN: Is Self-Regulation of the Internet
Fundamentally Flawed," International Journal of Law and information Technology, Vol. 12, No. 1,
2004, p. 2.
27 For a more general discussions about the state's meddling with the privacy because of the needs for
national interests, national security or law enforcement, see, for example, W. Diffie and S. Landau,
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the use of surveillance and even the imposition of criminal penalties have taken place
for the sake of national and public security. David Lyon vividly claimed that people
are nowadays living in an "electronic panopticon," in which traces of the use of
electronic communications can be recorded, compiled, and even compared as a
personal record of people's online activities.28
In the Chinese case, there is no doubt that many officials believe that they can
control online activities partly by infringing Internet users' rights of privacy and
freedom of expression through administrative measures. Control over the Internet and
censorship of Web contents may be achieved from the government's view by applying
regulatory measures as well as licensing procedures to the parties of ISPs and ICPs.
ISPs are required to store all users' detailed personal information and keep a record of
users' online activities, including Web sites visited, for at least sixty days and render
them to public security officials when requested. In a similar vein, those ICPs are
obliged to store contributions to any Internet chat rooms, discussion boards and
disclosed to authorities on requested. Both ISPs and ICPs are required to report any of
their patrons that violate relevant laws and regulations.
However, do ISPs, ICPs and the (local) police force rigorously enforce the laws
to monitor and report all incidents of violations in online and offline activities? The
fieldwork behind this project suggests that the authorities may charge or sentence a
few offenders in the increasingly adept Internet population, thereby setting an
example for other potential violators. In other words, it is called "killing chickens to
frighten monkeys," (sha ji jing hou) as the Chinese proverb goes. In part this is
Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption (Cambridge, MA. and London: MIT
Press, 1998).
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because the government is unlikely to manoeuvre and mobilise all its physical
resources to check the Net at all time. Selective prosecution of cyber-offenders,
accordingly, seems a practical way to deter those who might intend to violate the laws.
Arresting and detaining a few cyber-dissents has thus been one of the government's
plausible measures to tackle the problem.29
The London-based Amnesty International has claimed that Chinese Internet
users are at risk of arbitrary detention, torture and even execution by the authorities.30
Amongst those who have been arrested and detained is the Shanghai-based computer
engineer, Lin Hai, who was allegedly the first victim of stringent Internet regulations
in China. His breach of regulations in 1998 brought him two years in jail because he
provided some 30,000 e-mail addresses to the pro-democracy "VIP Reference,"
(Dacankao), an underground electronic newsletter, run on a daily basis by Chinese
dissidents and diasporas based in the United States. 3 ' Another prominent figure,
Huang Qi, a Chengdu-based Internet entrepreneur, also operated a pro-democracy
Web site (www.6-4tianwang.com), which was provocatively established to deQy the
Chinese governments' atrocities in the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. He was
consequently charged with subverting state power and sentenced to five years in
28 David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
29 For more information about Chinese individuals currently detained for online political and religious
activity, see, for example, the full list compiled by the organisation of Digital Freedom Network (DFN)
at <http://www.dfn.org/focus/china/netattack.htm >, accessed on July 22, 2003. According to DFN,
there are currently 34 Chinese individuals detained and only three have been released.
International, China: Internet Users at Risk of Arbitrary Detention, Torture and Even
Execution, November 26, 2002, available online at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA
170562002>, accessed on January 5, 2003.
' Amnesty International, State Control of the Internet in China, November 26, 2002, available online
at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASAI
 70072002ENGLISH/$File/ASA 1 700702.pdf, pp. 3-4,
accessed on March J 7, 2003.
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prison in May 2003.32
C. Internet Café Regulations and Crackdown
The June 6, 2002 fire in Beijing's "lanjisu" cybercafé that claimed 25 lives with 12
other people injured severely alarmed the authorities about inadequate governance
and supervision of Internet cafés. As such, the tragedy provoked a rapid order to crack
down on illegal cybercafés and it made all cafés re-register. Take China's capital city
for example. Beijing has 2,200 out of the total 2,400 Net bars operating illegally,33
where people usually associate with the strictest internet governance of Net cafés.
In fact, official sources suggest that only 46,000 out of 200,000 Internet cafés are
licensed, which means less than one quarter of them are legally registered. 34 The
nationwide overhaul of Internet cafés simply resulted in the closure of some 3,300
illegal cafes over the six months following the fatal arson. 35 Yet there are many other
cafés still thriving across the country in all sorts of guises, 36 since the demand from
young people, students, the badly-off and rural residents, for instance, remains high.
32 Ibid., p. 4.
"Beijing Internet Cafes Ordered to Stop Operation for Rectification," People 'sDaily, June 17, 2002,
available online at <http://eng1ish.peop1edai1y.com.cn/200206/17/eng2002061 7_97950.shtml>,
accessed on June 18, 2002; "Fire Prompts Tight Control on Internet Cafes in China," People's Daily,
June 18, 2002, available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/18/eng20020618_
98048.shtml>, accessed on June 18, 2002.
"China Orders Unlicensed Internet Cafes Closed Nationwide," People's Daily, June 29, 2002,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn1200206/29/eng20020629_98774.shtml >,
accessed on June 30, 2002; Hannah Beech, "Living It Up in the Illicit Internet Underground," lime,
Vol. 160, No. 4, July 22, 2002, P. 4.
"China Closes over 3,300 Internet Cafes in Six Months," People's Daily, December 27, 2002,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/27/eng2002  1227_I 09161 .shtml>,
accessed on December 27, 2002.
36 Some cafés operate under the guise of other businesses, such as "labor skill training center," which
is regulated by the labour department, and some have a private school as their front, which falls under
the jurisdiction of the education department. Other cafés even discreetly place cameras overlooking
the pavement, and monitoring any movement toward the door. See Raymond Zhou, "Internet Cafes
Percolating Despite Legal Clampdown," China Daily, December 4, 2002, available online at
<http://www3.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2O02-  I 2/04/content 146503 .htm>, accessed on January 16,
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Many of them cannot afford to buy the required computer facilitates or they are not
better off by gaining Internet access at home. Still, they are keen on tiying to get
access to the Internet partly because the Internet may provide them with future
opportunities to get prospered or they can also show that they can live like others in
the information age.
In addition, the Chinese government at all levels has staged periodic raids on
Internet cafés, not only because they are worried about online pornography or violent
online games that pose a moral hazard to young people, but also largely because of the
"reactionary" or "undesirable" materials readily available on the Internet that have
long plagued the government. The former head of the Chinese Ministry of
Information Industry, for instance, has warned that moral standards in China are being
severely challenged by the rapid flow of information emerging from the Internet. He
states:
Due to historical and technical reasons, 90 per cent of the information available on
Internet is in English and the overwhelming majority of it generated from developed
countries, whereas developing countries are mostly information receivers. As
information flows across borders and developing countries are absorbing advanced
technological and cultural information, their cultural traditions, moral standards and
values have been severely challenged.37
More importantly, Internet cafés in China are under the management of multiple
government departments. Such a governing structure has often resulted in loose
coordination between the different departments or bureaus. Specifically, to acquire
2003.
Roman Rolinick, "Telecommunication Summit: China Concerned at Electronic Threats to Moral
Standards," Earth Times News Service, January 14, 2002, available online at
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the legal licences to operate Internet cafés, four governmental organisations and three
procedures are usually involved: firstly, special business and cultural permits issued
by the Public Security Bureau and the Cultural Bureau; secondly, an Internet
information service business permit issued by the Telecommunications Bureau (under
the Ministry of Information Industry), and thirdly, a business licence issued by the
Administration of Industry and Commerce. Often an Internet bar will have some but
not all of these required licenses; there are frequently one or two missing. A report38
has revealed it usually takes one to two months to obtain one of the licenses, and it is
thus rather difficult to attain all of the licences for an Internet café in less than half a
year. Before granting the operational licenses, an owner first needs to have the rental
contract approved, then get the cybercafe inspected and approved by the fire
department, and also make sure that all the computer facilities have been purchased in
advance. During the waiting period whilst the acquisition of licenses is pending, an
owner will spend tens of thousands of renminbi in rent. Because of the poor
inter-governmental coordination and excessively time-consuming and complicated
approval procedures, the so-called "hei wan gba" (literally "black bars" in Mandarin,
illegal Internet cafés) has to seek for ways to survive. That precisely provides more
channels for those who pursue rent-seeking behaviour.
Section IV Counter-Measures to Evade Internet Control and Regulations
One Chinese proverb neatly captures the measures to counter Internet control in
<http://earthtimes.org/jan/telecommunicationchinajanl4O2.htm >, accessed on November 23, 2002.
38 See Deng Ke and Wu Chenguang, "Wangba he Tade Shengcun zhi Dao" (Internet Cafés and Their
Ways of Existence), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), June 21, 2002, available online at
<http:llwww.people.com.cnIGB/it/48/297/20020621/758428.html>, accessed on March 15, 2004.
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China, namely, "Where there is a policy at the top, there is a counter-policy at the
bottom" (shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice). Despite the official scrutiny of the Net
and many Internet regulations, it would be far from certain to assume that the Chinese
authorities have gained absolute control of the Internet. On the contrary, the online
battle between the government and Internet users, or so-called cat-and-mouse games,
is still under way, and it should be judged from a long-term perspective.
Xiudian Dai holds that there are holes in the "Great Firewall" of heavy regulation
of the Internet in China since clearly defined implementation mechanisms are
deficient. In his words, "Whilst government ministries are scrambling for power and
control, loopholes are likely to be created—in interpreting government policy on the
Internet."39 Indeed, take the recently promulgated regulation on the Internet café bar
for instance. The Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites for Internet
Access Services replaced the previous one released in April 2002 and came into effect
in mid-November 2002.40 Such a measure involves four government departments, i.e.,
the Mu, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Culture, and the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce. All of them have contributed to the
overlapping of responsibilities and to a large extent the inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in Internet governance.
According to the Regulation, the cultural administration department in a
county's people government (xian) is responsible for issuing licences to the Net bar
owners. (Article 4) It is required by the Regulations that cybercafes place the licence
Xiudian Dai, "Chinese Politics of the Internet: Control and Anti-control," Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2000, P. 187.
° For the full text, see <http://www.people.com.cnIGB/I4677/21980/22078/1898093.html >, accessed
on June 12, 2003.
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certificate in a conspicuous location at the entrance (Article 20), and juveniles are not
allowed to enter the Internet café bars unless accompanied by their parent(s) or
guardians (Article 21) because an identification card is needed for access (Article 23)
Online gambling (Article 18) as well as offline games (Article 17) are breaches of the
Regulations. Their opening hours are fixed between 8 o'clock in the morning and
mid-night (Article 22) For the sake of safety and public security, smoking is
prohibited and bars cannot be fixed over the windows. (Article 24)
The actual state of Internet governance, nevertheless, exhibits a diversified
picture of how the Regulations are really implemented. Based on a series of surveys
conducted secretly by news reporters from the official Xinhua News Agency, the
implementation of the Internet regulations demonstrates diversity with "Chinese
characteristics." In the capital city of Beijing, the Regulations are rigorously enforced
as generally expected. 4 ' It is nonetheless loosely implemented outside Beijing.
Shanghai, for instance, is a major business hub in China, but here the Regulation is
virtually analogous to "a piece of empty paper" according to the Xinhua survey.42
Minors are free to enter the café bars since the bar personnel do not really verify their
ID card. Some of them even stay over for days and nights. Additionally, in spite of the
"No Smoking" sign that hangs on the wall, there are ashtrays on the tables besides the
computers and the cafés do sell cigarettes. More importantly, gaining access to
pornographic sites is not met with any difficulties and the café owners do not maintain
"Beijingn wangba guanli bijiao guifan, shangwang xu chushi shenfen zheng" (Administrations of
Cybercafés in Beijing are Better Regulated, Personal ID is Required to Gain Internet Access), Xinhua
News Agency, January 29, 2003, available online at <http://news.xinhuanet.comledu/2003-01/
29/content_ 712337.htm>, accessed on March 7, 2003.
42 
"Shanghai: Zhengfu fagui rutong yizhi gongwen" (The Government Regulations Are Simply Pieces
of Blank Papers in Shanghai), Xinhua News Agency, January 29, 2003, available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/
 edu12003-01/29/content_712361.htm>, accessed on March 7, 2003.
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records for sixty days of what their patrons have access. There is only a one-day
record available. Cybercafés are still open after 3 o'clock in the early morning. The
cases surveyed in Shanghai are not isolated at all, but typical of the rest of China. In
Chengdu, Sichuan province; Shaoyang, Hunan province; Changchun, Jilin
province; . . . etc., many other cafés are still operating after 12 o'clock because they can
simply lock the main entrance lest the inspection teams carry out raids. You can still
gain admission without a personal ID card.43
At times, Internet service operators even bend the rules over dissident messages
posted on the discussion boards. They may make concessions to offenders over their
subverting and agitating opinions, allowing them to remain online for a while and
deleting them later in exchange for their cooperation to maintain proper operation of
the sites. On the one hand, the Web site managers (operators) have indeed complied
with official guidelines to monitor and weed out "unhealthy" postings, given that they
tacitly tolerated such messages to remain on board only for a short period of time. On
the other hand, operators' deliberate connivance at those postings could help maintain
good relations with cyber-dissents and help sustain their popularity among Internet
users.
With these compromising initiatives, the cat-and-mouse games between
More	 surveys	 are	 available	 on	 Xinhua	 News	 Agency,	 at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2003-0 1/29/content_7123 45.htm>; <http://news.xinhuanet.com/
edu/2003-0 1/29/content_7 12360.htm>; <http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2003-0 1/1 3/content_687806.
htm>, all accessed on March 7, 2003. Besides, my personal experiences in several Internet café bars
during the field works in two summers of 2002 and 2003 confirmed the above-mentioned
phenomenon. Cybercafés in Beijing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Chengde would either let me in
without even asking to show my personal ID, or just required me to write my ID in a notebook without
any certification. I can always give others' ID numbers when registered. The malfunction of the
regulatory mechanism seems to suggest that paying money is more important than showing your ID.
These illustrations indeed exist in many cybercafés in China. Some of them are illegal and are
nicknamed as "hei wang ba."
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operators and Netizens would make the Web operations more profitable and
manageable.44 In a legal sense, it implies that failure to abide by the law in handling
Internet online activity affairs and laxity in law enforcement are common occurrences
(youfa buyi, zhjfa buyan), which accordingly creates potentially serious holes in the
"Great Wall" around the Internet. Thus loose and arbitrary implementation of
regulations is likely to contribute to the potential political impact of cybercafés—the
anonymity making it difficult to get caught.
Using a proxy server is an effective way to circumvent the great firewall in
accessing Web sites surreptitiously that are blocked. The basic principle is that the
proxy servers, situated in a third place like the United States or Europe, can act as an
intermediary for Internet service requests. These intermediary (proxy) servers can
thus help bypass Internet control. In this regard, proxy servers are functionally
designed to reroute requests through unblocked sites. The Chinese government
blocked access to the popular search engine Google in early September of 2002 to try
to disrupt dissidents. Even though the blockage was lifted after about nine days, the
central government in Beijing had vigorously sought to bar access to proxy servers
and the cache facility for the use of Google's immense database storage for the sole
purpose of disconnecting access to forbidden Web sites and pages. In a sense, since
Google can cache or reproduce Web pages (mirror sites) on its own that circumvent
During a conversation with a provincial capital-based Web site operator in the summer of 2002, he
confessed to me that they had developed strategies to deal with online posted messages from dissent
groups, in particular those Falun Gong followers. He said that they would not filter their messages as
soon as they were posted. It was in fact futile because they would not easily give themselves up
posting and it in turn escalated the tense situation. They had reached a compromise which allowed
these postings to remain up for two hours and then deleted them in exchange for their Web site survival
and prosperity. Local Web site operators usually have had strategic flexibility that arises from their
relatively relaxed environment, and can follow closely to the market profit concerns, particularly
non-political contents, such as cyber pornography.
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the blocked Web sites, Chinese Internet users may thus create space relatively out of
the reach of the Chinese government. As Gartner research director French CaIdwell
explains, "Google is one way the Chinese users get around the blockage. They may
not be able to link directly to a site, but they can link to a cached version of the site."45
Dissident material online can also be distributed via e-mail; people send e-mails
to other recipients in and out of China to get around the firewall. Weblogs, bulletin
boards, cyber discussion fora, and Web sites that constantly alter IP addresses can
skirt government censorship in a large part. In addition, the use of encryption software
is another way of dodging governmental surveillance over the Internet activities. The
added veil of encryption is thus maintaining electronic anonymity by converting
messages into codes that, in theory, only their designated recipients can decipher. As
such, "it directly concerns the conditions of possibility for anonymity, personal
security, and political dissension in the context of the pervasive visibility engendered
by state and corporate mechanisms for surveillance and control."46
The peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies are employed by many Internet users to
conduct interactive online chatting via computer programs like as Microsoft MSN,
ICQ, QQ, Yahoo Messenger, and Skype. Through the interactive and real-time
communication networks, the Internet users can discuss and disseminate/share
information or files that in a way make it more difficult for governments to track,
monitor, and censor online activities. Ross Anderson, a Cambridge University-based
Internet scholar who helped kick-start the concept of P2P file-sharing, boldly
Jay Lyman, "Google Responds to China Ban," NewsFac for Network, September 3, 2002, available
online at <http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/19279.html>, accessed on November 6, 2002.
46 Diana Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet (Minneapolis and London:
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 142.
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advocates a new and improved version of Usenet via P2P networks, commenting,
"The effect of peer-to-peer networks will be to make censorship difficult, if not
impossible."47
Section V	 Conclusion
The Chinese government has long been torn by the ambivalence brought about by the
Internet. It regards the Internet as an engine to drive economic growth on the one hand,
and as a subversive challenge to undermine the ruling Communist Party on the other
hand. As soon as ICTs, particularly the Internet, were introduced and Web sites
mushroomed, the Party was so determined to harness the new medium to assure the
Internet's economic and scientific benefits. As a consequence, controls other than
stifling ICTs would be critical for the CCP's agenda to achieve the century-long
modernisation process and in the meantime, consolidate its power. As Wu Jichuan,
ex-Minister of Mu, recognises, "Network and information safety can not be
overemphasised, as it has a bearing on the sovereignty and economic security of a
nation. Any improper handling of the relations will hamper the overall economic
development."48
It is true to claim that Internet control in China is not foolproof, nor has the
Internet governance achieved much success there. The Chinese government has tried
hard to keep the average Internet users on a tight leash, regardless of self-censorship
or penalties among Internet users. There are reasonable grounds for believing that the
Tracey Logan, "File-sharing to Bypass Censorship," BBC World Service, April 9, 2004, available
online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3611227.stm >, accessed on May 12, 2004.
Roman Roilnick, "Telecommunication Summit: China Concerned at Electronic Threats to Moral
Standards," Earth Times News Service, January 14, 2002, available online at
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democratising nature of the medium is likely to prevail because the CCP cannot
control every facet of Internet use in China.
The discussions in this chapter have contributed to the overall argument of this
dissertation that the Chinese government is not as much in control of public use on the
Internet as it is of governance (or domination) of other forms of traditional media. As
shall be explored in chapters 5, 6, and 7, the spread of information technology has
further contributed to a gradual pluralisation of alterative value orientations and
political communications aided by a wealth of information now available online that
(in)directly contradicts the Party's spin on events and crises.
In other words, whilst the government can exert some control over the Web
contents and messages/information posed online, the state control over the new
medium is indeed diminishing, when particularly compared with traditional press and
mass media. The Internet has incrementally created a shift in mass communication
that allows the public to speak en masse. There are indeed political implications as
will become apparent in the chapters to come. Before the dissertation moves on to
argue that the government is not as much in control of public debates on the new
media as it is in debates in other mainstream mass media, it will explore the role that
Internet entrepreneurs play in Chinese society. Are there any sociopolitical
implications that may be revealed from the government-business nexus in the Internet
sector?
<http://earthtimes.org/jan/telecommunicatiOflChiflaj aril4_02.htm>, accessed on November 23, 2002.
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Chapter 4 Confrontation or Reconciliation: The Interactions
between Internet Entrepreneurs and the Chinese
Authorities
Section I	 The Private Economy and the Rise of the IT Sector
One of the most far-reaching changes brought about by the economic reform in China
has been the emergence of new business elites in the non-state sectors. Private
entrepreneurs are now not only officially recognised as important to the powerhouse
of the national economy, but also are acknowledged as a new "stratum" in the
post-Mao sociological setting in China. 1 Indeed, the emergence of private
entrepreneurs in China is striking because it helps unleash a dynamic and rapid
economic transformation in contemporary China, with possible transitions spilling
over into the sociopolitical arena. It is also a noticeable change from when from when
initially the private economy was largely confined to small-scale operations because
of the prevalent political philosophy of collectivism doctrine. Yet after a quarter of a
century of dramatic economic reforms in China, official statistics released by National
Bureau of Statistics has shown that private economy, along with the state-owned and
collective economies, has now become the motor that drives China's fast economic
According to a collaborative work conducted by a few sociologists from the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, it marked off "ten strata," namely (1) strata of national and social management; (2)
managers; (3) private enterprise-owners; (4) professional technicians; (5) clerks; (6) industrial and
commercial individuals; (7) business service staffs; (8) industrial workers; (9) agricultural labourers
and (10) city unemployed, laid-off and half laid-off vagrants in urban areas. See Lu Xueyi, ed.,
Dangdai Zhongguo She hui Jieceng Yanjiu Baogao (Research Report on Social Strata in Contemporary
China), (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian, 2002). The work is, however, arguably served a specific
sociopolitical purpose and is under the acquiescence and auspices from the Chinese authorities. For
example, Joseph Fewsmith argues that the book is apparently written in part to support the Jiang
Zemin's efforts to dampen notions of class struggle and to broaden the social basis of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rule. See Joseph Fewsmith, "Social Issues Move to Center Stage," China
Leader Monitor, No. 3, summer 2002, available online at <http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/
20023/JF.pdf, accessed on October 12, 2002.
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growth.2
Within China's fast growing private economy, the information technology (IT)
industry has stood out particularly in the past few years. Internet entrepreneurs as an
outgrowth of the information technology take-off from the mid-1990s are actually a
new social component in Chinese society. The very appearance of the Internet
entrepreneurs may suggest the possibility that they are unlikely to be merely
"transmission belts"3
 of the Leninist state but rather harbingers of a fresh pattern of
state-business relations in twenty-first century China. David Sheff, for example,
presents an in-depth account of what impact the Internet has had upon business
activities of several major information technology industry players in the Chinese
context. He suggests that the emerging Internet entrepreneurs will ultimately
transform China's economy into a more capitalist market. 4 In this regard, are the
newly emerging Internet entrepreneurs in China actually positioning themselves to
employ their economic favoured position to play a role in China's political affairs or
even drive the democratisation process?
The conventional wisdom about the role of entrepreneurs basically follows the
discourse of structural theory that sees the rise of entrepreneurial elites as crucial to
the extension of societal autonomy from state domination, and the change of
2 
"Private Sector Ranks Third in China's Economy," Xinhua News Agency, January 18, 2003,
available online at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/53891.htm>, accessed on April 24, 2003.
A political party that strictly follows Marxist and Leninist ideals in a socialist system functions in an
almost entirely different way from its counterparts in western democracies. Within the traditional
Leninist states, virtually all sort of institutions, including media and (business) associations are
dominated by the party and mostly function as a sort of "transmission belt" for implementing the party
policies. See Tony Saich, "Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,"
The China Quarterly, No. 161, March 2000, pp. 124-141. For a classic explanation, see Carl J.
Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger,
1966), second edition.
' David Sheff, China Dawn: The Story of a Technology and Business Revolution (New York:
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"structure of power" (state versus entrepreneurs) will lead towards liberalisation and
eventually democratisation. 5 Guobin Yang, for instance, argues that the co-evolution
of the Internet and civil society does exist in contemporary China. The mushrooming
of online Internet forums (including blogs) and cyber-communities in a sense
exemplify a nascent civil society taking root in the Chinese communist regime. 6
 In
other words, the growth of entrepreneurs and civil society out of capitalist
development will forge the counterweight to the state apparatus, and as long as the
structure is changed or shifted, sooner or later the democratisation process will take
place. It is nonetheless generally regarded as a long-term process of change.
In contrast with the structural approach, a more recent argument, which is more
case-oriented, has suggested that the (Internet) entrepreneurs in an authoritarian
regime like China have opted for cooperating with rather than confronting the state.
For example, Bruce Dickson coins the term "red capitalists" as a metaphor to capture
the merger of competing political and economic power in contemporary China. The
"red capitalists" who have close personal and political connections to the CCP are
increasingly co-opted into the Party for further economic development. As a result, he
suggests that they are unlikely to advance political democratization. 7 Meanwhile,
Shanthi Kalathil posits that Internet entrepreneurs, domestic or foreign, like all
HarperCollins, 2002).
See, for example, Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961);
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943);
Barrington Moore, Social Origins ofDictatorship andDemocracy: Lord andPeasant in the Making of
the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens
and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
6 Guobin Yang, "The Co-evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 43,
No. 3, May/June 2003, pp. 405-422. See also Guobin Yang, "The Internet and Civil Society in China:
A Preliminary Assessment," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 36, pp. 453-475.
' See Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for
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investors in China, are keen to make profits in China's "confusingly regulated but
opportunity-laden markets." Together with a series of stringent regulations imposed
on their operations and the business licences, she sees the "relationship-dependent
business practices" laden in the Internet sector and accordingly she suggests the
Internet entrepreneurs are playing a rather limited role in promoting political
liberalisation.8
Whilst acknowledging the insights both approaches have contributed, a hybrid
approach, the clientelist-corporatist argument, may be more plausible in explaining
the current relationship between Internet entrepreneurs and the Chinese state.
Margaret Pearson develops a hybrid pattern—socialist corporatism and
clientelism—to conceptualise present-day's state-society relations in China's leading
economic sectors, such as foreign and private sectors. In her words, while socialist
corporatism "dominates the state's efforts in the associational realm," clientelism
"characterizes the behaviour of both individuals and associations." 9 Bruce Dickson
has also argued that the Chinese authorities create corporatist links with business
associations as part of the state's strategy of adapting Leninist regimes.'° These
analytical frameworks are both illuminating and practical to help investigate if the
emergence of private Internet entrepreneurs in China is likely to serve as agents of
Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on
Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), pp.
13-42; Shanthi Kalathil, "China's New Media Sector: Keeping the State in," The Pac/ic Review, Vol.
16, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 497-498.
Margaret M. Pearson, China r New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), esp. chapter 6. See also Margaret M. Pearson,
"Entrepreneurs and Democratization in China's Foreign Sector," in Victoria E. Bonnell and Thomas B.
Gold (eds.), The New Entrepreneurs of Europe and Asia: Patters of Business Development in Russia,
Eastern Europe and China (New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 130-55.
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change and accordingly promote political liberalisation and even democratisation.
Here, Internet entrepreneurs are referring particularly to those civilian-managed
or privately-owned Internet enterprises: they usually consist of managerial elites of
Internet Content Providers (ICPs), Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Net bar owners
or operators, and Internet-related service providers like Short Message Service
(SMS), which is a service to send messages from/to the Internet. One of the main
substances of being "private" that makes this category of elites so critical to civil
society in China is the assumption that their commercial-oriented capabilities to
master the skills of entrepreneurialism, beyond its economic repercussion, may pose
impact upon other arenas such as politics and society. In other words, the assumption
underlying the entrepreneurialism-democratisation linkage is that the rise of a class
of entrepreneurs might have a positive impact on the direction of socio-economic and
political change.
A. A Brief History of the Evolvement of the Private Economy
Although private businesses never completely disappeared in China, even during the
Cultural Revolution, the first businesses were not officially sanctioned by the central
government until 1978 after the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's
(CCP) 11th Central Committee. The "Decision on Reform of the Economic System"
adopted in October 1984 by the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee
embarked on a novel strategy that relied heavily upon the comprehensive
development of state-owned, collectively-owned and individually-owned
10 See note 7 above.
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enterprises." The Chinese government later allowed private enterprises to exist in
1988 under the "Tentative Stipulations on Private Enterprises." It was not until 1999
that China passed a constitutional amendment, giving formal and full recognition to
the country's rising and flourishing private sector. 12 The CCP had even conceded the
possibility of recruiting capitalists or entrepreneurs into the Party at the Fifteen
National Party Congress in November 2002. This idea is embodied in Jiang Zemin's
version of the so-called "Three Represents." In his groundbreaking speech delivered
on the CCP's Eightieth anniversary on July 1, 2001, he officially advocated the
accession of the private entrepreneurs (capitalists) into the Party, since the Party
represented the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people. In other
words, the Party is not only the vanguard of the working class, but the representative
of the basic interests of the majority of the people as well. 13 The thoughts of the Three
Represents were later enshrined in the Party's constitution as an amendment at the
Party's Sixteenth Congress in November 2002, and were written into China's
constitution, along with amendments to safeguard the ownership of private property,
in March 2004 during the second plenum of the Tenth National People's Congress
Robert F. Dernberger, "China's Transition to a Market Economy: Back to the Future, Mired in the
Present, or through the Looking Glass to the Market Economy?" in China Economic Future:
Challenging to U.S. Policy, ed. Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 1997), PP. 63-65.
2 
"Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa Xiuzhengan, Dijiujie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Dierci Huiyi Tongguo" (The draft amendments to the constitution of the People's Republic of China
has been approved by the presidium of the Second Plenum of the Ninth National People's Congress on
March 15, 1999), People Daily, March 17, 1999, p. 1.
The notion of the "Three Represents" also indicates that the communist Party represents the
advanced productive forces, and the advanced culture. See Jiang Zemin, Speech at the Rally in
Celebration of the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist party of China, July 1, 2001
(Beijing: New Star Publishers, 2001).
' "Full Text of Resolution on Amendment to CPC Constitution," People Daily, November 15, 2002,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/14/eng200211  14_106825.shtml>;
"Amendment to CPC Constitution Approved," People Daily, November 14, 2002, available online at
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/14/eng2002
 1114_I 06809.shtml>, both web sites accessed
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(NPC).'5
B. The Industrial/Technology Policy and the Rise of the IT Sector
Unlike the approach towards industrial reform and policies that were adopted in the
Former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe where more attention was given
to privatising large state-owned enterprises, and the introduction of market forces, the
Chinese state has instead opted for a "heterodox path" 6 by actively intervening in the
market and promoting a wide array of industrial policies to support, for example, the
growth of a "national team" of large firms that can compete with the world's leading
corporations and eventually share the state's nation-building project.'7
The old Chinese technology policy was replaced by a new one adopted by the
central government in August 1999, following a more favourable political atmosphere
towards private enterprise since the 15th Party Congress in September 1997, and the
exponential growth of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) from
the late 1990s.' 8 Compared with the previous decisions made in 1985 and 1995, as
on January 13, 2004.
"Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa Xiuzhengan, Dish j/ie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Dierci Huiyi Tongguo, March 14, 2004" (The draft amendment of the Chinese constitution adopted by
the second session of the tenth NPC on March 14,2004), Peoples Daily, March 16, 2004, p. 1.
16 In terms of property rights of the state assets, the Chinese has tended to pursue the quick and more
comprehensive privatisation process in rural and in medium- to small-sized urban state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Yet, the large SOEs remain the stronghold of the state. Partly it is because of the
large-scale unemployment concern.
The "national team" or "national champions" were often SOEs, which were selected by the
government in the thrust to promote industrial and technology development. They received
tremendous resources for nurturance and support from the government. See Peter Nolan, China and
the Global Business Revolution (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 67-139. Additionally, a good
example from the China national team within the private commercial Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) sector is the Lenovo Group Ltd. (Lian-Xiang Jituan, formerly Legend Computer),
the largest and most profitable personal computer manufactory. See Li Tao, Zhongguo Lianxiang
(China Legend) (Taipei: Jiuding Guoji, 2002); Wang Yang and Kang Yiren, Lianxiang Wuxian
(Legend infinity) (Taipei: Kuangbang Wenhua, 2003).
18 Ibid., p. 177. The 1999 Decision, Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Jishu
Chuangxin Fazhan Gaokeji Shixian Chanyehua de Jueding (The Decision of the Central Committee of
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well as the "China Torch Program" in 1988, the 1999 Decision has exhibited more
concrete and practicable initiatives aimed at boosting technological innovation,
high-tech development and the industrial application of new technologies. The
Chinese government at all levels has aggressively rewarded those Chinese who were
trained overseas with IT-related knowledge and entrepreneurial skills because of a
desperate shortage of talent.19
The role of overseas trained Chinese in China's ongoing informatisation is
pivotal and unique. It is pivotal because the advanced innovative, technical, and
managerial skills as well as expertise they have acquired are much needed to further
promote China's High-tech development. From the government's viewpoint, the
extensive "brain drain" over the past decades may be enhanced if more overseas
well-trained professionals, Chinese and foreign nationals, may be attracted back to
help develop China's nascent information industry. In one aspect, the move is to
the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council on technological innovation, high-tech
development and industrialisation of new and high technologies), was released on August 20, 1999.
The full text appeared on the People Daily, August 25, 1999, p. 1, available online at
<http://202.99.23 .245/rmrb/1
 99908125/newfiles!col_1 9990825001008jryw.html>, accessed on
February 24, 2004.
' The China's State Councilor Chen Zhili in an interview revealed that hi-tech talent and high-level
managerial personnel were in "short supply" and "constrained the current Chinese development." See
"Erecting Pillars of the Future," Being Review, Vol. 46, No. 42, October 16, 2003, pp. 11-14. Apart
from the supportive and preferential measures declared in the 1999 Decision, there are a few more
additional friendly initiatives and provisions for those who are willing to return home, such as the
creation of Silicon Valley-like science and technology industrial parks, enterprises clusters, funds, the
housing and social benefits. See, for example, the recent rewarding measures for the overseas
high-tech personnel by the Xiamen City Council, Fujian Province, available online at
<http://xmol .w
 1 .chinae.com.cn/xmok/news/view.asp?NewsID=5 84&classlD=5>, accessed on
February 18,2004. As a matter of fact, through setting up housing and providing others social benefits
as mentioned above, some high-tech enterprises have recreated the institutional features of the danwei
(work unit). See Corinna-Barbara Francis, "Reproduction of the Danwei Institutional Features in the
Context of China's Market Economy: The Case of Haidian District's High-Tech Sector," The China
Quarterly, No. 147, September 1996, pp. 839-859. For a more detailed discussion about the impact of
the "Silicon Valley" model on the formation ofthe regional economy of "greater China" (PRC, Taiwan
and Hong Kong), see, for example, Ngai-Ling Sun, "(Re-) Imagining 'Greater China': Silicon Valley
and the Strategy of Siliconization," in China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward, ed.
Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.
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narrow the gap in science and technology that exist between China and the developed
countries in the world. This kind of vein is evidenced when the Chinese paramount
leader, Deng Xiaoping, made a speech to the National Science Conference in March
1978. During this speech, he acknowledged that ". . .backwardness must be
recognised before it can be changed. One must learn from those who are most
advanced before one can catch up and surpass them."2°
Meanwhile, the role of foreign trained elites is also unique since the information
technology industry is the sector in which China currently enthusiastically promotes
industrialisation through informatisation. Such a vision makes China's development
process even more noteworthy. It aimed at leapfrogging the industrialisation process,
which most Western advanced countries have gone through for more than a century,
into the informatisation process. The IT talent inflows that have greatly contributed to
the take-off and sustainable development of Taiwan's semiconductor and IT
industries may likewise be duplicated in China.2'
China's industrial and technology policies are usually characterised as favouring
certain sectors at the expense of others. In general, sectoral discrimination is often
accompanied by unequal treatment of foreign and domestic firms. That is part of the
wider strategies employed by the Chinese government as Long and Zhang have
102-126.
20 Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at Opening Ceremony of National Science Conference," Peking Review,
Vol. 21, No. 12, March 24, 1978, p. 10. It is also available online at
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103390.htm>, accessed on June 6, 2005.
For more about the IT talent flow cross the Taiwan strait and the California Silicon Valley of the
USA, see Tse-Kang Leng, "Economic Globalization and IT Talent Flows: The
Taipei/Shanghai/Silicon Valley Triangle," Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 2, March/April 2002, pp.
230-250. See also Barry Naughton, "The Information Technology Industry and Economic Interactions
Between China and Taiwan," in Francoise Mengin (ed.), Cyber China: Reshaping National Identities
in the Age of Information (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 155-184.
104
argued.22 A series of policies and initiatives have resulted in the transformation of the
industrial structure which is shown in Table 4.1. In fact, it generally accords with the
worldwide industrialisation process: the reduction in primary industry and the growth
of the tertiary (service) industry. Whilst the share of GDP represented by primary
industry dropped from 28.1% in 1978 to 15.4% in 2002, the secondary and tertiary
industries increased from 48.2% and 23.7% in 1978 to 5 1.1% and 33.5%, respectively.
In the meantime, given that secondary and tertiary industries are the mainstay of the
national economy which totalled 84.6% in 2002, the primary industry employs a
larger proportion of the national work force of about 50% in 2002, dropping from
70.5% in 1978, which is still starkly disproportional to its output. The sharp increase
in the secondary and tertiary industries in recent years is partly because of the IT
sector, particularly the Internet industry, which serves as one of the most preferential
sectors in present-day China. By and large, it reflects the ongoing strategy in China to
promote industrialisation through informatisation. Such a vision makes China's
development process even more noteworthy. It aimed at leapfrogging the
industrialisation process, which most Western advanced countries have gone through
for more than a century, into the informatisation process.
For example, Zeng Peiyan, minister of the State Development Planning
Commission, accentuated the "Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-05)," claiming that the
State would during this period give top priority to the development of IT, with the
22 Acrding to Zhang and Long, there are principally six patterns of industrial policies used, each one
interweaving another: "central government financing and planning; empowering key industries with
direct financing; preferential interest and tax rates and favorable financing for target industries; infant
industry (trade) protection; pricing policies; and administrative means." Xiaoji Zhang and Guoqiang
Long, "China's Industrial Policies in the Process of Marketization," in Seiichi Masuyama, Donna
Yandenbrink and Chia Siow Yue (eds), Industrial Policies in East Asia, cited in Ding Lu, "Revamping
the Industrial Policies," in Shang-Jin Wei, Guanzhong James Wen and Huizhong Zhou (eds.), The
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slogan of "driving industrialisation with informatisation." 23 Indeed, the new
leap-forward strategy has been sustained by the impressive economic performance of
the IT sector during the "Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000)." During this period, this
industry saw a 31.4 per cent annual growth rate on average, and it had taken about 2
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), making its contribution to the overall
GDP growth rise from 5.2 per cent to 12.4 per cent.24
Table 4.1 China's Industrial Structure 25 (1978-2002; Unit: %)
Primary Industry	 Secondary Industry	 Tertiary Industry
Employment Proportion o Employment Proportion of Employment Proportion ol
the GDP
	
the GDP	 the GDP
	
1978 70.5	 28.1	 17.3	 48.2	 12.2	 23.7
	
1980 68.7
	 30.1	 18.3	 48.5	 13.0	 21.4
	
1985 62.4	 28.4	 20.8	 43.1	 16.8	 28.5
	
1989 60.1
	 25.0	 21.6	 43.0	 18.3	 32.0
	
1990 60.1	 27.1	 21.4	 41.6	 18.5	 31.3
	
1995 52.2	 20.5	 23.0	 48.8	 24.8	 130.7
	
1996 50.5	 20.2	 23.5	 49.0	 26.0	 30.8
	
1997 49.9
	 19.1	 23.7	 50.0	 26.4	 30.9
Globali_-ation of the Chinese Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), P. 19.
23 This concept was first explicitly proposed in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Congress of the
Communist party of China held in October 2000. See Lu Xinkui, ed., Zhongguo Xinxihua (China
Informatization) (Beijing: Electronics Industry Publisher, 2002), pp. 5 1-83; "State to Launch Specific
Information Industry Unit," People Daily, September 26, 2001, available online at
<http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200109/26/eng20010926_81  100.html>, accessed on March 15,
2002. For more details, see Ministry of Information Industry (Mu), Tenth Five-Year Plan
(2001-2005) -Information Industry. The English translation is provided by the Telecommunications
Research Project of Asian Studies at the University of Hong Kong, available online at
<http://www.trp.hku.hk/infofile/chinaJ2002/ 10-5-yr-plan.pdf', accessed on September 14, 2002;
Xiudian Dai, "Towards a Digital Economy with Chinese Characteristics?" New Media and Society,
Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 14 1-162.
24 
"State Nurtures Fledgling IT Sector," Business Weekly, April 24, 2001.
25 The industrial structure re-defined and decreed under the title Sanci Chanye Huafen Guiding
(Regulations on the Classification of the Three Industrial Structures) was published by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China on May 14,2003, in which the primary industry includes farming, animal
husbandry and fishery, the secondary industry includes mining, manufacturing, electronic power,
water supply and construction, and lastly the tertiary industry are those which are excluded from the
primary and secondary industries, including transportation, post and telecommunications, information
industry, financing and services, ...etc. See <http://www.stats.gov.cnitjbzlsccyhfgd/1200305280116 .
htm>, accessed on June 25, 2003.
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	1998 49.8
	 18.4	 23.5	 48.7	 26.7	 '32.9
	
1999 50.1	 17.7	 23.0	 49.3	 26.9	 33.0
	
2000 50.0	 15.9	 22.5	 5Ø•9	 27.5	 33.2
	
2001 50.0
	 15.2	 22.3	 51.1	 27.7	 33.6
	
2002 50.0
	 15.4	 21.4	 51.1	 28.6	 33.5
Source: Zhongguo Tong/i Nianjian (China Statistics Yearbook) (Internet version), National
Bureau of Statistics of China, various years, available on-line at <http://huang9.nease.net/
images/jianding.htm>, accessed on February 19, 2004.
Section II
	 The Emergence of Internet Entrepreneurs and their Operational
Environment
The Internet entrepreneurs did not mushroom in China right after the economic
reforms in the late 1970s. In the early 1990s indigenous private IT managers did not
possess adequate know-how and entrepreneurial skills for the operation and
governing of IT-related businesses. Yet, the lack of Internet capitalists was later
supplemented by transnational corporations, overseas-trained Chinese and Chinese
diaspora when the IT industry was ready to take off in the mid-1990s. One survey
indicates that many high-tech ventures in China have started with "foreign-educated
Chinese" (hai gui, "sea turtles" in Mandarin) who have had overseas credentials or
close contacts, who usually have received funding support before they are lured back
to China.26
 They have also tended to further import technology and capital for China's
economic development. 27
 Zhang Chaoyang (Charles Zhang), for instance, chairman
and CEO of Sohu, is MIT-trained (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) with a
Ph.D. Similarly, the incumbent Sina CEO, Wang Yan, also has a Bachelors degree in
26 Debbie Liao and Philip Sohmen, "The Development of Modern Entrepreneurship in China,"
Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 29.
27 See David Zweig, Chen Changguo and Stanley Rosen, "Globalization and Transnational Human
Capital: Overseas and Returnee Scholars to China," The China Quarterly, No. 179, September 2004,
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Law from the University of Paris. And the former Sina CEO, Mao Daolin, completed
his Master's degree from Stanford University. All of them are relatively young,
between 30 and 40, and were all trained overseas.
Since there were few pioneering Internet entrepreneurs to grasp the abundant
opportunities during the Internet boom in China, many of them have become tycoons
in recent years. Quarterly financial reports of major Internet portals have revealed that
their operating profits are principally derived from online advertising business,
wireless value-added services, corporate network services, the online gaming market,
and mobile phone short messaging service (SMS). 28 The results of the 2003 Forbes
China Rich List have further confirmed their economic achievements. As Tim
Ferguson, editor of Forbes Global, commented, "This year [2003], particularly, we
are seeing the development of a new type of Chinese businesses from high-tech
sectors, especially the Internet industry." 29 Whilst Charles Zhang, CEO of Sohu.com ,
ranked No. 20 with $270 million, Ding Lei (William Ding), founder and chief
architect of NetEase.com, topped the Rich List, with wealth that could be as big as
US$1 billion. 30 As a consequence, the Internet entrepreneurs have become
pp. 749-754.
28 Vanessa Hua, "Portals Hit Pay Dirt: 3 Net Companies Set up Lucrative Deals in China," San
Francisco Chronicle, July 7, 2003, available online at <http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/
2003/07/07/BU34838.DTL>, accessed on July 8, 2003. The major Internet portals have provided
Internet content to users of China's nearly two hundred million mobile phones. On their phones,
subscribers can receive news report, entertainment and sports news, jokes or advice on their sex lives,
and access their e-mail account. In 2003, for example, at least forty-five percent of the revenue of each
portal came from wireless phone service. See Yilu Zhao, "China's Web Portals Open a Door to Risk,"
The New York Times, March 7, 2004.
29 
"High-tech T'coons Highlighted in Forbes China Rich List," China Daily, October 31, 2003,
available online at <http://wwwl .chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-1 0/3 1/content_277355.htm>,
accessed on December 9, 2003.
30 
"The Top 15 China Rich List Members," Forbes Maga-ine, No. 11, November 24, 2003, available
online at <http://www.forbes.comlforbes/2003/1124/156.html >. There were a total of eight
technology tycoons amongst the Top one hundred China Rich List, reflecting better time for the
Internet-related technology industry. See also Russell Flannery, "Web of Nation," Forbes Magine,
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economically influential role models in China and in particular amongst the younger
Internet generations. As such, "it is the Internet that has made their economic success
possible."3 ' One of the implications may be that socioeconomic change both abets
and is abetted by the new Internet entrepreneurs. Whether the political orientations
and its influence of the Internet capitalists may be favourable or opposed to the
existing regime is a critical question for the Chinese government and those concerned
about China's (political) future.
As said earlier, the Internet industry, together with high-technology enterprises,
did not flourish in China until the mid-1990s. Institutionally speaking, it was only in
September 2000 that the State Council classified the telecom business into two
categories in the China Telecom Regulations: basic telecom service and valued-added
telecom business. Whilst the basic telecom service includes fixed-line and mobile
phone, paging, data and satellite communications, the valued-added telecom business
encompasses Internet content providers (ICPs), Internet service providers (ISPs),
Internet, Internet data centres, and application service providers. 32 Sohu.com and
Sina.com were among the first group of Internet companies to be awarded an official
ICP licence by the MIT in early 2001, which is renewable on a yearly basis.
In practice, the recent development of China's "Internet media," also known as
the new media, may be classified into three major categories in terms of its affinity
with the state and its ownership: (1) websites operated by traditional official media,
No. II, November 24,2003, available online at <http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/l124/l54.html >,
both addresses were accessed on January 24, 2004.
31 Henny Sender, "China's Future: Entrepreneurs," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 163, No. 4,
January 27, 2000, p. 73.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianxin Tiaoli (Telecom Regulations of the People's Republic of
China), Article 8, State Council, September 2000, available online at <http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/
hyzw/hygl/dxtl.htm>, accessed on February, 13, 2004.
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such as the People Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television (CCTV),
China Daily; (2) websites supported mainly by the provincial/local news media and
government (news) organisations, such as CYCNET (China Youth Computer
Information Network), QiangLong Net (2ldnn.com ), Eastday (Dong Fang Wang),
Enorth.com.cn (Bei Fang Wang), Southcn.com.cn (Nan Fang Wang); (3) commercial
Internet media websites, domestic and foreign, including Sina, Sohu, Netease, Tom,
Chinese Yahoo, China.com (Zhongguo Wang). The Internet entrepreneurs in a broad
sense may encompass any managerial elites that govern and operate websites.
However, in contrast to traditional media websites (category 1) and those provincial
and local quasi-official ones (category 2), that both to a varying degree receive
government funds and subsidies for their regular operation and are subject to official
directives, the commercial Internet websites have instead born full responsibility for
their Internet company's survival. 33 In other words, the Web sites sponsored by
traditional and provincial/local media have shown official or quasi-official features,
and more importantly the propaganda-orientation characteristics. 34 Moreover, the
commercial websites are indeed part of the non-state sector and fall into the min-ying
n Guo Letian, "2003: Zhongguo de Xinwen Wangzhan Hechuqu" (2003: Where do Chinese News
Media go), Chuanmei Guancha (Media Observer), No. 2, February 19, 2003, available online at
<http://www.chuanmei.netlTopic/articleshow.asp?ID = 1 870&TopiclD=6>, accessed on May 1, 2003.
In an interview with Zhang Ping, CEO of China Daily, he confirmed that China Daily like some
other official media "served the main purpose to propagandise China to the world in a good manner."
Vice CEO of the China Internet Information Centre (Zhongguo Wang, China Net), Li Jiaming also
confirmed that under the state fund, China Net was not under business pressure like the commercial
Internet Web sites. If there was any pressure, it came from whether the Web site was popular amongst
Internet users. Both illustrations highlight the general features of those official and quasi-official
media websites in the face of commercial websites. See "Zhongguo Ribaowang Zongcai Zhangping:
Zhuiqiu Gongzuo he Shenghuo de Shuangying" (CEO of China Daily, Zhang Ping, pursues the
win-win situation both in work and life), People's Daily, September 30, 2003, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/I4677/2 1965/22069/ 211 8206.html>;"Zhongguo Wang Fuzongcai
Li Jiaming: Xianghe Wangyou Jiao Pengyou," (Vice CEO of China Net, Li Jiaming wants to make
friends with Netizens), People's Daily, September 30, 2003, available online at <http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/21965/22069/2118215.html>, both accessed on February 27, 2004.
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(civilian-managed) enterprises, also known as siying (private) enterprises. 35
 In this
respect, the dissertation has adopted a narrower but practical definition towards what
is meant by "Internet entrepreneurs," that is to focus mainly on the private and
commercial Internet websites that fall wholly in category 3.
The environments in which the private Internet entrepreneurs operate
demonstrate at least some notable phenomena. Firstly, the commercial websites are
significantly constrained from legally publishing (flu bu) their own news reports, and
reprinting off-shore news sources; they can only reprint (zhuan zai) news from those
websites sanctioned officially. 36 As a consequence, the main news sources for
commercial media websites are supposed to come solely from monopoly news
channels—central and provincial traditional media outlets. By and large, the
commercial Internet portals have signed cooperative agreements with authorised
news outlets and carry news from them. The immediate result can be partially
examined in the figures presented by Chen Tong, editor-in-chief of Sina.com , which
showed that the total online news hits were shared principally by the four national
Four operational definitions decreed by the government to distinguish private enterprises from
state-sector ones: (1) be financially self-reliant; no budgetary funds available for the enterprises; (2)
business established entirely at the initiative of the business founders; no state administrative
participation or intervention; (3) a high degree of autonomy in their management; (4) be responsible
for their own profits and losses. See Xinhua Yuebao (New China Monthly), No. 584, June 1993, p. 42,
cited in Bennis Wai-yip So, "Evolution of Minying High-tech Enterprises in China: Legitimizing
Private Ownership," Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 5, September/October 2001, p. 82.
36 Hulian Wangzhan Congshi Dengai Xinwen Yewu Guanli Zhanxing Guiding (Provisional
Regulations on Governance of Internet-based News Providers Registration ofNews Websites),jointly
issued by the Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry (Mil)
on November 7, 2000, available online at <http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca42718.htm>, accessed
on February 21, 2004. Key stipulations related to commercial websites include: (1) If commercial
portal sites run by non-news organisations wish to carry news, they may do so only after obtaining
permission. After gaining approval, they may only publish news provided by officially approved news
organisations; (2) Commercial portals may not carry any news items based on their own interviews or
from other sources. Other commercial sites run by non-news organisations are not allowed to carry
news of any kind; (3) No China-based Web sites will be allowed to link to overseas news websites or
carry news from overseas news media or websites, without separate approval by the State Council
Information Office and (4) Commercial websites that wish to carry news must first sign cooperative
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websites, Sina, Sohu, Xinhua News Agency, and the People Daily, at 35 per cent, 20
per cent, 20 per cent, and 20 per cent, respectively. But when it came to the
comparison with general website visiting, there existed stark differences between
commercial and traditional websites. Sina had more than 27 per cent share of total
visits, whilst Sohu, Xinhua News Agency and the People 's Daily occupied 19 per cent,
2 per cent, 2 per cent, respectively.37
Because all ISPs, ICPs, and Internet café owners are responsible for reporting
any patron who violates the laws and regulations, the stringent but ambiguous
regulations have a profound impact upon Internet entrepreneurs; they promote
self-censorship and set up their own monitors, known as "Big Mama," to censor the
chatrooms, bulletin boards and Internet cafés lest they may incur "severe penalties for
content violations by third parties on their network, site, or server."38 In so doing, they
may keep in line with the laws that are broadly decreed. Given these constraints on
Internet operators, they have publicly committed themselves on several occasions to
adhere to (Internet) media controls put forward by the CCP on the one hand, and
continue to utilise the leeway provided to Internet-based commercial portals
unavailable to other media on the other hand. There will be more discussion in the
agreements with authorized news outlets.
" "Shangye Wangzhan yu Guanfang Wangzhan zai Hezuo zhong gong Fazhan" (Commercial and
official websites develop through co-operation), People c Daily, September 26, 2003, available online
at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/21965/22069/2111292.html >. See also a recent
comprehensive survey conducted by Guo Liang under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
entitled 2003 nian Zhongguo Shier Chengshi Hulianwang Shiyong Zhuangkuang ji Yingxiang
Diaocha Baogao (The 2003 research report on surveying Internet usage and impact in twelve Chinese
cities), especially part 3.3, available online at <http://tech.sina.com.cn/focus/internet_Rlindex.shtml >,
both websites were accessed on October 30, 2003.
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, 2002 White Paper: American
Business in China, section on the Information Technology, available online at <http://www.
amcham-china.org.cnlpublications/white/2002/en-20.htm>, accessed on February 29, 2004. See also
Lokman Tsui, Internet in China: Big Mama Is Watching You, unpublished MA Thesis, University of
Leiden, 2001, available online at <http://www.lokman.nu/thesis/010717-thesis.pdf,  accessed on
112
ensuing sections about their pragmatic approaches.
In this respect, the Internet has emerged as an alternative to the traditional media
to acquire, exchange, and disseminate information in the wired world. In fact,
compared with Web sites affiliated to traditional media such as the People 's Daily or
Xinhua News Agency, news channels on Internet portals have advantages in a more
flexible style palatable to a broader readership. That is partly because the Internet
portals can also acquire much more news reports than any single medium by means of
extensive cooperation and purchasing stories. Moreover, they have also provided a
wide array of content online. At times, "news" (xiii wen) is virtually indistinguishable
from "information" (xin xi) because there seems no clear-cut distinction between
them, when especially "news" and "information" are carefully edited in the Chinese
context. As Jiang Yaping, head of the online version of the People Daily,
acknowledged, "The unique feature of the Internet is exhibited in its ambiguity
between news and information, and between news publishing and reprinting. They are
all interwoven and thus have resulted in the truth that it is but a step from news to
information."39 This has created space for privately owned Internet web sites to exert
influence on their targeted audiences.
Section HI Case Studies of the Interilet Portals—Sohu.com  and Sina.com
The Internet media in China, according to Charles Zhang, CEO of the Sohu.com, was
not treated as a popular mass media when it was set up in 1996. It was not until 1998
March 12, 2004.
Jiang Yaping, "Zhongguo Wangluo Meiti Xianzhuang Fenxi he Zhanwang," (Analysis and Outlook
of Current China Internet Media) People Daily, July 4,2002, available online at <http:/Iwww.people.
com.cnJGB/itJ48/298/20020704/7685 19.html>, accessed on November 4, 2003.
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that the Internet began to play a role similar to the traditional media. "When there is
tremendous online traffic of some two hundred million hits daily on Sohu.com , the
role of the popular Internet media outlet is confirmed and strengthened." 4° With a
mostly foreign-funded ownership structure and partly western-style management,
Sohu started their Web site as early as 1996 when Charles Zhang returned from the
USA with foreign funds.4'
Sohu has proclaimed its Internet editorial policy as "humanitarian care, social
responsibility and media credibility." 42 Sohu's policy is in principle consistent with
China's Internet laws and regulations, such as the Provisional Regulations on
Administration of Internet Culture, which was promulgated by the PRC Ministry of
Culture in May 2003. In comparison with previous Internet-related rules, the
regulation further specifies the roles that the Internet media should play in enhancing
social responsibility and facilitating social conscience. Above all, Internet media
ought to shoulder the obligation to serve the people, state and socialism. 43 Under the
present news constraint, Sohu.com  has like other Internet portals presented "softer" or
"safer" online materials,' featuring less politically sensitive and subversive arenas,
40 
"Duihua Souhu Zhang Chaoyang, Zhubu Chengdan qi Meiti de Zhongda Zeren," (Dialogs with
Sohu's CEO, Zhang Chaoyang—Undertake Media's Great Responsibility Gradually), People r Daily,
December 31, 2003, available online at <http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/it/1067/2273587 . html>,
accessed on 19 February 2004.
Descriptions cited in Sohu.com, available at <http://www.sohu.com/about/English/vision.htm>,
accessed on January 12, 2004.
42 
"Souhu Xinwen Yizhi zai Nuli Jianchi Ziji de Wangluo Xinwen Jiazhiguan" (Sohu's news is
persistently working on its own Internet news media values), Sohu.com, 12 November 2003, available
online at <http://news.sohu.com/06/23/news215502306.shtml >, accessed on March 14, 2004.
Hulianwang Zhanxing Guanli Guiding (The Provisional Regulations on Administration of Internet
Culture), article 5. For full text, see <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1027/1946034.html >,
accessed on January 8, 2004.
' Caroline Straathof, spokeswoman for Sohu.com , has acknowledged that given websites have to be
what people called politically correct, that only concerns most sensitive political news. See Caroline
Straathof, "New Media and Democracy: Case Studies—China," Are the New Media Good for
Democracy?—Media Round Table Report (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2001), 24, available
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such as entertainment, environmental protection, gender and ethical issues, violence,
and so forth. Although their materials are politics-free in form, these reports usually
have some political implications in nature. Furthermore, the coverage from Sohu and
other commercial Internet portals has indeed widened the public debates and
displayed the plurality of public opinion. By skilfully editing news and information,
comprehensive categorising, and Web page designing, Sohu has become a
predominant Internet news platform with its timely and all-round coverage of the
news and information. The results have been far-reaching: commercial Internet Web
sites like Sohu have demonstrated themselves influential mainstream media that
attempt to shape and direct public opinion and debates.45 Chinese people, who in the
past were limited to official sources of news and information, such as the evening
news at seven o'clock on China Central Television (CCTV, xinwen lianbo) or the
People 's Daily, have now found themselves equipped with multiple sources of news
and information once they get online.
It should be always born in mind that a commercial Internet company like Sohu
has striven hard to maximise their profits from the fledgling Internet market. One of
the consequences is that online chat rooms with their anonymity, convenience and
interactiveness have, for example, fallen victim to pornographic and sexually
seductive messages and contents. 46 Allegedly in order to boost their cyber traffic and
online at <http://www.idea.intJ 200 1_forum/media/mrtJapers/round_table_report.pdf, accessed on
May 15, 2002.
"Sohu Gongsi Shouxi Yunyingguan Gu Yongqiang Xiansheng Zhici—Quanwen" (The full text of
speech of Gu Yongqiang, Sohu's Chief Operating Officer), Sohu.com, November 12, 2003, available
online at <http://news.sohu.comJl6/22/news215502216.shtml >, accessed on March 14, 2004.
46 See, for example, Wang Jipeng, "Wangzhan CEO de Xiayige Chenghu—Laobao: Tantan Wangluo
Seqing," (The next title for the Internet portals' CEO—pander: talks about the online pornography)
Yahoo China, June 20, 2003, available online at <http://cn.tech.yahoo.com/030620/55/1nybk.html >,
accessed on February 27, 2004.
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popularity, Internet portals have formed "marketing alliances" with illegal
pornography Web sites, after their previous online marketing strategy failed.47
Official media, scholars and commentators have then responded by stepping in and
calling for greater attention to the seriousness of such online obscenity.48
The topical case is the Mu Zimei incident. Working for a biweekly column on
City Pictorial, Mu Zimei, a 25-year-old sex columnist, was small-fry until she was
hailed as a household name in the Internet community because of her most
controversial work—diaries of sexual encounters, appearing online from mid-June
2003 onwards. Sina.com has even used its platform to promote the serialisation since
November 11, 2003. One of their management officers explains that "Sina.com
normally attracts 20 million hits daily. However the number immediately jumped to
30 million and stayed there for 10 days soon after the serialisation of Mu Zimei was
online." 49 As a result, Sina.com credited her with attracting 10 million daily visitors.
Sohu.com, says "Mu Zimei is the name most often typed into its Internet search
engine, surpassing one occasional runner-up, Mao Zedong." 5° Her writings have
fuelled a wide rage of discussions and debates about sexuality and gender issues on
the Internet, where more people are inspired others to write weblogs. Sina.com  was
later attacked first by Beijing Wanbao (Beijing Evening News) for its negligence of
maintaining social responsibly and excessive pursuit of online viewings and
Sarah Schafer, "The Portals into China," Newsweek, October 13, 2003, P. 38.
48 
"Zhongguo Wangluo Yulun Wenti Duoduo," (Plenty of public opinion's issues in China's Internet),
Liao Wang Xinwen Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly), No. 5, February 26, 2004, available online at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedial2004-02/25/contentl 3301 94.htm>, accessed on February 27,
2004;
Jim Yardley, "Internet Sex Column Thrills, and Inflames, China," The New York 7imes, November
30, 2003, P. 3, available online at <http://www.nytimes.comI2003/11/30/international/asia/3OCHIN .
html>, accessed on December 2, 2004.
50 Ibid.
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commercial benefits. 5 ' Sina.com has as a result shrunk its coverage and moved the
related reports from a prominent layout spot to a less notable position in response to
social criticism.
In this regard, commercial Internet outlets like Sina.com are emancipating a
relatively fettered society where the once tabooed social themes now can be more
lively and openly discussed, online and offline. The Internet is now impacting China's
sociopolitical environment, creating a more pluralised society where diversified
public interests may coexist. In this repect, the private Internet entrepreneurs have
provided a loosely regulated platform that serves a wide range of people's interests.
Despite negative impacts upon society, there is no doubt that different interests and
needs of the public may now converge in Chinese cyberspace.
In addition, Internet portals like Sohu.com have also fulfilled their corporate
social responsibility on the one hand, and maintain a good relationship with the state
on the other hand. Take the coverage of the World AIDS Day on December 1, 2002 as
an example. Here, Sohu covered a lengthy and wide range of issues in approximately
forty pieces of news to bring the seriousness of this issue to the public's attention. One
of the noticeable and controversial events on that day was an HI V-positive woman
from the central province of Guizhou marrying her HI V-negative fiancé in Beijing.
This interesting contrast from Sohu's coverage on this matter bears an important
implication here that while there were varied standpoints from the health authority,
the Beijing Municipal Government, and the former President Jiang, their perspectives
51 
"Zenme Kan Mu Zimei" (How to look upon Mu Zimei phenomenon), Being Wanbao, 16
November 2003, available online at <http://www.bjd.com.cn/BJWB/2003111
 6/GBfBJWB'
11 523M0"l 6W101 0.htm>, accessed on April 15, 2004.
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could be presented in a number of cyber media spaces besides Sohu.com.52
Moreover, Sohu has managed to establish a closer tie with the authorities by
giving concrete support to government and quasi-government societal organisation
for its own causes. For instance, Sohu was exclusively granted the privilege to cover
the World Economic Forum: China Business Summit 2003 Conference, in
cooperation with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the China Enterprise
Confederation in November 2003. Sohu.com actually used its Internet platform to
widely publicise such a high-profile event. On top of the VIP participants consisting
of high-ranking officials and foreign as well as domestic CEOs, China's Executive
Vice-Premier Huang Ju took part in the conference and delivered a keynote speech
about China's growing prospects in the midst of continuous development.
Both cases have revealed two significant political meanings. First, Sina, Sohu
and other commercial Internet portals have played a part in widening public debates,
and presented people with a much wider horizon. They may have even moved the
bottom line of what the government considers acceptable and created a more relaxed
socioeconomic environment. As Li Xiguang optimistically notes, with the
proliferation of new communications technologies, Chinese people can now begin to
"form their own viewpoints by verifying and discounting information that they
52 See "Case Study I: Sohu.com—A CSR Perspective," CSR in China Quarterly, No. 2, April-June
2003, P. 5, available online at <http://www.mfcinsight.com/files/CSR_BB_Oped3_
Update030725.pdf>, accessed on January 16, 2004; "Aizibing: Guojia Gai Guan Shenme, Bu gai
Guan Sheme," (AIDS: What does the state should intervene and not intervene) available online at
<http://news.sohu.com/00/O7/news204670700.shtm1>; "Yufang Kongzhi Aizibing Ying Jiejue
Liangge Falu Wenti," (There should solve two legal issues on preventing and controlling AIDS),
available online at <http://news.sohu.com/38/31/news204663138.shtml>; both appeared on Sina.com .
on December 1,2001, and accessed on March 13, 2004.
See the homepage of the China 2003 Business Summit at <hup://business.sohu.comJ36/66/column
214726636.shtml>, accessed on March 10, 2004.
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consider biased."54 Secondly, Sohu has not only promoted its non-profit public image
for socioeconomic causes, but also broadened the channels to further (business)
cooperation with government organisations, agencies and officials in the future. In a
word, commercial Internet media like Sohu may strengthen its brand-name image and
most importantly enhance their businesses relationship with the Chinese authorities.
Such a business practice has accordingly become something of a mantra for
successful entrepreneurs to maintain ties with central and local governments under
such intricate guanxi networks. Partly guanxi is in this respect seen as filling the
"institutional hole" created by China's incomplete and partial reforms; it has its own
independent logic. 55 All in all, it leads some commentators to argue that "the
possibility of being shut down by the government has encouraged self-censorship
[and discipline] by Internet companies—which in turn has dampened online political
communication,"56 and there is little reason to expect that commercial or foreign
Internet operators would risk advancing noble and just political ends like human
rights and democracy. It is nevertheless too early and the reality too complicated to
jump to a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the pragmatic approach adopted by Sohu
and other portals alike in dealing with their online contents has proved very successful
in negotiating China's political winds. When the grand political climate turns towards
nationalism (patriotism) and tighter media censorship at the time of special (political)
Li Xiguang, "ICT and the Demise of Propaganda in China," Global Media Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3,
Fall 2003, p. 4, available online at <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edulccalgmj/SubmittedDocuments/
Fall2003fRefereed/Xiguang.htm>, accessed on March 16, 2004.
See more debates in Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David Wank, eds., Social Connections in
China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
56 Shanthi Kalathil, "The Internet and Asia: Broad Band or Broad Bans?" Foreign Service Journal, Vol.
78, No. 2, February 2001, available online at <http://www.ceip.org/filesfPublications/internet_asia .
asp?p5 &frompubdate>, accessed on April 18, 2001.
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events, the Internet portals have deftly asserted their loyally and political support for
the government's policies and stances. However, in more liberal times and relaxed
occasions, they tend to have presented themselves as crucial bridge builders between
the Internet customers and the seemingly unfettered gateway to their large news and
information databases. The Internet entrepreneurs are thus adopting this kind of
practical approach in dealing with (political) demands from the authorities, but in the
meantime hunt for business profits to attract more online viewers. This approach and
aptitude is a link to the next theme to be discussed: the clientelist-corporatist
relationship between the state and the Internet entrepreneurs.
Section IV	 State-Business Relationship in the Internet Sector
In pre-reform China, state-society relations were partly sustained and strengthened
through state authority and Party ideology. The central government exercised its
grassroots control by means of local party meetings that were usually conducted
through an individual danwei (work unit) or neighbourhood association—village
committee (cunweihui). As a result, the Party was indeed ubiquitous in penetrating
into peasants' and workers' everyday lives, partly because the danwei-based society
depended heavily upon the delivery of social welfare and provisions, as presented by
Andrew Walder in his book, Communist Neo-Traditionalism. The centrally
mandated practice of business operation has been gradually withered away in the
reform era since I 980s. Due to the institutional changes in the wake of economic
transition, the economic imperatives require at least some compliance with directives
Andrew G Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). See also Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish,
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of the Party and the command economy. 58 Meanwhile, the institutional changes in
China have undeniably benefited some groups more than others in the state-led
redistribution of resources and benefits. 59 Private entrepreneurs including former
bureaucrats who have left the communist Party, government office, military
organisations, and SOBs, and newly emerged business elites have also all contributed
to the reshaping of the state-business relationship in China. In one sense, the "Three
Represents" mirror the state's proactive measure to cope with the changing
relationship.
This dissertation argues that the state-business nexus in the Internet sector is and
will be remaining a "clientelist-corporatist" trajectory at least in the short- to
medium-term. With respect to clientelism, the state has awarded resources
(operational licences, for example, in the case of the Internet sector) to its clients
(Internet entrepreneurs) in exchange for their political support for ruling legitimacy
and social contributions like job creation, tax revenue and national wealth for the
majority of populace. In the meantime, the state may concede certain operational
autonomy to their everyday Internet business management.
The hybrid clientelist-corporatist complex is manifested in one way or another
within the Internet industry. Not only are the government-sponsored or -supported
Internet enterprises effectively under heavy control of their patrons, but the private
Internet companies also have to comply with the government's administrative
regulations in return for a limited numbers of operating licences. The Internet industry
Urban Life in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
See, for example, Andrew G Walder, "The Decline of Communist Power: Elements of a Theory of
Institutional Change," Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, April 1994, Pp. 297-323.
Xiaobo Hu, "The State and the Private Sector in a New Property Rights Systems," in China after
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in China is hence by and large a protected sector given that the IT industry is exposed
to fiercer competition from global corporations under the concessions and terms made
in its entry into the WTO. Prior to China's accession to the WTO, the former Minister
of Mu, Wu Jichuan, spoke publicly in September 1999 that foreign companies would
not be allowed to invest nor operate in Chinese Internet-related business, whether
content providers or service providers, for both fall into the category of value-added
telecom services. 60 China is still only partially opening up the market even after
entering the WTO in spite of the terms of IT and basic telecommunications policies
agreed.6 ' One of the direct impacts on the industry is that competition is still regulated
by issuing a certain number of licences. The state's discriminatory policy is thus
apparent in the domains of policy interpretation and law enforcement. These
situations have somewhat resulted in distorted and discriminatory market competition
where the Internet entrepreneurs are usually and ought to be well connected to
Jiang, eds. Gang Lin and Xiaobo Hu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), PP. 69-89.
60 Hans Lombardo, "China Bans Foreign Investment in Internet Sector," Internetnews.com , September
14, 1999, available online at <http://www.internetnews.corn/bus-news/article.php/200131 >, accessed
on February 13, 2004.
61 Upon China's accession, foreign service suppliers for those value-added services, including Internet
and paging services, would be permitted to establish joint venture value-added telecommunication
enterprises, without quantitative restrictions, and provide services in the cities of Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Beijing. Foreign investment in joint venture would be no more than thirty per cent.
Within one year after China's accession, the areas would be expanded to include Chengdu, Chongqing,
Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Xi'an, Taiyuan
and Wuhan and foreign investment would be no more than forty-nine per cent. Within two years after
China's accession, there would be no geographic restrictions and foreign investment would be no more
than 50 per cent. See "China's WTO Commitments," Being Review, Vol. 47, No.4, January 2004, Pp.
16-18. For example, American venture capital fund International Data Group (IDG) has helped a
Chinese Internet company named 8848.com to get back to the Internet market in the aftermath of
China's accession into the WTO. As a matter of fact, the IDG Technology Venture Investment has
been the first American venture capital investor to enter the Chinese information market that has
invested in dotcoms. We can even proclaim that many major Internet ISPs and ICPs, such as Sina.com ,
Sohu.com, NetEase.com , Tom.com, 372 1.com, Baidu.com, .. .etc., have to a varying degree received
foreign investments in different forms. See Tang Yuankai, "Net Profits," Being Review, Vol. 47, No.
4, January 22, 2004, PP. 22-24; Russell Flannery, "Mergers and Acquisitions: China's Internet M&A
Bang Likely to Last," Forbes.com, December 1, 2003, available online at <http://www.forbes.com/
2003/12/O1/czrfl2Olchina.html>, accessed on January 22, 2004. But for the basic telecom service,
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political power for the purpose of enjoying such privileges.
The current politico-economic climate in the Internet industry also promotes the
ostensibly imperative doctrine that Internet and ICT entrepreneurs have to maintain a
close relationship with government officials at all levels. They are apt to believe that
the clientelist approach is both a politically safe and an economically effective
strategy to manoeuvre the way they do Internet business vis-à-vis the state
bureaucracy. For instance, Rupert Murdoch, a household name of media tycoon,
claimed in September 1993:
Advances in the technology of communications have proved an unambiguous threat to
totalitarian regimes: Fax machines enable dissidents to bypass state-controlled print
media; direct-dial telephone makes it dfflcult for a state to control interpersonal voice
communication; and satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry
residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels.62
Nevertheless, in order to gain limited access to China's lucrative markets for ICTs,
Murdoch has been currying favour with the Chinese regime by removing the BBC
World Service Television newscasts since April 1994 from his Star TV satellite
broadcasts because the Beijing government deems that the BBC usually carry
politically inappropriate and sensitive issues in its coverage of China, Hong Kong and
Taiwan. He has also broadcasted China Central Television's (CCTV) programming in
Europe and America.63
The situation is even more conspicuous for Internet entrepreneurs running
there have not seen a single operating licence granted to a foreign-invested telecom joint venture two
years after China's WTO entry.
62 Marcus W. Brauchli, Joseph Kahn and S. Karene Witcher, "Murdoch's Plans Could Aid China in
Media Control," Wall Street Journal, January 31, 1996, p.A4.
63 William Atkins, "Brand Power and State Power: Rise of the New Media Networks in East Asia,"
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cybercafés in medium or small cities. This is largely because Internet entrepreneurs
still more or less depend on the local government's discretionary favouritism for
protection and resources. 64 In this regard, the Internet café entrepreneurs have less
autonomy but more structural dependence. It is analogous to the practice of
"embedded autonomy" as Peter Evans has called it, in which he describes the
phenomenon mostly found in developmental states, of"... an autonomy embedded in
a concrete set of social ties that bind the state to society and provide institutionalised
channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies."65
Given that the Chinese case does not perfectly conform to the definition provided, the
Internet entrepreneurs still increasingly play a consultative role for the government
because many executives have been appointed to government policy panels aimed at
soliciting visions from Internet industry and enhancing cooperative
government-business relationship.66
The strong regulatory powers over the behaviour of domestic Internet
practitioners also have somewhat promoted indigenous firms' personal relationships
with the authorities concerned. 67 In an interview for this project, an Internet manager
talked about the role of the "princeling party" (taizidang or gao gun zidi) in
significantly facilitating business prosperity through government support or resources.
The "princeling party" in China is the special privileged class; they are usually the
The Pac/lc Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 473-480.
64 Interview with a local Internet entrepreneurs running a cyber café in Chengde city, Hebei province,
in July 2002.
65 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), P. 59.
66 Shanthi Kalathil, "China's New Media Sector: Keeping the State in," The Pac/Ic Review, Vol. 16,
No. 4, December 2003, pp. 497-498.
67 Christopher R. Hughes, "China and the Globalization of ICTs: Implications for International
Relations," New Media & Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 208-2 10.
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offspring or relatives of the nomenklatura. Normally they manage to draw on the
legacy or influence of their veteran communist revolutionaries in a subtle way to take
power or hold key posts in the party, government, military, or more recently in
lucrative business fields.68
 Since the group of taizidang is usually the family members
of political leaders, they appear to have easy access to political power when they
engage in business. Those taizi or proteges are often sought by transnational
corporations as "advisers" of their business into the gigantic China market chiefly
because of their guanxi more than their professional advice. Albeit that the
institutional constraints on the "princeling party" has now been stronger than ever as
Cheng Li has argued,69
 the role of gaogan zidi can not be simply overlooked.
Specifically, two renowned IT figures were mostly identified in an interview for
this chapter: Jiang Mianheng, son the Jiang Zemin, and Daniel Mao, husband of
President Hu Jintao's daughter. Jiang Mianheng, vice president of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, holds a long list of directorships, including chairman of China
Netcom, a state-run project to build China's Internet backbone. He is especially
collaborating with Taiwan tycoon Winston Wong to construct a US$1.63 billion
semi-conductor plan in Pudong, Shanghai. 7° Daniel Mao is the former CEO of
Sina.com, China's biggest Internet portal, and he still remains on the Sina board of
directors. In this respect, the unique factor, the role of the taizidang in boosting
68 For a more general discussion about the "princeling party" in China, see, for example, Pin Ho and
Xin Gao, Zhongkong taiidang (China's Princeling Party) (two volumes) (Hong Kong: Mirror Books,
1993).
69 Cheng Li, China Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Md. and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2001).
° Informal talk with Internet entrepreneurs in Beijing in September 2003. See also "China's IT Power
Player," Asiaweekcom, July 27—August 3, 2001, available online at <http://www.asiaweek.com/
asiaweek/technology/article/0,8707,168222,00.html>, accessed on March 5, 2004. The group of
taL-idang is the family members of political leaders and they usually have easy access to political
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China's IT industry, has also nurtured and strengthened the state-business relationship,
insofar as it provides telling evidence for the coexistence of clientelism and state
corporatism.
Meanwhile, strong autonomous and independent groups from the
Internet-related businesses are relatively few in China. Take the Internet Society of
China (Zhongguo Hulianwang Xiehui, <http://www.isc.org.cn/>) for instance. It is
probably the only (nationwide) Internet association that encompasses Internet players,
lawyers, and media scholars. It was inaugurated in May 2001. It functions as an
intermediary between the government and entrepreneurs. Its objective is to propagate
state policies, laws and regulations with regard to the Internet industry, reflecting the
needs and wants of specific policies from members, helping the government enact
relevant Internet policies and promoting self-regulation among members. 7 ' Indeed,
all societal organisations, including trade and labour unions, virtually have to be
sanctioned by the state. The authorities chiefly organise them, and their leadership is
directed by or subjected to government leadership, ensuring the members of the
associations conform to the state's interests, such as the overall national
informatisation process and network economy. They are far from acting contrary to or
challenging the communist regime and running against the stability of the society.
Resembling many other civic groups, the Internet Society largely serves the cause of
the state and is arguably a form of state corporatism. Both clientelism and corporatism
have effectively prevented an organised and a threatening Internet entrepreneurs
association from coming into being.
power when they engage in business.
Internet Society of China, available online at <http://www.isc.org.cn/xhjs/index.htm >, accessed on
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As Charles Zhang, CEO and President of Sohu.com stated after receiving their
ICP licence in 2001, that Sohu would,
"...further strengthen the working relationship between the state and private new media
enterprises by enhancing their legal status. We will work with the government to create
an Internet environment where stability and growth go hand-in-hand for everyone to
benefit. ,,72
Whilst the government fears the Internet as a source of open information, the
goal-keepers of the large commercial sites are seen as safely self-censored. What is
also worrisome for the Beijing authority, however, is that these relatively smaller,
individual sites are difficult to regulate and even harder to keep track of. One of the
interviewees has confirmed,
"The sky is high and the emperor is far away. (tian gao huang di yuan) So I can take
advantage of the geographical remoteness from the centre to make profits, [although the
online contents displayed are at times not wholly in line with governments
requirements].
The situation is not an isolated case, but allegedly a widespread phenomenon since
there are variations in law enforcement across provinces and regions within China. It
is usually referred to as the consequence of decentralisation reform, in which the
central government delegated greater decision-making authority to local government
in the reform era.
Moreover, many foreign Internet entrepreneurs seem reluctant to press for
March 4, 2004.
72 
"Sohu.com
 in First Batch to receive ICP licence," Sohu.com, January 11, 2001, available online at
<http://www.sohu.com/aboutJEng1ish/023.htm>, accessed on March 3, 2004.
Informal talk with a local Internet entrepreneur running an Internet portal in Shanghai in September
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political liberalisation and reform. Their shrewd attitude has in turn solidified the
clientelist-corporatist relationship between the state and Internet entrepreneurs. They
usually turn a blind eye to the calls from human rights organisations to pressure the
Chinese government into relaxing their human rights violations on cyber-activists.
Amnesty International, for example, claimed recently that fifty-four people were
detained or sentenced for expressing "revolutionary" online opinions or for
disseminating and downloading "unhealthy" information from the Internet. They
asserted that "foreign corporations indirectly contributed to human rights violations
or at the very least, failed to give consideration to the human rights implications of
their investments." " Specifically, several foreign companies, including Cisco
Systems, Microsoft, Nortel Networks, Websense and Sun Microsystems, were
allegedly accused of providing technology or software to censor and control the use of
the Internet in China. 75 Cisco and Microsoft dismissed the allegations with the
defence that "if the government of China wants to monitor the Internet, that's their
business. We are basically politically neutral." "We just focused on delivering the best
technology to people throughout the world. We cannot control the way it may
ultimately be used."76
 Both responses are actually in line with how most foreign
Internet-related entrepreneurs operate in dealings with the Chinese government. All in
2003.
"People's Republic of China: Controls Tighten as Internet Activism Grows," Amnesty International,
January 28, 2004, available online at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA1700I2oo4 >,
accessed on February 5, 2004.
David Lee, "Multinationals Making a Mint from China's Great Firewall," South China Morning
Post, October 3, 2002; Greg Walton, China's Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of
Surveillance Technology in the People Republic of China, released by Rights and Democracy,
October 2001, available online at <www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalizationj
oldenShieldEng.html>, accessed on March 17, 2002.
6 Paul Mooney, "China's Cyber Crackdown," Newsweek International, December 16,2002, available
online at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/844730.asp>, accessed on March 25, 2003.
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all, the profit-orientation of the Internet entrepreneurs, home and foreign, has
intensified the clientelist-corporatist relationship. This relationship may be linked as
the often-noted rhetoric—a socialist economy with Chinese characteristics.
Section V	 Conclusion
A. Implications for Civil Society
Although the overall party-state capacities have been declining since the economic
reform and opening to the outside world, the central government has nevertheless
laboriously attempted to utilise the Internet and its related infrastructure to improve its
administrative control over provincial and local governments. Although operational
autonomy is practised in the increasingly commercialised Internet sector, the outcome
has not been further political democratisation. Partly the party-state is still powerful
enough to harness and alleviate any negative spin-off deriving from economic
prosperity. Meanwhile, the operational autonomy is usually confined to enterprise
management. Besides, the Internet entrepreneurs as the beneficiaries of the IT's
take-off in the past decade have not developed a solid socio-economic foundation to
distance themselves from the state apparatus. The structural dependence and
asymmetric power between the state and Internet entrepreneurs still remain palpable.
Having said that, since the Internet industry is still a relatively protected sector with a
mildly open market, many capitalists have prospered as a result of the preferential
policy. It has also strengthened their proclivity for political clientelism vis-à-vis the
authorities. The Beijing government can thus effectively prevent the emergence of
vigorous and potentially dangerous social groups to challenge the rule of the
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communist party.
In addition, China has until now been a country where any formal organisations
needed to be sanctioned and created under government auspices. Autonomous legal
civil associations that are free from state power are difficult to find not only in the
Internet sector but all throughout the private economy. The circumstances appear
similar to what Frolic has called "state-led civil society—"social organisations and
quasi- administrative units created by the state to help it manage a complex and
rapidly expanding economy and changing societies."77
 It may be conceived of as a
"Chinese" mode of political development, that is, an outcome of such
clientelist-corporatist approach of development after more than two decades of
economic reform.
Yet the Internet entrepreneurs have to cater to an increasingly diversified
audience of users. They cannot just simply mimic official Internet media to sell
progaganda, nor can they merely present "softer" or "safer" contents, acting as an
extension of the entertainment industry in cyberspace. To solicit Internet users'
popularity usually leads to business profit. Against this backdrop, the entrepreneurs
may not directly challenge the authorities politically, but the contents and "virtual"
media spaces they provide may further push the society into becoming more
pluralized, where many value orientations are coexistent. Online pornography
material stands at one extreme. The Internet entrepreneurs may (un)intentionally
promote indecent content; nevertheless, cyberspace in this domain is ill-regulated and
a nascent civil society with common interests begin to form online. Similar civic
" B. Michael Frolic, "State-Led Civil Society," in Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil
Society in China (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 46-67.
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online groups, such as environmental activists, gay rights promoters, can also be
found in cyberspace. At another extreme, an international ICT player like Rupert
Murdoch has asserted that the international community can play a key role in assisting
China to "achieve progress across an entire spectrum of economic, social, legal and
political issues." He commented at the 2004 Asia Society Annual Dinner,
We need to be far more aggressive in helping China confront and come to grzps with its
deepening AIDS crisis. We need to encourage China to develop institutions that
strengthen the rule of law. We need to support and engage grass-roots organ isations in
China—groups such as NGOs—that affirm civil society by tackling such problems as
environmental pollution and local corruption. And we need to help China more
effectively combat the rampant piracy of intellectual property that left unchecked will
undermine the business models of creative companies worldwide.78
Many foreign and indigenous Internet entrepreneurs such as Murdoch are unlikely to
provoke the authorities publicly, but how they run their digital and Internet media may
indeed provide foundations and pave the way for incipient public space to be possibly
created online which is necessary for a healthy civil society to grow and be nurtured.
B. Concluding Remarks
The Internet entrepreneurs are increasingly powering the national economy, and they
are accordingly in one way or another being integrated into the communist party and
state bureaucracy. For the CCP, in so doing, it can guarantee the continuing
communist rule by recruiting the rising private elites into the incumbent regime, lest
Rupert Murdoch, Keynote Address at the Asia Society Annual Dinner, February 25, 2004, available
online at <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/murdoch04.htm1 >, accessed on April 7, 2004.
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they may act against the state for demanding for economic and political rights as
reform takes root. It is also a preemptive strategy for the state to deter potentially
reactionary forces from the private sector. For Internet entrepreneurs, their pragmatic
approaches in dealing with the government have proven relatively successful. They
have in turn strengthened the structure of the clientelist-corporatist relationship in the
Internet sector in China. They are therefore more willing to cooperate with the
government rather than push ahead with political liberalisation and democratisation.
The decade-long economic success in China has created more business opportunities
for them to become better-off. Unlike some Chinese people previously enthusiastic
about realising political ends during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, (Internet)
entrepreneurs have nowadays become more pragmatic and compromised; they are
now more concentrating on "economic and other non-political endeavours."79
It is inappropriate to exaggerate the potential of the Internet entrepreneurs for an
inevitable political transformation into a healthy civil society if we simply extrapolate
trends from Western experiences and theories and insert them into China's political
future. This is not to suggest that Western experiences are invalid when applying into
the Chinese situations. I would instead suggest that the foreign experiences need more
empirical grounds to support such assertions. The emergence of civil society in the
wake of Internet entrepreneurs might be delayed, partly because of governments'
efforts (Internet control and the preemptive strategies) and partly because of the
premature socio- and politico-economic environment.
More importantly, it may not be the Internet entrepreneurs that directly advance
19 Suisheng Zhao, "Introduction: China's Democratization Reconsidered," in Suisheng Zhao (ed.),
China and Democracy: The Prospect for a Democratic China (New York and London: Routledge:
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political causes in China, but the Internet users themselves. In general, the Internet
entrepreneurs might not be bold enough to promote or even fully realise the political
potentials of the Internet unless the directions are guided or initiatives implemented.
What in turn makes the Internet significant is how and to what extent the medium is
being utilised by Netizens or any NGOs. As Sohu's CEO Charles Zhang comments,
"With more access to information, people are listening rather than just hearing, are
thinking rather than blindly following directions. The Internet empowers the
individual."80
 In summary, the Internet has a strong potential to transform the Chinese
state, but it ultimately depends upon how the Internet is used. Benjamin Barber also
suggested that "whether democracy survives and flourishes is not going to depend on
the quality and character of our technology, but on the quality of our political
institutions and on the character of our citizens."81
2001), p. 2.
80 Lisa Movius, "To Be Young, Chinese and Weiku," Salon.com, May 30, 2001, available online at
<http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/200
 1/05/30/china_web/print.html>, accessed on February 26,
2004.
Benjamin R. Barber, "Which Technology for which Democracy? Which Democracy for which
Technology," International Journal of Communications Law and Policy, No. 6, Winter 2000/2001, p.
8.
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Chapter 5	 Case Studies of the Impact of the Internet upon the
Political System: from Words to Action
Section I	 Introduction
Information management in China has according to Tony Saich, conventionally
practised, "a system of information control and censure with an intricate grading
process for who at what level is allowed to see which kinds of information." Saich
illustrates this with the "Rectification Movement" in Yan'an in the 1940s to
emphasise the significance to provide the authoritative and correct interpretations of
Party history. To Mao Zedong, it was particularly important because "accurate"
presentations of Party history are mainly associated with regime stability, (central)
leadership consolidation, and policy implementation.2
In a sense, this is in order for the communist Party to rein in information flows
and uses, ensuring that the central leaders can and will always govern the world's
most populous country in a more effective manner. To achieve this, they try to
prevent any significant alternative stream of information flows from spreading
among the general public for fear of the destabilising and subverting effect of
popular mobilisation based upon numerous precedents in Chinese history. There are
basically two distinct communication systems that the Chinese Communist Party
applies with varying objectives. Whilst one system, which is characterised as the
bottom-up approach, accumulates information and data that is sent upwards into the
Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 306.2 Tony Saich, "Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution of Party
History," in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.), New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist
Revolution (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 299-33 8.
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bureaucratic hierarchy, 3
 the other top-down mode of communication network
disseminates organisationally sanctioned information from the top to the general
public. This is done on the basis of what is called the "grading system," where the
higher a person's official position, the greater the quantity and quality of the
information s/he receives.
The mass media in China have never been a significant forum for any serious
free policy discussions and debate. This is primarily because of grand social and
political stability concerns. Meanwhile, the nature of insert the "traditional" media
and the character of the government-controlled news outlets has also hindered the
creation of a freer media space out of the Chinese state apparatus. Yet, with the
advent and proliferation of the Internet, cyber chat-rooms in particular, the "new"
media are arguably acquiring the potential for a much greater impact on the political
system in general, and on the government-controlled media in particular, as
increasingly diversified and alternative information and opinions are made available.
The previous literature review chapter showed that western sources from the
1990s onwards have generally researched whether the new media (the Internet) may
lead to increased political participation and the reinvigoration of industrial
democracies. From the late I 990s, however, we have seen the rise of the revisionist
arguments of "technological determinism" that contend that the spreading Internet
use and Internet-derived political transformations and democratisation are not
necessarily correlated in a linear process. On the contrary, the Internet is likely to
This kind of information is usually called nei-bu-can-kao, or nei-can, internal reference. For more
information, see Qingliang He, Zhongguo Zhengfu ruhe Kongzhi Meiff (How the Chinese
Government Control the Media), a Report by Human Rights in China, 2004, pp. 44-48, available
online at <http://www.hrichina.org/fs/downloadables/pdf/downloadable-resourcesfMediaControl
ALL.pdf?revisionid=20206>, accessed on February 24, 2005.
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serve the incumbent (authoritarian) leadership to shore up their dominance and
authority.
It is hypothesized that when deliberating the impact of the Internet on society
and the political system as a whole, it may hinge upon two considerations: the
short-term and long-term perspectives of the Internet's consequences, though the
two are linked. This chapter will investigate a few episodes as short-term empirical
evidence, aiming to lay the basis for mid- and long-term assessments of the political
impact of the ICTs.
Section II
	 The Impact of the Internet on Foreign Relations
The Internet has become a particular venue for Chinese nationalist politics. China's
modern history is full of national humiliations, accounts of its nation-building
process and currently "rightful" place in the world. The Internet is in this respect
acting more or less as a venue for nationalist cyber-politics, with online activists
vying for online influence or impact on state authority. In other words, the Internet's
power in the Chinese foreign context may be to influence and (re)shape the
government-imposed agenda and to affect the implementation of foreign policies.
The Spy Plane Incident, a contingent event in itself, serves as an appropriate case to
highlight the Net's impact on China's foreign politics.
The U.S. Spy Plane Collision
On 1 April 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft collided with a Chinese
fighter jet over the South China Sea. Since this shocking incident reminded the
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Chinese people of earlier national humiliations, it triggered immensely populist
sentiments both on- and offline. Media sources such as the People Daily covered
the official interpretations that the U.S. plane was spying in Chinese air space and
violated China's sovereignty. The plane eventually landed on Hainan Island in
southern China. 4
 Because traditional media-space in China was either deficient or
not readily available to play a role of an interactive channel linking the public and
the authorities, the new media, the Internet in particular, had as a result emerged
quickly both as a "virtual" hub of congregations of civic discourse, and functioning
as a platform to originate and disseminate news and/or information with regard to
the later developments of this incident.
In terms of online traffic following the incident, two weeks later on 13 April
2001, the popular commercial Internet portal, Sina.com, claimed two hundred
thousand postings and nearly one million visits to their Web site. 5
 Another popular
Web chat room, Qiangguo Luntan (Strong Country forum), hosted by the
Communist Party's flagship newspaper, the People Daily, saw a similar soaring of
online postings and clicks. 6
 This incident per se is contingent and unpremeditated
that the Beijing government lagged behind the quick response from the Chinese
cyberspace. The online version of the People s' Daily was the first Chinese media
outlet to cover the collision, whose report appeared at 7:33 PM on 1 April 2001 from
See <http://www.people.com.cnIGB/shizheng/16/20010403/431573.html>, People's Daily, April 3,
2001, accessed on April 3,2001.
See <http://www.pladaily.com.cnlgb/pladaily/200
 1/04/24/20010424001 006_TodayNews.html>,
Jiefangun Bao (PLA Daily), April 24,2001, p. 1, accessed on April 26, 2001.6 The People Daily reported a fivefold increase of online visits to their Web site. See
<http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/it/48/297/20010414/441959.html >, People c Daily, April 14, 2001,
p. 5, accessed on April 15, 2001.
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its journalist based in Washington D.C.7 Yet, two hours earlier, one message entitled
"Meiguo Zhenchaji yu Zhongguo Zhanji Xiangzhuang, Pojiang Huanan" (the US
spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, landed in Southern China) was posted
in Qiangguo Luntan at 5:22 PM,8
 after the crash took place at 10:15 AM on the
same day.
There was another sharp contrast between the mainstream media reports and
the online messages covering this incident. During the first two days (April 1-2), the
official media, whose news sources were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released
only nine news items in total (three news pieces each in the People Daily, Xinhua
News Agency and China Central Television), while the foreign news outlets, mainly
from the Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France-Presse, had more than fifty
news reports, and posted messages on Qiangguo Luntan exceeded one thousand.9 In
this regard, the online media had acted more swiftly than the traditional ones. The
Internet in China is thus playing an increasingly essential role of alternative platform
for the Web-based communications and information to be originated and exchanged,
and most importantly, the often-undervalued public opinion much mediated and
represented in the cyberspace.
On the other hand, after the first message was posted, it aroused greater public
attention and agitated lively discussions and debates. In general, the contents of
posted messages renewed a strong wave of nationalist sentiment against America's
See <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1
 9/20010401/4305 87.html>, People Daily, April 1,
2001, accessed on April 2,2001.
See <http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/c/2003-06-05/1 5561 95040.shtml>, Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern
Weekend), June 5, 2003, accessed on September 10, 2003.
"Cong Zhongmei Fei Xiang:huang kan Lianguo Meiti de Guojia Jishi,"(National Consciousness
though the Media: the Sino-US Plane Collusion Incident) Peoples Daily, December 18, 2001,
available online at <http://five.people.com.cn/bike/viewnews.btml?id=144 >, accessed on January 15,
2002.
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perceived aggression and hegemony, following the US bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. As a matter of fact, in addition to a special theme
of the US spy plane incident Web site, which was prominently exhibited in the
People 's Daily Online, a number of government-sanctioned military and
international law experts were also mobilised to participate in the interactive
discussions held in Qiangguo Luntan, aiming to shape "correct1' online public
opinion so that it could follow the Party line during such a national crisis. Similarly,
other commercial Internet portals like Sina.com and Netease both set up a feature
Web page and related chatrooms to accommodate the latest news as well as an
upsurge of public opinion.
In general, the Internet has played a significant part not merely in the extension
of the traditionallmainstream media in China, but also in regard to the alternative
sources of information and communications (ICTs) platform. The state-run media, as
widely believed, have usually upheld the guidelines of politically-correct reporting
particularly when issues or incidents themselves are of great political influences. So
the mainstream media appear reticent and cautious in covering news and publishing
commentaries if no clear official directives are given, lest they transgress political
taboos.
In the severe politico-diplomatic crisis, cyberspace was unlike the traditional
mediaspace, which had been almost tamed by the central government; it instead
emerged as an effective means to challenge authority. The level of public opinion
enabled by the Internet had tended to push government officials into a stronger line
on foreign negotiations with the US government. As such, the surging anti-American
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sentiments were fanned in part by the long-practised political education, which was
closely associated with patriotism and official propaganda. The young, educated and
urban professionals and students, who constitute the majority of the Chinese Internet
users, had usually circumvented cyber censorship to post news and opinion and
retrieved information from non-official resources. Many of them were directly from
offshore (mirror) Web sites that were not permitted according to China's Internet
regulations.
Without doubt, nationalist sentiments in cyberspace were rampant as some
people were motivated by government-controlled media to vent their resentments
against the US over its intervention in China, which had caused a Chinese casualty."
But a close examination of several Chinese Internet fora revealed that posted
messages did not always give much credence to the government's account, although
a great deal of government resources, including manpower, had been deployed to
monitoring rigorously the online content. One of the reasons why the authorities
clamped down on extreme online nationalist sentiments was that it could undercut
the CCP's legitimacy in a direct or indirect way if they were not under the
government's absolute control as would also be seen after the anti-Japan protests in
April of 2005. Meanwhile, the Beijing authorities cannot afford to ignore
'° Alan R. Kluver, "New Media and the End of Nationalism: China and the US in a War of Words,"
MOTS PLURIELS, No. 18, August 2001, available online at <http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/
MotsPluriels/MPl8OIak.html>, accessed on January 12, 2002; Li Xiguang and Qin Xuan, "Shei Zai
Shezhi Jintian de Yicheng?—Dianzi Luntan zai Zhongda Xinwen Shijian zhong dui Dangbao Yiti de
Chonggou," (Who Is Setting Chinese Agenda?—The Impact of Online Chatroom on Party Press) in
Li Xiguang and Zhao Xin-shu (ed.), Meiti de Liliang (The Power of Media) (Guangzhou: Nanfang
Ribao, 2002), pp. 156-169; Jack Linchuan Qiu, "Chinese Opinions Collide Online: U.S.- China
Plane Collision Sparks Civil Discussion on the Web," Online Journalism Review, April 12, 2001,
available online at <http://ojr.usc.edu/contentlstory.cfm?id561 >, accessed on April 20, 2001.
For instance, China's official media deliberately manipulated news stories from the United States
and played down the US offer to help search for the missing Chinese pilot. See Dexter Roberts and
Pete Engardio, "Lessons of a Crisis," Business Week,April 23, 2001, pp. 56-57.
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nationalistic sentiments because it is an effective tool for the ruling entity to have
patriotic Chinese citizens who are loyal to the Communist regime. The Chinese
government was in this sense compelled to assuage (online) nationalism before it got
out of control. An article from Time magazine revealed that about ten Big Mamas
(webmasters, or ban-zhu in Chinese) were employed by the People Daily to engage
in censoring what the authorities deemed "unhealthy" and "inappropriate" online
messages to "sharpen the anti-American fervour by erasing pro-U.S. Web
postings."2
There indeed existed a greater diversity of opinions on the Internet. Empirical
evidence from Internet chatrooms indicated that while some requested an official
apology from the US, others criticized the CCP and challenged the official agenda
by advocating a tougher and an unyielding government stance towards the handling
of the US crew as well as the damaged plane. Notably a few Netizens deftly
incorporated a variety of metaphors in their postings to contrast the different stances
on foreign policy under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin's
leaderships.' 3 Their messages of disaffection were either in the form of explicit
indications or covert signs conveyed between the lines. Meanwhile, a few
hot-headed Chinese youth, also called "hong-ke" (hackers)' 4 in Mandarin, had
12 Mark Thompson, Mathew Forney, James Carney, John F. Dickeron and Hannah Beech, "Four
Key Lessons," lime, Vol. 157, No. 16, April 23, 2001, p. 43.
See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/chinese/news/newsid_1 514000/15142951 .stm>, BBC News Online
(Chinese edition), August 29, 2001, accessed on February 10, 2002.
14 There are two distinctive expressions concerning the term "hacker" in China: "Red Guest"
(hong-ke) and "Black Guest" (hei-ke). While "Black Guest" is a Chinese slang term for any
computer intrusions by hackers, the "Red Guest" mainly refers to Chinese hackers because they
normally do not act out of malice but of patriotism. See Chin-fu Hung, "The Internet and the
Changing Beijing-Taipei Relations: Toward Unification or Fragmentation?" in Françoise Mengin
(ed.), Cyber China: Reshaping National Identities in the Age of Information (New York: Paigrave
Macmillan, 2004), p. 150, note 76.
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boldly engaged in a series of fierce cyber attacks, mostly defacing US official Web
sites and blocking their online access.15
The official agenda—moderate response to the US government—seemed
challenged in the cyber community. The authorities made it clear that Chinese
citizens were strictly prohibited from waging protests against the US embassy,
which was evidently different from the earlier US bombing incident in 1999 when
people were allegedly "encouraged" to take part in demonstrations. Li Xiguang, for
example, argued the Internet users had during the US spy plane incident "revised"
and "re-constructed" the imposed official agenda, and their critical discussions and
debates had contributed to the emergence of a civil society.' 6 Commentators like
Richard Worf take a further step to hold that public opinion can no longer be tightly
controlled by the Communist Party since its power has forced the government "...to
compromise its immunity to popular criticism."17
In summary, this incident highlights a few subtle and steady changes that have
been taking place in Chinese cyberspace. The changes illustrated here are closely
correlated. Firstly, Netizens, even though they live in an authoritarian regime like
China, can wage cyberwarfare at any time without being officially sanctioned. The
online actions—hacker activities, online petitions, and strong nationalist views—to
IS See, for example, "World War on the Internet," The Straits Times, May 4, 2001; Ted Bridis,
"U.S., Chinese Hackers Infiltrate Web Sites, Trade Insults Across Pacific in 'Net War," Wall Street
Journal, May 1, 2001, p. B.6; Michelle Delio, "Is This World Cyber War I?" Wired News, May 1,
2001, available online at <http://www.wired.comlnews/print/0,1283,43443,00.html >, accessed on
May 2,2001.
6 Xiguang Li, "ICT and the Demise of Propaganda in China," Global Media Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3,
Fall 2002, available online at <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/SubmittedDocuments/
archivedpapers/Fall2003/pdffiIes/Internet%20and%20democracy(xiguang).pdf, accessed on June
2, 2004.
Richard Worf, "Speaking out: The Internet in China," Harvard International Review, Vol. 23, No.
4, winter 2002, p. 7.
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some extent constrain the options of the national leaders at a time when China is
increasingly entwined in global affairs. In other words, Internet users have already
been developing and gaining more political autonomy from the Chinese state than
they had been in the 1999 NATO bombing incident. Although the Chinese hackers
targeted foreign (primarily the US in this case) Web sites this time, there was no
guarantee the Chinese government would not be singled out by the backfire next
time.
Secondly, the lively debates and discussions with regard to this incident have
paved the way for a healthy public space to emerge in the long term. Virtual
"public" participation during this incident attempted to sway the government from
negotiations with the US. The information and communication technologies are in
this respect facilitating the expression of strong public opinions on sensitive issues
like Sino-US relations. This supports Nina Hachigian's observation that "Because
the Internet offers perspectives not shaped by the state-controlled media, Chinese
citizens are being empowered to challenge their Communist Party leadership."8
One of the direct implications in terms of political development is that the revived or
burgeoning public discussions have boosted the significance of public opinion in
today's China that is usually ignored or not seriously taken into account when
initiating (public) policies.
Thirdly, the on-line discourse shows it is increasingly difficult for the
government to mould or manipulate popular opinion as much as it has traditionally
done prior to the introduction of the Internet. The Chinese government has also
Nina Hachigian, "Chinese 'Web Worm' Find Their Own Sort of Truth," Los Angeles Times, May
9,2001, p. B-13.
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realised the necessity to exploit online public opinion to better serve its imposed
agenda and purposes through tactics of sophisticated use and control of the Internet
like the establishment of the "Government Online Project" 9 and "Golden Shield
Project (Internet Great Firewall)."20 Yet public opinion per se is a two-edged sword.
Shanthi Kalathil confirms that if nationalist sentiments amplified on the Internet are
skilfully manoeuvred, it can help maintain CCP's political legitimacy and bolster its
popularity. On the other hand, they may also limit and undermine the government's
governing capability.2'
In summary, the governing capability of the Chinese government is now
increasingly influenced or even challenged by Internet-based public opinion and
debates, which the communist government is unaccustomed to dealing with.
Section III The Impact of the Internet on Domestic Political Issues
The Internet has also impacted China's domestic politics. One striking case is the
outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which occurred in
early 2003. The demand for the truth about the real threat from the deadly SARS
epidemic from both the public and international community had imposed enormous
pressure on the government in Beijing to reverse its policy from covering it up to a
more transparent and accountable handling of the outbreak. This case shows that the
' See, for example, Jinkui Ji et al., Zhongguo Dianzi Zheng'vu Li ngdao Ganbu Zhishi Duben
(China's E-Government: Reading for Leaders) (Beijing: Central Party School Press, 2002).
20 See, for example, Greg Walton, China's Golden Shield Corporations and the Development of
Surveillance Technology in the People's Republic of China (Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 2001),
available online at
<http://www.dd-rd.ca/englishlcommdoc/publications/globalization/CGS_ENGPDF >, accessed on
March 12, 2002.
21 Shanthi Kalathil, "Nationalism on the Net," The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2002,
available online at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa =view&id=9 19>,
accessed on March 8, 2002.
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Chinese government is increasingly obliged to respond to the ICTs-facilitated public
opinion.22
The SARS Outbreak
The genuine account and full scale of the outbreak of SARS, or called fei-dian
(atypical) in Mandarin, may not have been exposed or have been little revealed if it
were not for the ICTs and foreign media. People now confirm that the first SARS
case was reported in Foshan, a city in China's southern province of Guangdong, on
16 November 2002, which was nearly five months prior to the official
acknowledgement of SARS on 20 April 2003. The first news report in the Chinese
media was, however, from a local newspaper in Heyuan City, Guangdong, on 3
January 2003, whose news resource was from the local health bureau. This piece of
news did not take the epidemic seriously, simply noting, "No epidemic disease is
being spread in Heyuan .. . Symptoms like cough and fever appear due to relatively
colder weather."23 After that there were scattered news reports from seriously
affected cities like Zhongshan, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou but all played down the
gravity of this epidemic, quoting provincial authorities to the effect that there was no
need for people to panic since the health department had effectively controlled the
virus. In the meantime, the propaganda department banned journalists from
reporting on the outbreak.
The attempt to suppress media coverage regarding the epidemic was partly out
22 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian regimes:
China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution, First Monday, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2001, available online
at <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_8/kalathil/>, accessed on September 28, 2001.
23 Jan Wong, "How China Failed the World," The Globe and Mail, April 5,2003, p. F6.
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of the great concern that the perplexing disease might breed "unnecessary" social
unrest and possibly lead to political instability, when particularly the prominent
political event of an annual meeting of the so-called "Two Sessions"- National
People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress
(CPPCC) - was being prepared in anticipation of the top-level leadership transition
in March 2003. While there was no official statement about the illness, rumours
began to spread swiftly. Some speculated that the disease was caused by bioterrorists,
and others believed fish-curing vinegar was an effective way to kill the virus. More
people would take traditional Chinese (herbal) medicine, mainly ban-lan-gen in
Chinese, which was alleged to ward off the disease. On the electronic side, people
used digital media, including email and mobile phones, to inform their relatives and
friends about the lethal virus and how to cure it. A lot of information sent to
mainland China was actually from friends and relatives living abroad. 24 The
situation further deteriorated as people temporarily migrated on a massive scale
during the Chinese Lunar New Year to visit relatives in other cities and provinces.
It was not until February 10, 2003, that the Guangzhou municipal government
held a press conference in response to extensive rumours among ordinary people.
The message conveyed by the officials was simple but confident: "Public panic is
unwarranted; there is nothing to worry about." 25 In fact, the Guangdong authorities
already reported the outbreak to the Central government on 7 February 2003,
24 Ciping Huang, "No Press Freedom in China after SARS: Statement to CECC," New Century Net,
September 8, 2003, available online at <http://www.ncn.org/asp/englishlda-en.asp?1D54412 >,
accessed on March 2, 2004.
Baopu Liu, "Containing SARS: A Case Study of China's Bureaucracies," China Brief, Vol. 3, No.
11, June 3, 2003, available online at
<http://ww.jamestown.org/printfriendly.php?volume_id19&issue_id676&  article_id=4739>,
accessed on October 20, 2003.
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according to Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily).26 The official statements, dated 18
March 2003 and 26 March 2003, respectively, from central leaders, including Zhang
Wenkang, the then-minister of the Health Ministry, and Kong Quan, the
then-spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, both stressed that effective
measures had been adopted and the government had put the epidemic under its tight
control.27 Apparently, the Chinese authorities, until then, had not seriously reckoned
on the seriousness of the epidemic. They thought they could, on the one hand, cover
up the heath crisis as they had handled other incidents in the past, and on the other
hand, prevent news on the virus from being reported in traditional media and contain
the widespread rumours circulating in the online and offline communities.
As a matter of fact, during the early stage of the SARS crisis, the
hyper-cautious propaganda department issued warnings to owners of newspapers
and magazines not to cross the official line of reporting subjects that may be
politically significant but unacceptable. For instance, the Er-shi-yi Shjji Huanqiu
Baodao (The Twenty-first Century World Herald), which is part of the Nanfang
Daily Group, had been ordered to close its operations for more than one month by
the Guangdong propaganda authority due to their extensive coverage (up to eight
pages) of the outbreak. 28 They ensured that citizens could only access information
and news from sources under government censure. This implied "stability above all
else." The closing of newspapers and the arrest of journalists/editors would in fact
26 Quoted in Xupei Sun, Freedom of the Chinese Press vs. Keeping Stale Secret In Light of the SARS
Crisis: An Analysis, paper prepared for the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools, Atlanta, Georgia, January 2-6, 2004, available online at <http://www.aals.org/am2004/
Xupei2O04.pdf, accessed on June 2, 2004.
27 See <http://www.pkusimba.com/sars/dsj2.htm >, accessed on May 2, 2003.
28 See <http://www2.epochtimes.comlgb/3/6/9/c13301.htm>, accessed on September 18, 2003.
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set a punitive deterrent for potential violators not to boldly cross the line.
Yet grapevine gossip prevailed. People communicated through informal
channels to discuss and learn about SARS. When people were quarantined during
the SARS crisis, the Internet and SMS (Short Messaging Systems/Services) rapidly
expanded the medium of information flow: sharing and disseminating alternative
information behind the government's back. 29 The turning point came when Jiang
Yanyong, a retired physician at Beijing's Chinese People's Liberation Army General
Hospital (No. 301), wrote a letter to media outlets on April 4, 2003, revealing that
there were in fact more cases in Beijing than had been officially announced. The
signed statement was later provided to Time magazine and subsequently broadcast to
the outside world. 3° The aftermath of that report was a global storm, leading to the
arrival of a team from the World Health Organisation (WHO) for the purpose of
investigating the situation in China. China eventually acknowledged the outbreak of
SARS on 20 April 2003. One of the immediate impacts was the dramatic sacking of
China's health minister and the mayor of Beijing for covering up the true story and
mishandling the SARS outbreak.
Dr. Jiang's disclosure of the seriousness of the epidemic was still somehow
downplayed by the government, and instead, the state apparatus of the Supreme
29 See, for example, Holly Williams, "Chinese Txt for Virus Information," BBC News, April 8, 2003,
available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2928969.stm>, accessed on April 20,
2003; Irene Wang, "Text Messages Boost SARS Fight," South China Morning Post, November 4,
2003, p.3.
30 Dr. Jiang firstly sent out his letter to Fenghuang Weishi (Phoenix Television) based in Hong
Kong on April 4, 2003 and then to the China Central Television (CCTV-4) the following day. He
later disclosed the truth in his statement given to the Time on April 9, 2003. See Susan Jakes,
"Beijing's SARS Attack," TIME, 8 April, 2003, available online at <http://www.time.com/
time/asia/news/daily/0,9754,441615,00.html>, accessed on April 10, 2003; Lou Yi, "SARS Xiqin:
Jiang Yanyong - Chengshi de Yisheng," CaiJing Za.-hi (Financial Magazine), May 8, 2003, available
online at <http://finance.sina.com.cn/gl20030508/1230338214.shtml >, accessed on June 19, 2003;
John Pomfret, "China's Crisis Has a Political Edge," Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. 33A.
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Court even threatened fines and criminal liability of prison terms of up to five years
for people who spread "false" information that was not released by the central
government. The reporting of SARS for journalists became a clear instruction from
the central government following the new law. The move was believed to stave off
continuous speculation and rumours that were still rampant via the Internet and SMS.
Considering the government's crisis management, ordinary people tended to be
suspicious of official interpretations and were alienated by their mishandling of the
SARS epidemic.
A few illustrations manifest the degree to which people, especially those who
live in the most affected areas, were desperate for SARS-related information. For
example, before the Radio Free Asia (RFA, http://www.rfa.org/)  Web site was
banned, or jammed, on May 4, 2003, the online traffic directly from China had
reached its highest record with visits in April 2003 double those of the preceding
year.3 ' Beijing Netcom reports that Internet use increased up to 40 per cent during
the outbreak of SARS. Sina had previously experienced a rise of 20 per cent in
Internet traffic then.32 Besides, the Telecommunication Research project under the
auspices of the University of Hong Kong published some telling figures about the
use of the telecoms during the outbreak of SARS in greater China (PRC, HK and
Taiwan). It shows:
1. Shanghai Mobile monitored any mobile users for sending more than 100
' See SARS in China: Implications for Information Control, Internet Censorship, and the Economy,
p. 32, hearing conducted by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 5,
2003, available online at <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2001_O2hearings/transcripts/02_06_O5tran .
pdf>, accessed on February 3, 2004.
32 Quoted in a market research report from the BDA, a China-based telecom and technology
consulting services corporation. See Ted Dean, "SARS Drives Internet Boom," BDA Analysis, May
15, 2003, available online at <http://www.bdachina.com/contentJen/features/analyses/B 10563317
68>, accessed on January 12, 2004.
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SMS per hour;
2. SARS-related information enquires topped other entries, and the Baidu, one
of China's popular search engines, saw a 9 per cent strong increase everyday
in April 2003;
3. The number of mobile subscribers to Shanghai Telecom's broadband services
increased three-fold (up to 25,000) in just two weeks between late April and
mid-May 2003, compared with 7,000 each week in March 2003.
The SARS crisis aroused two distinct arguments about its impact on China's
political system: while one argued that SARS would be "China's Chernobyl,"34
bringing in sweeping political transformations and reform, the other explanation was
more pessimistic, believing that the political system would absorb the impact and
would not result in change.35
Both arguments capture some but not all dimensions of the SARS impact upon
China's politics. If one were to assess the impact from a governance perspective, the
government has since pressed forward to become more transparent and accountable
in terms of major public issues like public health. The authorities that once
Telecoms InfoTechnology Forum, Telecoms and SAPS: Iwo brief papers from TIF and
Telecomasia.net, July 2003, available online at <http://www.trp.hku.hk/tif/papers/2003fjul/telecoms
-sars.pdf, accessed on June 5, 2004.
Gorbachev, for example, argues that "The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was
graphic evidence not only of how obsolete our technology was, but also of the failure of the old
system." See Mikhail Gorbachev, "Diagnosing SARS in China," The New York limes, p. 20A, May
19, 2003, available online at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/19/opinion/19MON1.html >,
accessed on May 21, 2003.
China and SAPS: The Crisis and Its Effects on Politics and the Economy, roundtable discussion
co-sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Brookings Institution, The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, and the U.S.-China Business Council, held on July 2, 2003,
available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/cnaps20030702.pdf,  accessed on
December 2, 2003; Joan Kaufman, "Can China Cure Its Severe Acute Reluctance to Speak?," The
Washington Post, April 27, 2003, p. BOl, available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A39950-2003 Apr25.html>, accessed on May 1, 2003; Gordon G Chang, "SARS
Crisis: New Disease, New Leaders, Same Old Regime," China Brief, Vol. 3, No. 8, April 22, 2003,
available online at <http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_idl  9&&issue_id
=673>, accessed on May 7, 2003.
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attempted to keep a lid on the epidemic have now found that it caused a greater
national health disaster and damaged its "good" international image, which the
regime has carefully cultivated since the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989.
Whilst the state-controlled media were covering up the seriousness of the epidemic
and giving propagandistic accounts, online communities like the Qiangguo Luntan,
administered by the People 's Daily, were already inundated by postings condemning
officials for failing to tell the truth in a timely and accurate fashion, thus demanding
concrete protective measures and openly updated information about SARS.
It should be noted that after the Chinese authorities gave the green light for
mainstream media to cover the SARS story, Internet chat rooms encountered
stringent censorship on discussions of the pandemic. News reports appearing in the
press media and messages posted online were strictly required to toe the government
line, citing officially sanctioned statements and data, or their postings would be
deleted before they could appear online.
A news report released by Agence France-Presse revealed confirmation of
heightened cyber-censorship from China Internet operators because "negative"
postings deemed by the authorities could incur harsh penalties. According to this
report, one staff member (webmaster) working for the People 's Daily commented,
"If the postings have something to do with pneumonia, we will post the ones we
think should be posted and not post those that shouldn't be." The commercial
Internet operators were similarly required to follow suit, as one manger of Sohu.com
noted, "The main point is that positive postings can be posted, but those that are
negative cannot be posted.. .There are regulations, if the posting [willi have a bad
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influence on social stability then we can't post these kinds of things."36
In the circumstance of a national crisis, Internet usage was heavily monitored,
for fear of further social unrest and widespread rumours. As a result, the SARS crisis
did not eventually result in "China's Chemobyl." In the end, online and offline
coverage of the SARS crisis largely converged, but at a point of greater openness
than if there had only been offline traditional coverage. Although the Chinese
government still managed to curb the flow of information, it nevertheless discovered
ways in which global issues such as SARS could have a far-reaching impact on its
domestic national agenda. The government's attitude is changing as partly reflected
by relevant administrative statute,37 enacted in response to the increasing gulf
developing between the authorities and the public over its credibility and public trust,
which in turn may undermine its legitimacy if they continue to ignore
life-threatening issues like SARS.
Whether or not the public opinion and debates will be guided in the "right"
direction is an issue that will be evaluated in the long run. At the very least, the
authorities are now giving more weight to public opinion that is facilitated and
mediated by the ICTs. This has profound implications. Despite the government Web
presence that is most likely for the purposes of propaganda, the interactive
mechanism set up online may in a sense encourage "virtual" political participation in
the solution of public affairs and stimulate a gradual increase in deliberative
36 Quoted in Robert J. Saiget, "China Gags SARS Talk in Internet Chatrooms," Newsobserver.com,
April 5, 2003, available online at <http://newsobserver.com/24hour/technology/story/842454p-
5919649c.html>, accessed on April 16, 2003.
" The administrative regulation, entitled Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shjjian Yingji Tiaoli
(Regulations on Preparedness for and Response to Emergent Public Health Hazards), was enacted
and promulgated by the State Council in mid-May 2003. For full text, see
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradocfgroups/public/documents/
 APCITYfUNPAN009620.pdf, accessed
on April 26, 2004.
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discourse, upon which democracy rests.
It is widely perceived that China's Fourth Generation (Hu-Wen) leadership are
striving to foster the good image of effective governance and most importantly work
closely with ordinary people particularly after the regime has been highly criticised
for its mishandling of the SARS situation. Below is another case study—the BMW
incident—that will demonstrate how the Internet is impacting legal and political
issues in China as well.
Section IV The Impact of the Internet on the Legal-Political Sphere
The Internet has also facilitated the better functioning of the rule of law, contributing
to a more legally just society in China. This could be done mainly through mounting
pressure on the authorities to alter the balance of interests that shape the political
dynamics, which determine the content of law.
The BMW Incident
The BMW incident would be similar to any other traffic accident in China that
would have been by and large ignored, or at best, mentioned in passing by the
traditional news outlets, if it were not for the Internet. 38 The incident, best known as
Baoma Sh/ian in Chinese community, occurred on 16 October 2003 in the
northwestern city of Harbin, the centre of the Chinese industrial rust belt. The gist of
38 In 2003, for example, official figures revealed that there were more than sixty-six thousand road
accidents which cost some one hundred thousand lives, reinforcing the country's notorious reputation
as one of the world's most dangerous places to drive. See "Gonganbu Tongbao 2003-nian Quanguo
Daolu Jiaotong Shigu Qingkuang" (The Ministry of Public Security promulgates situations of the
nationwide road traffic accidents for 2003), Xinhua News Agency, January 18, 2004, available online
at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/  2004-01/18/content_ 1282400.htm>, accessed on April 15,
2004.
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this road accident was that a well-off woman, Su Xiuwen, drove into a crowd,
killing a peasant woman, Liu Zhongxia, on a rickety tractor and injuring twelve
onlookers after her BMW was accidentally scraped by the peasant's cart loaded with
market-bound spring onions. The Harbin Daoli District People's Court ruled on 20
December 2003 that it was merely an "accidental traffic disturbance" caused by Su's
negligence. Su was thus sentenced to two years' imprisonment with a three-year
reprieve.
The incident first broke in a local newspaper, Shenyang Jinbao (Shenyang
Today), on 4 January 2004, which contributed a series of news reports on the subject
until 13 January 2004, 10 days in total. Its serial reports unveiled some inside stories
and suggested a retrial of this case. 39 The report from this city-based news media,
however, received little attention until it was picked up by the popular commercial
Internet portal, Sina.com, whose news sources are usually from national and local
press channels. This piece of news was immediately reprinted (zhuan zai)4° on
Sina.com on the same day. As a result public interest in this story surged
significantly. In fact public outrage emerged swiftly through the Internet. In many
cases, the contributions of Netizens' comments reached a record high in several
cyber chatrooms. For instance, Chen Tong, editor-in-chief of Sina.com , noted, "We
have received more than 200,000 postings within ten days. That's the biggest
See the first news item, for example, at <http://bf3.syd.com.cn/gb/syj b/2004-01/04/content_
88879 1.htm>, Shenyang Today, January 4,2004, accessed on March 12,2004.
40 According to China's Internet regulation, the commercial Internet portals cannot publish their
own news reports but can only "reprint" news from national or local media outlets that are officially
approved to publish news stories. See Hulian Wangzhan Congshi Dengzai Xinwen Yewu Guanli
Zhanxing Guiding (Provisional Regulations on Governance of Internet-based News Providers
Registration of News Websites), jointly issued by the Information Office of the State Council and the
Ministry of Information Industry (Mu) on November 7, 2000, available online at
<http://www.isc.org.cn120020417/ca42718.htm >, accessed on February 21, 2004.
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response we have ever got for a single story."4'
After the story about the controversial verdict was posted on Sina.com , the
mainstream press and other Internet portals issued news on this event and many of
them set up feature Web sites to cater for the surging public interest by following up
the latest developments. Specifically, besides Sina.com  (w.sina.com), Sohu
(www.sohu.com),	 Netease	 (www.163.com),	 People	 Daily	 Online
(www.people.com.cn), Yahoo (cn.yahoo.com), Xinhua News Agency
(www.xinhuanet.com), Qianlong Wang (www.gianlong.com) and Dayoo Wang
(www.dayoo.com) all created their own Web sites to cover this incident. A Sina.com
staff member revealed that the very first piece of the news covered on Sina.com  had
experienced more than 10,000 contributions within a single day (1 1AM-8PM), far
exceeding other major incidents like the outbreak of SARS, the arrest of Saddam
Hussein and the launch of China's Shenzhou-V space flight. 42 The visits to
Sina.com and Sohu.com for news about the BMW incident also outnumbered any
other event.43
The large-scale coverage both in the traditional press media and Internet Web
sites as well as discussion boards has demonstrated greater public attention both in
cyberspace and in the offline world. In this respect, the Internet served to accelerate
the speed and scale of communications in regard to the latest developments of this
incident. Collective online fury has indeed had an impact on public discourse. This
41 Ching-Ching Ni, "Incensed Chinese Wield Internet Clout to Press for Justice," Los Angeles limes,
January 17, 2004, available online at <http://www.latimes.com/news/printeditionJasection/
la-fg-bmwl 7jan 17,1,1672021 .story?coll=la-news-a_section>, accessed on April 4, 2004.
42 See <http://medianet.qianlong.com/7692/2004/0  1/06/33@1 806521 .htm>, Qianlong Wang,
January 6, 2004, accessed on February 8, 2004.
See <http://www.bjd.com.cnIBJWB/20040
 I 08/GB/BJWB"l 1 576"3'08W3 I 2.htni>, Beying
Wanbao (Beijing Evening News), January 8, 2004, accessed on March 20, 2004.
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in part reflects citizens' long-concealed feelings about rampant social injustice and
official corruption. The Internet has also provided a prompt, anonymous and most
importantly, interactive, platform for the rocketing public opinion about this
unforeseen event to be vented and it again led to convergence of on- and offline
opinion in cyberspace. Political leaders at the central and provincial levels not only
gave heed to the event, but also promised to step in to make sure this criminal case
was handled justly.
The official responses to the public opinion mediated off- and online were of
great implication and importance in terms of the Internet's impact on legal politics.
The government's Xinhua News Agency published initial comments the very next
day from the provincial leader in response to public anxieties over this incident. On
5 January 2004, Han Guizhi, Chairman of Political Consultative Conference in
Heilongjiang province met with journalists to clarify wildly spread rumours on the
Internet and in the press that she was the defendant's mother-in-law. She promised
the government would intervene to deal with the allegations through due process.44
A few days later, the Party's People Daily Online on 10 January 2004 quoted a
spokesman from Harbin government information office to the effect that "the
judicial and public security organs were now re-investigating the BMW case, and
they would soon deliver a 'responsible' response to the general public and the
press."45 China Central Television (CCTV) also broadcast a special TV programme
on 9 January 2004 in response to people's challenge to the verdict made in the
See <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-0 1/06/content_I 261 829.htm>, Xinhua News
Agency, January 6, 2004, accessed on April 27, 2004.
See <http://www.peop1e.com.cn/GB/paper39/11093/I004523.htm1 >, People r Daily, January 12,
2004, accessed on April 27, 2004.
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Harbin district court.
These illustrations demonstrated that the Party and government were very
aware of the event. In one sense, the higher degree of attention put them under
heavy pressure to review or even intervene in legal cases like the BMW one. The
Internet had during this incident served as an effective means to boost collective
public resentment against the verdict since a spate of angry online opinions
demanded further investigation and even renewed prosecution of Su Xiuwen. Many
People perceived the court verdict as telling evidence that the Chinese "judicial
system is far too easily manipulated by the rich and powerful", 46 and consequently,
resulted in a rather light sentence—a two-year jail sentence that came with a
three-year reprieve. Given the ruling of the reinvestigation into this case reaffirmed
that the previous verdict was "appropriate," 47 the growth of (online) public opinion
would in this regard foster more responsive and accountable political institutions in
the PRC. Public opinion has begun to create an enabling socio-political environment
for a more transparent government to emerge. In present-day China, it is popularly
addressed as, "yulunjiandu" (supervision by public opinion), as Dalin Yang holds
that "the Internet can fulfil the role the media should play in an open society."48
The impact of the BMW affair upon China's authoritarian regime is profound
but limited. It is profound because when we consider the BMW incident, along with
46 
"Road Rage, and Web Rage: The Growing Power of the Internet," The Economist, Vol. 370, No.
8360, January 31, 2004, P. 57.
See <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/28/content_1 3 88452.htm>, Xinhua News
Agency, March 28, 2004, accessed on April 2, 2004.
48 Julie Chao, "Internet Rages over China's 'BMW Incident'," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
January 18, 2004, available online at <www.ajc.com/news/contentJnews/0l04/18chinabmw.html >,
accessed on February 5, 2004.
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other hotly-debated legal cases such as those of Sun Zhigang, 49 Liu Yong, 5° the
grassroots online discussions have been able to bring the case concerned to the
wider attention of ordinary people, the Party and the government, and the
international media. The Chinese government also somewhat tolerates a higher
degree of public discussion on some sensitive issues with the caveat they do not
cross the political bottom line and are not overly critical of the Party and
government. Yet the impact is still limited because the Chinese government has
neither been willing to unleash the full potential of the Internet power upon public
affairs, nor has it extensively relaxed its tight grip on the Chinese cyberspace. Wei
Lai, an editor of Sina.com, disclosed on 20 January, 2004 that the company already
deleted about 20 per cent of ' its contributions to discussion boards on the BMW
incident in compliance with government requests. At that point there were still
nearly a quarter-million messages remaining on the board. On 15 January 2004,
those remaining 250,000 messages were all deleted. 5 ' The source from Sina.com
also acknowledged that the flood of postings was so great that it exceeded the
The BMW Incident can be paralleled with the Sun Zhigang and Liu Yong cases in terms of the
Internet impact upon the judicial system in China. In the case of Sun Zhigang, he was mistakenly
detained in a Guangzhou shelter for the homeless and later died in police custody after allegedly
being beaten up. The report initially broke from Nanfang Dushibao (Southern Metropolis News) on
the Web, which is a Guangzhou-based news outlet fanious for its outspoken editorial policy. Relayed
by the Internet and widely discussed by cyber chatters, this piece of news reached Chinese people in
an almost nationwide scale and elicited enormous public concern and debates. The Internet is this
case has partly contributed to similar heated debates on public issues and the eventual abolition of
the two decades-old regulations on repatriating migrants and vagabonds.
50 Acting as a gangland boss, Liu Yong was sentenced to death in April 2003. He was, however,
given a two-year reprieve after an appeal in August 2003. This ruling drew widespread criticism on
the Internet as Internet users weighed in with an outcry against the verdict. Netizens suspected that
Liu had used personal connections with the former mayor and deputy mayor of Shenyang to get off.
In December 2003, the Chinese Supreme Court overturned the verdict and ordered the immediate
execution of Liu.
51 Philip P. Pan, "The Unquiet Death of a Chinese Peasant: Lenient Treatment for Driver in 'BMW
Case' Ignites Media Frenzy, Wide Discussion of Wealth and Justice," The Washington Post, January
16, 2004, p. A14, available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename
article&contentIdA2Il97-2004Jan15&notFoundtrue>, accessed on March 15, 2004.
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capability of Web monitors to censor them. 52 The surge of online critical public
opinion, as well as the forthcoming annual meetings of the NPC and CPPCC, partly
explained the periodical crackdown on news discussion forums that targeted harsh
and critical opinions and independent reporting, which had not been sanctioned by
the propaganda department. The growth of grassroots opinion mediated online is
emerging as a force that the authorities usually have to reckon with.
To summarise, the BMW incident stands out as a unique case in China's legal
politics: the vocal court of "virtual" public opinion prompted traditional media
outlets to catch up and follow the detail of the latest developments. With the
increasingly widespread diffusion and usage of the Internet and digital media,
incidents may not always go away quietly. In other words, Internet users may set
their own agendas that the authorities concerned cannot easily overlook. The
Internet is giving ordinary people a wider platform than the traditional media to vent
their feelings and possibly organise themselves in ways that were unavailable to past
generations. Meanwhile, lending force to the outrage from the BMW incident,
China's recent experiences with SARS have most likely aroused a strong sense of
public concern about the merits of good governance. In a word, the collective
pressure from the Internet users and the general public has increasingly compelled
the government to seriously take their opinions into account.
Section V	 The Impact of Internet-enabled Dissenting Groups and
Individuals on Politics
Robert Marquand, "China Mutes Online News," The Christian Science Monitor, March 10, 2004,
available online at <http://www.csmonitor.coniJ2004/0310/p07s01-woap.html >, accessed on April 4,
2004.
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Arguably the Internet becomes an extraordinary tool in the hands of activists
devoted to sociopolitical change. 53 The "battle of Seattle" in November 1999 saw
one of the largest anti-globalisation protests against the ministerial convention of the
World Trade Organisation in which more than 50,000 protesters were organised and
assembled in part through the frequent and extensive use of the Internet
communication. 54 Partly the success is attributed to the basic nature of the new
technology itself, in which it ". . . presents them with a variety of new opportunities
for disseminating information to a larger and more geographically dispersed
audience than ever before, and potentially for organising their activities in
unprecedented ways."55
In the context of China, the key point is whether the cyber activists or
dissidents are willing and capable of exploiting this fresh communication tool to
express their dissent views and/or organise themselves to achieve their ends in both
the online and offline worlds. When considering China's cyber dissidents, they are
usually composed of dissident groups of Falun Gong, Pro-Taiwan/Tibet
Independence, the Uyghur (or East Turkestan) Coalition, and individuals who
heavily criticise Party cadres and government officials (usually high-level) for
wrongdoings. Before this section moves to discuss the dissident group—Falun
Gong—in more detail, it is helpful to pay some attention to the individual cyber
dissidents in order to have a more complete picture about cyber activism in China in
See, for example, Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers (eds.), Cyberactivism: Online
Activism in Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge: 2003).
For more details, see, for example, <http://www.globalissues.org/TradeReIated/SeattIe.aSP#Media
Portrayal>, accessed on August 28, 2004.
" Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the
Internet and Being's Counter-Strategies, p. 38.
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general. In one aspect, how are they different from dissident groups in terms of
their online strategies to express dissent (political) discourses?
Among many other cyber dissidents in China, Liu Di, for example, who is
better known for her screen name—bu-xiu-gang laoshu (stainless steel
mouse)—became a cause celebrity for her online anti-government opinions. Because
of her "reactionary" cyber postings, which expressed sympathy for Huang Qi, a
famous jailed Internet activist, criticising the closure of Internet cafés and online
chat rooms, and urging other Internet users to ignore state propaganda, she was
finally seized on her Beijing Normal University campus on 7 November 2002. She
was detained in Beijing's Qincheng prison without charge for about one year.
After she was released on bail and put under house arrest on 28 November 2003, her
cyber adventure was later posted online, entitled "bu-xiu-gang laoshu shangwang
ji." (Adventurous log of "stainless steel mouse' going online) In her words:
• . .1 was deeply moved by the rise of movements to safeguard Internet rights during
my one year in detention.. In the past, we had set up a more efficient approach in
communicating, and made our work and [virtual] organisation more transparent and
democratic. The Internet somehow replaced the functions of fformal] organisation.
And it had already fostered the integrity of the Chinese society, nourishing a public
space from which the often oppressed Chinese civil society could emerge.56
As a matter of fact, the detention without charge of Liu Di is not an isolated case.
But this case may highlight the fact that the Internet is increasingly employed to
disseminate alternative and uncensored information online and served as a platform
to exchange grassroots public opinions. Yet the medium is rarely utilised on behalf
56 See <http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/4/1/18/n450779.htm >, Dali Yuan (Epoch Times), January
18, 2004, accessed on January 20, 2004
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of sociopolitical movements in the offline world to stimulate political transformation
in authoritarian China. The political effects are thus limited. In this respect, this may
partly explain why Liu Di was freed without charge in the end, because the Chinese
government now appears to be more tolerant towards Internet users' discussions on
unconventional subjects or even debates of a few sensitive issues so long as they do
not cross the (political) bottom line. In the meantime, the government may add
another channel to gauge public opinion from cyberspace. 57 Nevertheless if
Netizens do indeed cross the (political) line, the authorities will duly take action to
punish some offenders so as to set an example. Moreover, the light punishment also
resulted from the fact that she did not really translate her online dissent opinions into
organising political campaigns to attack the government in the offline world. This is
something that the CCP perceives as a real and immediate threatening force that is
associated with the Internet's political impact. Thereby it marks a notable difference
between individual cyber dissidents and dissident groups like the Falun Gong that
will be discussed next.
The Falun Gong Movement
It was a large Falun Gong-led demonstration, involving 10,000 of the group's
followers outside the Xinhuamen, Zhongnanhai, the politically cloistered compound
of the Party and State, on 25 April 1999 that first drew Beijing authorities' attention
to the severe threat from such incidents. Wang Zhaoguo, a high-level Chinese
" Since there is no political opinion polling in China, the central government has generally gauged
public opinion through other channels, including the internal references written and/or compiled by
the official Xinhua News Agency, the annual meeting of the NPC and CPPCC, and the petition
system (It is usually referred to as the system of letters and visits. It is called xinfang :hidu in
Chinese.
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official, described the sit-in protest as "...the most serious political incident since
the June 4 political turbulence in 1989.58 Nancy Chen has pointed out the Falun
Gong practitioners were able to assemble such a large-scale demonstration against
the CCP's crackdown in the capital city because of their tactics of "combined low
tech (word of mouth) and high tech (Internet)."59
When Li Hongzhi, the spiritual leader of Falun Gong or Falun Dafa, was asked
in what way such a coordinated protest could be effectively organised "without any
organisational structure"; he replied succinctly "...[t]hey learned it from the
Internet."60 In other words, by means of effective and efficient exploitations of the
Internet, including electronic mail, the Falun Gong followers successfully managed
to penetrate the forbidden compound of the Communist Party, a shocking intrusion
that the then-President Jiang Zemin found both "disturbing and intolerable."6 ' In the
light of China's hierarchical and tight public security net, the Communist leaders
have grounds to believe that the Falun Gong movement has precisely presented such
an insurmountable challenge to the very foundations of the State's absolute authority.
Vivienne Shue, for instance, maintains that Falun Gong "quietly proselytizes its
corrosively critical counterhegemonic system of value and its alternative
"Ge Minzhu Dangpai Zhongyang he Quanguo Gongshanglian Lingdaoren ji Wudangpai Renshi
Biaoshi Jianjue Yonghu Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Chuli 'Falun Gong' Wenti de Juece"
(Leaders of China's eight non-Communist parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce, as well as some leading personages without party affiliation, have voiced their support
for the policies made on 'Falun Gong' from the CCP Central Committee), People Daily, July 24,
1999, p. 3.
Nancy N. Chen, "Healing Sects and Anti-Cult Campaigns," The China Quarterly, No. 174, June
2003, p.514.
60 See <http://faluncanada.net/fldfbb/news990502.htm>, accessed on August 20, 2002.
61 James Tong, "Anatomy of Regime Repression in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 6,
November! December 2002, p. 819.
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transcendental cosmology." 62 The Chinese officials, consequently, strongly urge the
elimination of such potential threats.
The Falun Gong group was officially denounced as a "xie-jiao" (heterodox
organisation or evil cult) and outlawed in July 1999, three months after its
demonstration. Propaganda spoke of its great harm to the integrity of Chinese
society and the Party-state. It was then forced to rely heavily on the Internet to
disseminate information, exchange opinions, and wage any offline campaigns, since
any attachment with the Falun Gong in Chinese society is labelled a serious political
taboo. The State relentlessly represses it.63
Because of the continuous harsh crackdowns on the Falun Gong movement in
mainland China, the followers had to appeal to a much wider international
community through the use of digital media, mainly the Internet and satellite
communities, to counterattack the autocratic Chinese government for their serious
violations of basic human rights—freedom of speech, assembly and religion. As
Yuezhi Zhao notes, "If books and audiovisual tapes were the main carriers of the
Falun Gong message in its early years inside China, the Internet has been
instrumental to its more prominent emergence as a transnational global
community."64 Stephen O'Leary holds that the Fulun Gong "offers a fascinating
glimpse of an ancient religious tradition that is mutating rapidly as it makes the leap
62 Vivienne Shue, "Global Imaginings, the State's Quest for Hegemony, and the Pursuit of Phantom
Freedom in China: From Heshang to Fulun Gong," in Catarina Kinnvall and Kristina Jonsson (eds.),
Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity (London and New York:
Routledge), 2002, p. 224.
63 See, for example, Han-qi Fang, "Falun Gong yu Hulianwang" (Falun Gong and the Internet),
Zhongguo chuanboxue: Fansi yu qiait-han (China Mass Communications Studies: Introspection and
Prospect) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2002), Pp. 173-19 1.
Yuezhi Zhao, "Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China," in
Nick Couldry and James Curran (eds.), Contesting Media Power: Towards a Global Comparative
Perspective (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 2 16-217.
164
into cyberspace."65
In what ways is the Falun Gong actually adapting to this novel cyber world to
continue their offline teachings of Master Li? Certainly Minghui Net
<www.minghui.org>, acting as an official propaganda centre of the Falun Gong,
plays a directive and vital role for the movement. In addition to the Chinese version
of the Minghui Net (both traditional and simplified version), eight additional
languages, such as English, French, German, Spanish, are provided to appeal to the
global community. In terms of online content, there are nine major categories: Falun
Dafa, updates from China, news and media reports, persecution accounts, Falun
Dafa worldwide, open forum, personal cultivation, cultivation in persecution, truth
clarification, and scientific findings. A lot of Master's Li's handouts, publications,
and audio/video materials are available online.
To achieve the objectives of breaking through the Chinese government's
obstruction, exposing the persecution of Dafa practitioners, and spreading the
"truth" of Falun Dafa, there are six recommendations promoted by the Falun Gong
headquarters that shape their backbone cyber-tactics. Since the recommendations
represent general guidelines for dissident groups like the Falun Gong to exercise
cyber militancy, they are quoted in detail as follow:
1. Falun Dafa practitioners in different regions of different countries are
encouraged to make every possible effort to set up websites to spread Falun
Dafa and, at the same time, strengthen coordination between websites;
2. All Dafa websites are encouraged to promptly re-post more Minghui articles.
65 Stephen D. O'Leary, "Falun Gong and the Internet," in Danny Schechter (ed.), Falun Gongs
Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or "Evil Cult"? (New York: Akashic Books, 2000), p. 208.
165
Please indicate that the articles were originally posted on Minghui Net
(http://minghui.ca) and the three official mirror sites announced on Minghui
Net (ex. http://minghui.org) when necessary. This will stop saboteurs from
finding any loopholes to be exploited for interference;
3. All Dafa websites can set up mirror sites of Minghui Net, but please ensure
that the sites are updated frequently and promptly with the most recent
contents in order to be responsible to the readers and Dafa;
4. Whenever possible, make links to Dafa websites from various public
websites. This will enable more readers to gain access to Dafa websites, and
increase the accessibility of Dafa information in society;
5. If technical support is needed to set up Minghui Net mirror sites, please
contact both <mirror@minghui.org> and <webteamminghui.ca>;
6. Set up reliable and safe email lists to periodically send articles from postings
on Dafa Websites (including Minghui Net) to practitioners in China and
people who are concerned about Dafa.66
Apart from the six-point-recommendations, several further technical measures,
including the use of encryption technologies and proxy servers, were circulated on
their Web sites in what they deem the "crusade" against the vicious crackdown
launched by the Chinese government at all levels. Yet the social movements led by
the Falun Gong following the outright ban on the spiritual movement in July 1999
are relatively smaller, mainly because many followers were intimidated by potential
arrests and the authorities have always remained highly alert to every social
gathering in cities and the countryside. The local leaders of residential committees
(/u wei hut) and village committees (cun wei hui) have helped the security
Minghui editors, "Break through Blockades and Enhance the Effectives of Falun Dafa Websites
around the World," Minghui Net, July 15, 2000, available online at
<http://www.minghui.orglmh/articles/2000/
 7/15/2625.html>, accessed on April 22, 2004.
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departments keep a close eye on the possible assembly of suspected practitioners of
Falun Gong. Reinforced by the Chinese propaganda apparatus, the general political
atmosphere is deliberately shaped so that any affinity with the Falun Gong is
seriously regarded as a no-go area.
In cyberspace, online police as well as Web site administrators enhance
heightened scrutiny of online contributions and contents, ensuring no alternative
opinions stray away from political correctness on the subject of Falun Gong. The
owners of Internet cafés are also required to keep records of online activities of their
patrons for at least 60 days, which in turn submitted to security authorities if
requested. The offenders, regardless whether it is an individual Internet user, ISPs
and ICPs, are all held responsible for their online postings or contents. Most Falun
Gong Websites registered in mainland China are shut down and those registered
off-shore are blocked. Several popular Internet search engines, including Google and
Yahoo, are either under heavy censorship or impose self-censorship to filter contents
by keywords, and thus erase/de-list some of their sensitive content, including their
cache feature that makes the deleted Web pages available from their database of
archived Web pages. They comply with the Chinese government in order to enter
China's vast electronic business market.67
Protesters have turned up at Tiananmen Square amid heavy security where they
usually display banners, shout or even commit self-immolation in protest against the
heavy-handed crackdown on their community. Nevertheless, social control remains
in the tight grip of the CCP. As Shanthi Kalathil observed, "Albeit some mainland
67 See, for example, Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005. A Country Study, available online at
<http ://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/chinalONl
 China Country Study.pdf, published on
April 14, 2005, accessed on April 18, 2005.
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Chinese followers possess the technical prowess necessary to access overseas Falun
Gong sites and evade capture, the government's campaign to eradicate the bulk of
the domestic movement.. . appears to be succeeding."68
Comparing independent cases of Internet activism like the Liu Di incident and
the Falun Gong movement reveals an important implication that the CCP may allow
a certain degree of online critical debate or voices to be expressed. It will not,
however, tolerate any offline sociopolitical force to emerge to either directly or
indirectly, threaten or challenge its power basis. In other words, as long as the online
criticism does not translate into substantative offline political movements to protest
in the streets, the CCP appears more lenient in letting a certain degree of freedom of
speech linger in cyberspace. One of the serious concerns is that the offline social
movement may not target the government now, but instead one day turns against the
authorities. In this sense, to consolidate the CCP's reign, it is essential to take
precautions to prevent an Internet-based "peaceful revolution" from taking shape in
the offline Chinese society. It is thus obvious that on any account, the Chinese
authorities claim that the struggle with Falun Gong will be "long-lasting, intense,
and complicated so long as some of its adherents still refuse to give in."69
Section VI Discussions and Conclusions
From the cases discussed above, it is clear that the Internet has had an impact upon
68 Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet
on Authoritarian Rule (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p.
30.
69 Ping Lun Yuan (commentator), "Gonggu he Kuoda Jiepi Falun Gong Douzheng de Chengguo"
(Carry and intensify the battle against Falun Gong through to the end), People Daily, July 20, 2000,
p. 1. Also available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/I042/151762.html >,
accessed on April 20, 2004.
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China's political system. First of all, the repercussions of the U.S. Spy Plane
Incident (April 2002) illustrated the ways in which the power of the regime to
conduct diplomatic manoeuvring was constrained by the groundswell of nationalist
opinions online. Some of them even threatened to disrupt the foreign and business
relations with countries like the US or Japan. The SARS and BMW incidents have
highlighted the increasingly popular concept of "people's right -to know" (zhi qing
quan) when the local authorities have neither disclosed nor released any official
real-time accounts of the incident. The profound concerns about public health as
well as the heightened social inequality between the rich and poor have all
contributed to the heated discussions and debates online. That the government's
initial attitude was ambiguous, non-transparent, and ineffective in the process of
handling these events further incurred widespread speculation and rumours both
online and offline, deeply damaging the CCP's long practised vertical flow of
communications, and instead boosting horizontal public communications through
digital media like the Internet and Short Message Service. The mishandling of the
SARS epidemic has particularly widened the mistrust between the government and
the public, strengthening pressure for a more transparent, responsive and
accountable administration.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, the Beijing authorities appeared to be more
tolerant of this sort of online activism during the US Spy Plane incident, as long as
they did not cross the line by waging protests in the streets. One explanation is that
nationalist activists vis-à-vis the US, Japan or Taiwan are much less threatening to
the communist regime than pro-democracy dissidents such as followers of Falun
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Gong who explicitly challenge its monopolised power structure. Considering the
postings articulated online during the Spy Plane incident, the majority of them were
indeed patriotic whose opinions expressed the need for a stronger government to
uphold a tough stance in the diplomatic negotiations with the United States over
compensation and an official apology. Moreover, the government can also gauge and
track public opinion through which they may sometimes mobilise (online) opinion
for support of the incumbent regime when needed.
Secondly, the "virtual" public discourse conducted via Internet fora has pushed
and challenged the sanctioned boundary of free speech, and most importantly,
demanded a greater degree of response and accountability from the government. An
article appeared in the Chinese Oriental Outlook bluntly claiming that the BMW
incident, for instance, demonstrated that "ordinary people have little faith in law and
they distrust the state apparatus." 7° In other words, the official media fail in these
incidents to play the "watchdog" role found in many Western societies. Effectively,
there is a "thin" public media space where freer mass opinion can be expressed
without fearing threats and retaliation from the State. The Internet media has
therefore extended the range of traditional media outlets to widen horizontal
communications and convey public opinions online. This is largely because there are
few institutional measures or mechanisms underlying China's socio-political system
that accommodate public opinion. The concepts of human rights and freedom of
speech are either mentioned in a broadly unspecific manner, such as the notion that
the Chinese government vows to generally respect and protect human rights, or such
° Liu Haipo, "Baoma' An Zhenzheng Lingren Youlu zhi chu" (What it is really worrying about the
BMW case), Liaowang Dongfang Zhoukan (Oriental Outlook), No. 3, 2004, January 15, 2004, p. 31.
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concepts are merely touched upon in passing in China's 1982 Constitution, the
subsequent amendments in 2004, and in the "International Convention of Civil and
Political Rights" signed in 1998. Public opinion is seldom a crucial and integral part
to be taken into account in the decision-making and arbitration processes of public
policies and affairs. Adding to this is the scarcity of institutionalised channels like
regular, free elections or an impeachment mechanism.
As Joseph S. Nye Jr. argues, information dissemination implies that "...power
is more distributed and networks tend to undercut the monopoly of traditional
bureaucracy." Following this logic, he implies that the speed of the Internet has to
some extent constrained governments' agenda, whether central or local, requiring
much more rapid responses to events. The Shenzhen case, 72 highlights the positive
interactions between local government officials and citizens (the cyber writer). What
should not be simply overlooked, however, is that underpinning this virtuous circle
is the Internet-enabled public opinion. To restore the government's credibility and
public trust, and to strengthen its hand, the Shenzhen city council took the
revolutionary step of keeping abreast of the changing opinion of its citizens, and
trying to respect the right of the people to have access to government information.
Given that the public opinion articulated in cyberspace may not be allowed the final
say on the direction of development of the city, the change in public attitudes and
71 Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Information Technology and Democratic Governance," in Elaine Giufla
Kamarck and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (eds.), Governance.com:  Democracy in the Information Age
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2002), p. 11.
72 The case is about an online controversial article, under the title of "Who Ditched You, Shenzhen,"
written on November 16, 2002 by a Chinese Netizen nicknamed "wo wel yi kuang" (crazy for her).
The article provided illustrations of many sorts of deep-seated problems in Shenzhen, such as the
inefficient government agencies, social security, urban environment management . . .etc. The article
was swiftly circulated and widely discussed online with the result that Shenzhen and related issues
generated a great deal of debate. And this eventually led to a face-to-face dialogue between the
author and the city's mayor.
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sociopolitical behaviour has a far-reaching impact on the government in connection
with its roles, institutions and bureaucracies. In this regard, the government has
gradually taken public opinion into consideration when initiating and implementing
public policies.
Thirdly, the incidents under review have generated evidence that the Internet
has somewhat shaped and affected the traditional media. One dimension is that the
mainstream media have been "stimulated" and "encouraged" to take bolder steps to
follow what has been hotly debated in the cyber community. They are stimulated
because they have to compete with rivals in pursuing more commercial benefits.
Besides, since they may be in a less risky position, they are also encouraged to cover
incidents that are already heatedly discussed in cyberspace. "Virtual" discussions
thus provide justifications for traditional media outlets to follow suit. One of the
direct consequences is that we have witnessed freer media coverage, probing the
bottom line of press and media scrutiny. Meanwhile, it is increasingly becoming a
news media practice that online opinions or discourses can be incorporated into the
mainstream media where the previous news and traditional media channels were
independent and separate.
The Internet's impact on Chinese society has also revealed another factor—the
effect of accident or contingency. The Spy Plane incident, the BMW incident, and
many others came up unexpectedly but they all caught the media spotlight. One
cause is that ordinary people may in general be aware of social injustice and official
corruption such as allegedly existed in the BMW case, and the concern with
anti-hegemony (or anti-imperialism) against the US (or Japan) during the CCP's
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political socialisation. Their disaffection and wrath are often constrained and/or
concealed until a specific incident emerges. Only then will they be induced to
actively express their resentment and engage in (online) discussions. In other words,
those kinds of events can be expected to take place soon or later. Yet they are
fundamentally different from the pre-planned political events that will be discussed
in the coming two chapters. The Net's political impact is therefore varied. When, for
example, the public expresses its sympathy with people who have become victims,
they may further fuse their long-standing hatred and anxiety into joint civic
engagement, online or offline. Both incidents illustrated have had effect in
challenging the existing legal and governing systems, and awakening concern with
civil and legal rights.
In the case of SARS, it was a contingency but not an event anyone had
expected would emerge in comparison with the previous two cases (Spy Plane and
BMW incidents). The Internet's political impact has thus shown subtle differences
between contingent events that are and are not anticipated. In the case of the SARS
epidemic, after local government's mishandling of the crisis, the aftermath of the
newly-issued regulation on public health highlighted a gradual but critical step of the
Chinese government to construct a more comprehensive mechanism for managing
public emergencies. They now hold local government officials accountable for either
hiding and delaying emergency information or giving false information. It aims to
achieve a more responsive and transparent local government for a timely,
comprehensive, and accurate public disclosure of information. In a word, in terms of
the political impact of the Internet, the unexpected contingent event appears greater
173
than expected because when things are expected to occur, the authorities will have
leeway to limit its impact. This preliminary conclusion drawn from the previous
case studies will be further tested and contrasted in the next two chapters.
In fact, the power of the Internet following circumstantial events recalls what
Nina Hachigian has predicted,
"...[tJhe power shifts wrought by the Internet will surface clearly only during an
economic or political crisis in afuture China where the Internet is far more pervasive.
At that time, the Internet will fuel discontent and could be the linchpin to a successful
challenge to party rule.
Fourthly, in the realm of the political impact of the Internet, the Falun Gong can
arguably be defined as a representative group of political dissent, which poses a
potential threat to China's Party-state. Some have further linked Falun Gong with
the Internet as a metaphor of "marriage made in Web heaven."74 Given the fact that
the Internet has presented Chinese dissidents with a weapon to challenge the
party-state through their offline mass demonstration, the Falun Gong has yet posed
any serious direct and imminent threat to the Communist regime. At best, the
Internet has enabled its followers to bring more international pressure against the
Chinese government. Its impact is significantly constrained.
Lastly, the Internet has been employed to advance advocacy of public
awareness pertaining to social justice and civil rights at a moment in time. An online
petition, entitled "Declaration of Citizens' Rights for the Internet," for instance, was
Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, p.
118.
"Falungong and the Internet: A Marriage Made in the Web Heaven," VirtualChina.com, July 30,
1999, available online at <http:/fww.virtualchina.com/infotech/perspectives/perspective-)073099 .
html>, accessed on September 15, 2001.
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signed on July 29, 2002, by a total 18 Chinese intellectuals on the eve of the
enforcement of the "Provisional Regulations for Internet Publication and
Management" of August 1, 2002. Addressing the necessity to safeguard the
legitimate rights of Chinese people's use of the Internet, the declaration proposed
freedom of speech on the Internet, freedom of Internet information and freedom of
Internet organisations. 75 The increasingly intense glare of the Internet and other
ICTs has also enhanced the public's awareness of the government's warts and
blemishes. The awakening of civil rights in the wake of wider application of ICTs
may further suggest that utilising the modern technology stands at the forefront to
open a freer Chinese sociopolitical society, albeit it is still in the incipient stage.
To sum up, there are grounds based on the empirical evidence presented in this
chapter to suggest that the Internet indeed has had an impact on the government in a
way that leads to a more transparent and accountable governing system in China.
Internet users may not directly or quickly subvert communist rule, nevertheless, they
have manoeuvred and mobilised the deemed "reactionary" power to challenge the
government's perceived agendas and bring forth sociopolitical relaxation, albeit it is
still premature to talk about political democratisation. The dramatic increase in
information available online is potentially a great challenge to the CCP's
propaganda-filled media environment. The Internet-enabled public opinion in China
is, as a result, bound to grow significantly in the future. After all, the Internet's
political impact will be shaped and determined less by the intrinsic nature of the
"Zhongguo Xuezhe: Wangluo Gongmin Quanli Xuanyan," (Chinese Scholars - Declaration of
Citizens' Rights for the Internet), No. 152, 11 Bao (China E-Weekly), July 29, 2002, available online
at <http://www.chinaeweekly.com/history/gb02070411.htm>, accessed on April 30, 2004. See also
Sophie Beach and Xiao Qiang, "As Control Increase, 'Internet Citizens' Demand More Freedom,"
South China Morning Post, October 3, 2002.
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Internet itself, and more by the underlying political dynamics of public opinion.
This chapter has contributed to the overall argument of the dissertation with a
picture of the overall impact of separate events on the Chinese political system. It
has basically been conducted from a macro perspective. The next chapter will
explore whether the Chinese government is as much in control of public debates in
cyberspace as it is of debates in the form of traditional media of the People's Daily.
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Chapter 6 The Political Impact of the Internet upon Value
Orientation (I): Case Study of the 16th National
Congress of Communist Party of China (November
2002)
Section I
	 Introduction
What can be the impact of the Internet upon authoritarian regimes? This chapter
addresses the issues of the formation and development of a public sphere and online
social capital in China with an empirical analysis of messages posted on the Qiangguo
Luntan web site during the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). The discussions centre upon four separate yet intertwined categories of issues,
(a) corruption, (b) the concept of xiaokang shehui and income inequality, (c) the
theory of the "Three Represents" and the official accession of private entrepreneurs
into the CCP, and (d) political reform. By contrasting the official coverage of the
themes that appears in the People Daily, the examination of the Qiangguo Luntan
can help explore the extent to which the Internet has facilitated the evolution of
e-social capital and the possible emergence of a public sphere, albeit with Chinese
characteristics.
A. Internet, Online Discussion Board and the Growth of Public Opinion
"Public opinion" is related to what Jurgen Habermas has designated as the "public
sphere." The "public sphere," in his words, is "...a domain of our social life in which
such a thing as public opinion can be formed... We speak of a political public sphere
when the public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the state."
Jurgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere," in Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson (eds.),
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In other words, the public sphere, as McNair explains, "...comprises in essence the
communicative institutions of a society, through which facts and opinions circulate,
and by means of which a common stock of knowledge is built up as the basis for
collective political action."2
In addition, examining the environmental agency and public opinion in
Guangzhou, Lo and Leung conclude that"... [ut is no longer taboo for a bureau to use
social forces to counter other parts of the bureaucracy. Public opinion is now seen as a
valuable resource."3 As far back as late 1995, the US-based scholars Jie Chen and
Yang Zhong, in cooperation with the Public Opinion Research Institute of People's
University of China, conducted a public opinion survey on political interests and
apathy in Beijing. Instead of showing political apathy, their finding reveals that there
is indeed a high level of political interest in Beijing. 4 As a matter of fact, public
opinion is now a force that leaders may often reckon with. As Joseph Fewsmith puts it,
". . . [t]he Government cares about public opinion because it is concerned with political
stability."5 Similarly, as argued by Minxin Pei,
Rethinking Popular Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), PP. 398-404.
2 Brian MeNair, An Introduction to Political Communication (London and New York: Routledge,
1995), p. 20.
Carlos Wing Hung Lo and Sal Wing Leung, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in
Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance," The China Quarterly,
No. 163, September 2000, pp. 677-704.
The study shows that two-thirds of respondents are either "somewhat interested" or "very interested"
in politics, 90 per cent indicate that they either "occasionally," "often" and "always" talk about politics
with their friends and family members. See, Jie Chen and Yang Zhong, "Mass Political Interest (or
Apathy) in Urban China," Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 1999,
p. 28 1-303.
See, for example, Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, "The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign
Policy: Does 'Public Opinion' Matter?" in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign
and Security Policy, 1978-2000 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 15 1-187; Joseph
Fewsmith, China Since 7iananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), p. 16.
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[w]hereas past policies were largely determined by the ruling ideology, its erosion [the
declining appeal of communism] means that the struggle over policy has become a more
spirited debate in which many political factors, including public opinion, carry weight.
Without any ideological reason to command loyally, too, the regime must be far more
sensitive to its standing among ordinary people. 6
In terms of public opinion, the Internet may offer the possibility of a public space free
from monopoly control of governments in China. When asked by the New York limes
about Internet governance in China, Jiang Yaping, who heads the Internet division of
the People 's Daily, replied, "We try to let the people speak. We are the main
newspaper of the Party, so of course there are limits. But it would take something
stronger than these [messages that are critical of the Party or the Government for them]
to be removed."7
B. The Internet and Political Values Orientation
Studies and surveys have all pointed out that the majority of Chinese Internet users
come from urban and coastal areas, and are young male professionals with
economically better-off backgrounds. 8 But the implication behind the reality is that
the use of the Internet for the time being for any serious information searches and even
for political associations and engagement appear to be a minor sideline, compared to
6 Minxin Pei, "Hearing the Voice of The People at Last," Newsweek, May 7, 2001, p. 21.
Messages such as: "I want her to know that we Chinese People don't like our government," "The
Communist Party doesn't let Chinese people read newspapers from overseas" are weeded out. See,
Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Web Sites Bloom in China, and Are Weeded," The New York limes, December
23, 1999, Section A, Page 1.
8 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Semiannual Survey Report on the
Development of China Internet (October 1997-January 2004), available online at
<http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm >, accessed on February 17, 2004.
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the massive flows of online traffic in entertainment, such as online games and
audio-visual programmes, chat rooms and increasingly business/commerce-related
activities.9 A survey using the Google search engine shows that business-related Web
sites and pages greatly outnumber their counterparts for politics and news information:
148,000,000 as against 4,430,000 entries respectively. Similarly, there are about
3,200,000 business entries versus 883,000 ones for politics and news-based websites
whilst surveying the Chinese version of Google.'°
Nevertheless a Chinese expert has argued that compared to Internet users in other
countries, the Chinese Netizens seem to demonstrate greater enthusiasm in expressing
their viewpoints over social, political, economic and military matters. In part he
believes the Internet is a venue where Netizens may enjoy a relatively freer space for
expression than in the traditional media.' 1 Online political debates and consultations
are becoming a critical hinge that can link grassroots politics with broader possible
social and political change.
Jonathan Zhu and Zhou He have carried out research on Internet users and their
value orientation in China. They demonstrate that the impact of the Internet on value
orientations of ordinary citizens in major cities of Beijing and Guangzhou has shown
a tendency to shift from official-oriented communism to the value system of
It is generally in line with the Internet use in the West. See, for example, Kevin A. Hill and John E.
Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet (Lanham, MD.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1998).
The results deriving from both standard and Chinese versions of Google search engine were
conducted on February 18, 2003. While keywords of "business" and "commerce" were input in
standard Google search engine, the Chinese equivalent words "qiye" (business) and "shangye" were
input in the Chinese version of Google. Meanwhile, keywords of "politics" and "news" were input in
standard Google, and "zheng zhi" and "xin wen" in Chinese version of Google.
Wang Xiaodong, "Hulianwang yu Zhongguo de Sixiang Duoyuanhua" (The Internet and Thought
Pluralisation in China), BBC Chinese Service, May 9, 2002, available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/  chinese/china_news/newsid_742000/742239 I .stm>, accessed on March 6,
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materialism and post-materialism.' 2
 Such a result coincides with a general survey
showing that the official ideology of communism is losing its popular appeal. Instead,
a more secularised and consumerist value orientation is increasingly prevalent, in
particular among younger generations in the reform era.' 3 This seems especially
likely amongst costal urban Chinese audiences as China accelerates its pace of
engaging with the world economy after accession to the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) in late 2001 and signals the official acceptability of private entrepreneurs in
the CCP in late 2002.
Section II	 Internet, e-Social Capital and Public Sphere
The notions of public sphere and social capital have usually been addressed and
debated separately in the social sciences. Rarely have they been studied jointly
together with the Internet. Since the Internet has brought a media revolution in
developed and most developing countries since the mid-1990s, I propose linking
together the public sphere, social capital and the Internet to deepen the analysis of the
political impact of the Internet upon any given state context, whilst adding a
normative dimension to the analysis.
Habermas defined the concept of public sphere in Between Facts and Norms. He
thinks that the public sphere can best be described as "a network for communicating
information and points of view, where the streams of communication are filtered and
2003.
12 Jonathan J. H. Zhu and Zhou He, "Information Accessibility, User Sophistication, and Source
Credibility: The Impact of the Internet on Value Orientations in Mainland China," Journal of
Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 7, No. 2, January 2002, available online at
<http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol7/issue2/china.html >, accessed on May 16, 2002.
Wei-wei Zhang, Thansforming China: Economic Reform and its Political Implications (London:
Macmillan Press, 2000), chapter 13.
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synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public
opinion." 4 To him, public or association life is part of the material from which the
public sphere may emerge. In fact such association life does not necessarily imply
physical proximity, as the classical example of café bars suggests.' 5 Bennett and
Entman have further claimed that the public sphere could refer to other areas of
"informal life," ranging from traditional cafés to modern Internet cafés, or any place
where the exchange of public opinion could be held—"where ideas and feelings
relevant to politics are transmitted or exchanged openly."6
In this sense, the Internet may help create new public spaces. Such a new public
sphere in the information age can refer to a fresh pattern of public/associational life
that the public get involved and participate in the debates and discussions of public
policy issues. As a result, like-minded citizens can gain a voice in public affairs
outside formal democratic institutions. 17 Interactive communication mediated by the
Internet means not merely a two-way process, but also a many-to-many channel of
14 Jurgen Haberrnas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (Oxford: Polity, 1996), P. 360.
' 5 As Antje Gimmier has pointed out, Habermas was pessimistic about the return of a critical public
sphere in his earlier work (1962 German versions and 1989 English version). Nonetheless he changed
his mind and argued that the return of such a sphere is possible within the resurgence of civil society
itself. See Antje Gimmler, "Deliberative Democracy, the Public Sphere and the Internet," Philosophy
& Social Criticism, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2001, p. 25; James Curran, Media and Power (London and New
York: Routledge, 2002), p. 234.
16 W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman, "Mediated Politics: An Introduction," in W. Lance
Bennett and Robert M. Entman (eds.), Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 3.
17 Lincoln Dahlberg, "The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the Prospects of Online
Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere," Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 4,
No. 4, 2001, pp. 615-633; Mark Poster, "Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere," in David
Porter (ed.), Internet Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 20 1-217; Douglas Keilner,
"Intellectuals, the New Public Spheres, and Techno-politics," in Chris Toulouse and Timothy W. Luke
(eds.), The Politics of Cyberspace: A New Political Science Reader (New York and London:
Routledge, 1998), pp. 167-186; Lincoln Dahlberg, "Computer-Mediated Communication and the
Public Sphere: A Critical Analysis," Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 7, No. 1,
October 2001, available online at <http://www.ascuse.org/jcmc/vol7/issue1/dahlberg.html >, accessed
on December 11,2002.
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exchanging, disseminating and relaying information, whether top-down, bottom-up or
horizontally. Hence Klein argues that the new technology like the Internet has
provided a new means for realising what Alexis de Tocqueville has held about the
application of the democratic theory into civic associations. He claims, "By providing
a new technology for [public] forums, the Internet opens new possibilities for citizen
associations." 18 Robert Putnam further links civic associations and voluntary
associations with what he terms "social capital" for political participation and
effective governance, after he has surveyed decades-long decline of American civic
engagement from the 1960s.' 9 He defines that "social capital refers to connections
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness
that arise from them,"2° that "enable participants to act together more effectively to
pursue shared objectives."2'
A growing literature from the late 1990s has begun to tackle the role of the
Internet with the connections of social capital and public sphere in advanced industrial
democracies.22 Relatively few works, however, have applied the same approach to
less developed democracies and undemocratic countries. Those few works that have
been written tend to treat the Internet as an isolated socioeconomic phenomenon
without considering how interactions on the Net may fit together with other impact
18 Hans K. Klein, "Tocqueville in Cyberspace: Using the Internet for Citizen Association," The
Inform ation Society, Vol. 15, No. 4, October-December 1999, p. 216.
19 Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 65-78; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival
ofAmerican Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Robert D. Putnam, ed., Democracies
in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
20 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival ofAmerican Community, p. 19.
' Robert D. Putnam, "The Strange Disappearance of Civil America," The American Prospect, Vol. 7,
No. 24, winter 1996, p. 34.
22 See, for example, Barry Wellman, Anabel Quan Haase, James Witte and Keith Hampton, "Does the
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and influences of ordinary people's political participation. Christopher Marsh and
Laura Whalen are amongst the few who have conducted research on e-social capital
and the Internet with regard to the Chinese context Building upon the concept of
"social capital,"23 Marsh and Laura postulate that the Internet and cyberspace allow
for a "new and unique" form of social organisation that can be used to generate an
electronic form of social capital. 24 After examining Netizens' usage as well as access
to the Internet, together with the (in)capability of the Chinese government to contain
the new medium, they come to the conclusion that Internet users undermine state
control and contribute to the formation of a civil society.25
This piece of work has shed light on further cyber studies in China, although it is
too soon to comprehensively assess their argument that the Internet and the evolution
of e-social capital have facilitated a definite democratic transition in China. The term
e-social capital, in the eyes of this dissertation, does not connote social capital
generated on the Internet merely, though it is indeed a principal component of e-social
capital per se. Rather, I would suggest that the electronic form of social capital may be
interplayed with social capital in the physical world, mutually influencing and
reinforcing each other. In addition, when studying social capital, Pippa Norris
Internet Increase, Decrease, or Supplement Social Capital," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 45,
No. 3, November 2001, pp. 436-455.
n This concept is borrowed from James Coleman and is defined as "social organisation constitutes
social capital, facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could
be achieved only at a higher cost." See James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge,
Mass. and London: Belknap Press, 1990), p. 304.
24 Traditionally, social capital must be formed in civil society where it is a relatively autonomous
sphere in a society which rests between the state and the private sector. The "new and unique"
environment afforded by cyberspace provides the form of social organisation that can be used by
democratisation movements in authoritarian regimes, despite these regimes' best efforts to control
civil society and organised opposition. See Christopher Marsh and Laura Whalen, "The Internet,
c-social Capital, and Democratization in China," American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1,
April 2000, p. 62, 66 and 67.
25 Christopher Marsh and Laura Whalen, "The Internet, c-social Capital, and Democratization in
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suggests it is more significant to "analyse the cultural norms and values associated
with membership."26
To sum up, attempts to compare the ways in which the same or similar events are
treated when the Internet was and was not available over a certain period of time may
in a sense highlight the Internet's impact upon the political domain. In the Chinese
case, since the Internet is increasingly exploited by many users, it presents a
favourable backdrop for us to further study the debates over online discussion boards
such as Qiangguo Luntan, hosted and administered by official People 's Daily,
contrasting the news coverage from the People 's Daily itself during and around the
16th National Congress of the CCP in November 2002. By comparing the two media
outlets addressing the same political event, we can present empirical evidence to show
how and to what extent the Internet has impacted upon the evolution of social capital
and the public sphere, and in consequence on the Chinese political system.
Section III Sixteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party:
Contrasting Qiangguo Luntan with the People's Daily
The establishment of the Qiangguo Luntan came from a deliberate initiative of Jiang
Yapin, chief of the online People's Daily.27 As Jiang sees it, the forum taps a growing
China," pp. 61-8 1.
26 Pippa Norris, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), p. 166.
27 According to an interview with a news reporter from lime magazine, Mr Jiang explained that the
idea of a chat room for discussing the news was approved in early 1999, but there was some hesitation
over when and how to launch it. "We were waiting for a special occasion." That presented itself on
May 8, 1999, when a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) warplane bombed the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade. A day later (May 9, 1999), the Protest Forum named "Qianglie Kangyi Beiyue
Baoxing BBS Luntan" was set up for ordinary people to express their reaction. Soon after the protests
died down, Jiang and his staff realized that people should be able to do more than just protest, so the
Protest Forum was later (on June 19, 1999) renamed the Qiangguo Luntan (Strong Country Forum) to
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trend towards outspokenness because "...[a]fter two decades of Deng Xiaoping's
economic reforms, Chinese people want to express their ideas to the government, and
the government needs to know what the people are thinking."28 The forum founded in
1999 is now extensively acknowledged as one of the most popular and influential
Chinese language online discussion fora, which is sponsored by news media in
Mainland China.29 It has attracted more than 200,000 registered users as of April 2003,
where average daily postings numbered around 7,000 and 10,000 in July 2001.°
During the 16th Party Congress, average daily contributions to the Qiangguo Luntan
even reached as high as around 40,000, far beyond the normal number of 10,000.3!
The reason why the Qiangguo Luntan enjoys unique popularity is in part because
unlike the developed media environment in those democracies where freer public
debates and consultations can be made through traditional media, there are yet few
equivalent channels available in China. Although the Qiangguo Luntan is looked
upon by some (Chinese) commentators as ". . . breaking through one-dimensional
expand wider discussion topics.
28 Mia Turner, "An Avenue for Dissent," Time, Vol. 155, No. 14, April 10, 2000, available online at
<http://www.time.com/time/asia/maga.zine/20O0/041 0/china.chatroom.html>, accessed on April 12,
2003.
29 See, for example, "Wangshang 'Renmin Luntan'—Qianxi Renmin Ribao Wangluoban 'Qiangguo
Luntan" (Online 'People's Forum'—Reviewing the 'Strong Country Forum' in the People c Daily),
Xinwen Zhanxian (News Battlefront), December 22, 1999, available online at
<http://bbs.people.com.cnlfuwu/mt/mt-1/004.html>, accessed on April 12, 2003; Du Ping,
"Zhongguo de 'Wangshang Tequ" ('Online Special Administration' in China), Lianhe Zaobao
(Singapore), July 17, 2000, available online at <http://bbs.people.com.cn/fuwulmt/  mt-1/006.html>,
accessed on April 12, 2003; Xue Yan, "Renminwang Wunian Chengguo Huihuang" (Fruitful
Accomplishments of the People's Daily Online), Jinghua Shibao, January 6, 2002, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/other70  18/7248/7249/20020404/ 702365 .html>, accessed on April
11,2003.
° Chen Tongxu and Derig Lifeng, "BBS Yiti de Xingcheng yu Shuaibian—Dui Renminwang
Qiangguo Luntan de Gean Yanjiu" (The Formation and Decay of Issues in BBS—A Case Study of
'Strong Country Forum' in the People r Daily), Xinwen yu Chuanbo Yanjiu (Journalism and
Communication Studies), No. 1, 2002, available online at <http://bbs.people.com.cn/fuwu/mtlmt-1/
013.html>, accessed on April 12, 2003.
" Li Xiaoming, "Renminwang 'Qiangguo Luntan' Tongshi Zaixian Tupo Siwan" (Online Population
Reaches 40,000 Simultaneously in the 'Strong Country Forum' of the People r Daily), People r Daily,
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public opinion" 32
 and ". . . revising as well as re-constructing the government's
agenda-setting," it is nonetheless constrained by the official guidelines of
regulations, and is probably obliged to propagate the Party and Chinese Government's
images, and to direct public opinion by standing out against the more liberal
international public opinion and media.34
The 16th Party Congress, convened between November 8 and 14, 2002 in
Beijing, was the first to mark the incorporation of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) into the nationwide propaganda machinery. Where previously
the general public relied upon the traditional media of TV and newspapers to secure
information about the 15th CCP Party Congress proceedings in September 1997, they
can now take advantage of the mushrooming of news coverage boosted by the new
media—the Internet. Live, diversified and audio-visual reports, provided by the
Chinese media as well as foreign channels, were promised by the Internet-based
technologies to bring them a more digitalised coverage of the 16th Party Congress.
Provincial or local Party leaders, government officials and scholars were, for example,
invited or assigned to come to Qiangguo Luntan to serve as special guests elucidating
the General Secretary's Report and to take questions from ordinary Internet users.
As regards the selection of articles from the People's Daily, the basic principle is
that articles appearing in the first few pages are usually regarded as prominent in
November 17, 2002, P. 4.
32 See, for example, Mm Dahong, "Dangbao han Dangbao Wangzhan" (Party Newspaper and Party
Newspaper's Website), Zhonghua Xinwenbao, July 10, 2001, p. 4.
n Li Xiguang and Qin Xuan, "Shui Zai Shezhi Jintian de Yicheng?—Dianzi Luntan zai Zhongda
Xinwen Shijian zhong dui Dangbao Yiti de Chonggou" (Who Is Setting Chinese Agenda?—Impact of
Online Chatroom on Party Press), in Li Xiguang and Zhao Xin-shu (eds.), Me iii de Liliang (The Power
of Media) (Guangzhou: Nanfang Ribao, 2002), pp. 156-169.
Zhang Husheng, "Jiangchi Zhengque Daoxiang, Tuxian Wangluo Tese" (Persist Correct Orientation,
Project Internet Characteristics), Xinwen Zhanxian, No. 7, 2002, available online at
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terms of propaganda and agenda-setting. Accordingly, they enjoy a priority position
for those relevant official stories pertaining to the themes set to be selected and
compared with those in Qiangguo Luntan. In addition, official guidance on the
selection of the themes discussed has a great deal to do with the (changing) nature of
the Party Congress. Issues of corruption, income inequality and political reform, for
instance, are usually articulated amongst ordinary people and brought into discussion
in the cyber chat rooms. These subjects are nevertheless hotly debated during the
session of National Party Congress. It is partly because the Netizens wish to take full
advantage of this opportunity to fuel and heighten their cyber-based agendas, making
themselves understood particularly by the Party representatives congregating in
Beijing. In part, they may also elevate and debate the themes lively in the cyberspace
since, from their perspectives, the restructuring of the Party chief and key personnel
may be the herald of new hope in tackling old problems.
Besides, the newly proposed and stressed concepts of Xiaokang Shehui, the
Three Represents Theory and official acknowledgement of private entrepreneurs into
the Communist Party are newly emerged issues that are expected to have the potential
to provoke wider public debates both in the "virtual" and "real" communities.
Therefore this chapter will focus on these notions. In short, the themes addressed in
this chapter are supposed to reflect the concerns of Chinese Netizens and provide a
valuable opportunity to lay the foundation to examine the triangular relations of the
Internet, e-social capital and public sphere in the Chinese cyber context.
There are, of course, some messages that are "strongly" sympathetic to the
government's agendas mirrored in the People Daily. These messages are re-directed
<http://www.snweb.comlgb/xw/2002/07/a070 I 009.htm>, accessed on April 11, 2003.
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into the main website version of People Daily, known as Renmin Wang, or People
Daily Online, and re-posted in a highly selective manner of course. Nonetheless, the
existing evidence is still sufficient to answer the research question posed at the onset
of this chapter. One of the primary reasons is that the research has been conducted
without deliberately sifting through one forum like Qiangguo Luntan to find
provocative or contrasting online messages in favour of the conclusions drawn. Apart
from that, the cyber messages that have been presented were not painstakingly chosen
as representative opinions to justify the arguments, but instead these sorts of messages
are so widespread that it is necessary to select an illustrative sample.
A. Corruption
There is no doubt about the enormous public concern over the seriousness of
corruption amongst government officials and party members. Such sentiments are
reflected in nationwide opinion polls. A recent survey, for instance, was conducted in
2001 by the State Development and Planning Commission of China, researching the
public attitudes of Chinese residents. It revealed that 73.8 per cent of respondents
regarded Fubai Guanliao Zhuyi (corrupt bureaucratism) as the most crucial factor
affecting social stability in China.35 Although the corruption issue is of high concern
amongst ordinary people, it is usually underreported or reported selectively in the
official media primarily for political reasons. Only after corruption incidents are
concluded can they usually be publicised. Often, in the face of state media cover-ups
Ding Yuanzhu and Zhou Yongping, "Zhongguojumin shehul xintai genzong fenxi," (An Analysis of
the Attitudes of Chinese Residents) in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi and Li Peilin (eds.), 2002: Zhongguo Shehui
Xingshi Fenxiyu Yuce (2002: Trend Analysis and Prediction of the Chinese Society) (Beijing: Shehui
Kexue Wenxiang, 2002), p. 24. (Table 7)
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or before news about corruption is released by official resources, cyberspace has been
playing the role of virtual watchdog in publicising corruption cases.36
Official campaigns in combating corruption (Fanfubai) have been extensively
addressed by many senior Party leaders in many occasions, including this 16th CCP
Congress. They have in general acknowledged the fatal threat that corruption has
brought to the party and the regime. For example, in Jiang Zeming's Report to the
16th Party Congress, he accentuated anew the importance of anti-corruption,
affirming that
"...[tJo combat and prevent corruption resolutely is a major political task on the whole
Party. If we do not crack down on corruption, the flesh-and blood ties between the Party
and the people will suffer a lot and the Party will be in danger of losing its ruling
position, or possibly heading for self-destruction.
The front page of the People s' Daily on 11 November 2002 issue, also covered
remarks made from Wei Jianxing, a top-level Party cadre, that
"the anti-corruption move has been going on well and made new achievements with
concerted efforts of the whole Party... The practice offighting corruption over the past
thirteen years fully shows that the third-generation collective leadership with Jiang
Zemin at the core has a sober understanding of the anti-corruption situation... Our
Party is fully capable of resolving the corruption problem. 38
36 Jianhai Bi, "The Internet Revolution in China: The Significance for Traditional Form of Communist
Control," International Journal, Vol. 56, No.3, summer 2001, p. 429.
" "Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress (3)," People Daily, November 18, 2002,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20O21I/I8/eng2002l  118_I 06985 .shtml>,
accessed on November 18, 2002.
38 
"Guanche 'Sange Daibiao' Zhongyao Sixiang, Jianchi Buxie di Kaizhan Fanfubai Douzheng"
(Carrying out the Three Represents, and persistent efforts should be made to combat corruption),
Peoples Daily, November 11, 2002, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
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The views quoted are basically the official interpretations in relation to the problem of
corruption.
Based upon empirical research conducted by the author of this dissertation
during the 16th Party Congress, the majority of the posted messages related to
corruption on the Qiangguo Luntan, quite revealingly, exhibited a cynical and critical
tone that deviated from official accounts in the People Daily, which praised much
the Party's notable results in building a clean and honest government and combat
corruption. 39 Several opinions were articulated as examples illustrate in Appendix 1.
The comments and questions quoted in Appendix 1 indicate that a growing
number of Internet users are not content with the government's strategies in tackling
corruption. Amongst their online debates over corruption, other than complimenting
the authorities' efforts, Internet users tend to be sceptical and critical of official
interpretations. They have instead proposed other solutions to the issue, paving the
way for a primitive form of public sphere in China's cyberspace, and creating e-social
capital in a rudimentary form, since they have been mapping an Internet community
within which basic trust and norms for China's future development are taking shape,
as the following examples show.
"The cause of corruption is that power is not effectively checked and balanced. Under
the current personnel promotion system, the government officials are held responsible to
their party superiors, not to the ordinary people. The current system has enabled Party
paper464/7697/734954.html>, accessed on November 11, 2002.
See, for example, "Fanfu Changlian Qude Xinde Mingxian Chengxiao" (The endeavour to build a
clean and honest government has yielded fresh notable results), Peopler Daily, November 1, 2002,
available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/news/8410/20021101/855896.html >, accessed on
November 2, 2002.
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officials to override government officials' power and authority, and overshadow
members of the National People Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). And then who is capable of supervising the Party
secretaries?" ("Beifendecaomin," 2002-11-06, 16:16:10)
When such a critical question was posed to an invited guest, one Netizen responded:
"The people, only the people can do that" ("Meidaoxiangzhu," 2000-11-06, 16:16:47),
and another bluntly and cynically responded "Can the people monitor their deeds... ?"
("Gongyuan erererer de zuihouyipilang," 2002-11-06, 16:27:14) Another replied
• the sole remedy for overcoming corruption is precisely to implement democratic
supervision over government officials." ("Beifendecaomin," 2002-11-10, 15:15:48)
Another Netizen claimed the so-called "Internet-based anti-corruption campaign"
ought to be adopted by the fourth-generation of leaders in fighting corruption because
Internet users could disclose corruption cases within the danwei (work unit) that they
know. ("Zhonghuazhanshi," 2002-11-16, 20:11:32)
B. Xiaokang Shehui and Income Inequality
So far as economic issues were concerned, coverage in the People 's Daily during the
16th Party Congress upheld the market economy mechanism. On the one hand it
declared that
"China should establish the principle that labour, capital, technology, managerial
expertise and other production factors participate in the distribution of income in
accordance with their contributions. "°
40 
"Yao tuijin jingji jianshe hanjingji tizhi gaige, baochi guominjingji chixu kuaisu jiankang fazhan"
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On the other hand it stressed that the economic tasks for China in the following five
years are to
"... improve the socialist market economy, promote strategic adjustment of the economic
structure, basically accomplish industrialisation, energetically apply Information
Technology, accelerate modernisation, maintain a sustained, rapid and sound
development of the national economy and steadily uplift the people living
standards. ,,41
In other words, the ultimate and fundamental goal for economic reform is to build a
Xiaokang Shehui (a moderately wealthy society) as claimed in the Report delivered at
the opening ceremony of the 16th Party Congress in the first two decades of the
twenty-first century.42
During the Party Congress, the concept of Xiaolcang Shehui was one of the main
themes and the term has been used to address the ambition of economic reform:
"building a well-off society in an all-round way" (quanmianjianshe xiaokang she hui)
in the twenty years ahead, and in the meantime addressing the Party's concern for the
improvement of living standards of ordinary people. For example, some coverage has
focused on how senior Party leaders and other delegates highly commended the
(Speeding up the economic development and restructuring, Maintaining a sustained, rapid and sound
development of the national economy), People c Daily, November 13, 2002, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/7720/736473  .html>, accessed on November 13, 2002.
" Ibid.
42 Speaking at a press conference after the 16th Party Congress, Zeng Peiyan, director of the State
Development Planning Commission, commented that "by the year 2020, we shall quadruple the GDP
of the figure in the year 2000 [800 US dollars] and achieve a GDP per person of 3000 US dollars,
which is the then projected average income in moderately developed countries." See "Official on
Connotation of a Complete Well-Off Society," People Daily, November 11,2002, available online at
<http://www.peopledaily.com.cn:80/GB/shizheng/1
 9/20021111/8631 50.html>, accessed on
November 12, 2002.
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Report.43 In addition, the issue of income distribution has been one of the thorniest
puzzles for the Beijing's authorities. China has, however, ranked itself amongst
countries where resident incomes are rather unequal. Take the capital city of China for
example. The income gap in Beijing in 2002 between the highest and lowest 20 per
cent of population has reached 16,620 renminbi, the most serious disparity since
949 An even bleaker statistic is that the per capita disposable income of urban
residents was 7,703 renminbi in 2002; a 13.4% increase from 2001, whereas for rural
residents it was 2,476 renminbi; a 4.8% increase.45 This suggests that the income
distribution disparity is widening at an unprecedented pace. In this regard, there seems
no disagreement that income inequality has deteriorated as the Gini Coefficient,
according to the Peoples Daily, grew from 0.33 in 1980 to the internationally
recognised critical point of 0.4 in 1994, and has exceeded 0.45 in 2001.46 The pyramid
of the wealthiest 20 per cent of Chinese residents occupies more than 51 per cent of
total national fortune, compared with the 4 per cent of the poorest. In other words, the
ratio between the two economic classes has worsened from 4.5:1 in the early reform
See, for example, "Jinjin Zhuazhu Zhongyao Zhanlue Jiyu, Qi Quanmian Jianshe Xiaokang Shehui"
(Keeping a firm grip of important opportunities on building a well-off society in an all-round way),
People's Daily, November 12, 2002, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GBI
paper464/7707/735596.html>.
" Data released by Statistics Department of Beijing Municipal Government in early 2003 indicated
whilst the per capida disposable income of the least 20 percent of Beijing residents in 2002 was 6,729
renminbi, a 7.3% increase over that of 2001, the top 20 percent of well-off population had reached
23,349 renminbi, a 16.7% increase compared to 2001. See, Jiang Xinju, "Jing jumin shouru jiada,
gaodicha 16,620" (The Income Gap among Beijing Residents is Widening, Reaching at 16,620
Renminbi), Being Yule Xinbao, February 14, 2003, available online at <http://www.people.
com.cn/GB/shenghuo/76/123/20030214/923387.html >, accessed on February 17, 2003.
' "Top Planner Zeng Peiyan Delivers Report to 10th NPC," People's Daily, March 6, 2003, available
online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn1200303/06/eng200303061
 1281 0.shtml>, accessed on
March 7, 2003.
46 Li Yea, "China Is Among Countries with Wide Income Gap," People's Daily, May 10, 2002,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20o2o5/10/eng2002051
 0_95447.shtml>,
accessed on February 18, 2003.
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era to 12.66:1. He Qinglian even maintained that the intertwining of power and
money in China had resulted in the corruption of government cadres, accelerating the
gap of income distribution between country and city, eastern provinces and western
ones.48
In general, complimenting much of the economic success achieved under Jiang
Zemin in the past thirteen years, the People Daily avoided harshly criticising and
publicising socioeconomic problems brought about by reform and the opening-up to
the outside world during the past decades.49 The closing ceremony, for example, has
again highlighted that CCP's achievements, stating
"In the last thirteen years, the third-generation leadership of the CCP has led the
Chinese people in making universally acknowledged achievements in reform, economic
and social development, maintenance ofstability, foreign affairs, national defence... and
so forth.
Many Netizens, nevertheless, show little interest in the officially propagated concept
' 
"Shenggua Fenpei Zhidu Gaige, Suoxiao Shouru Fenpei Chaju" (Deepening the Reform of
Distributional System, Shortening the Gap of Income Distribution), People Daily, March 8, 2002,
available online at <http://www1.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/1
 0307/10308/20030308/
939243.html>, accessed on March 9, 2003.
He Qinglian, "Zhongguo Gaige de De yu Shi" (The Success and Failures of China's Reforms),
Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiu (Modern China Studies), No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 2-24, available online at
<http://www.chinayj .net/StubArticle.asp?issue=020
 101 &total=76>, accessed on September 26, 2002.
See, for example, "Renmin Ribao: Yushi Jujin, Kaituo Chuangxin (She Lun)" (People's Daily:
Marching with time, engaging in exploration and innovation: Editorial), People s Daily, November 8,
2002, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/news/84784.html >,
accessed on November 8, 2002; "Meiri Redian—November 9" (Daily Spotlight: November 9),
People ' Daily, November 9, 2002, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/
252/8956/9434/20021109/862642.html>, accessed on November 9, 2002; "Yanzhe Dangde Shiliuda
Zhiyinde Fangxiang Fenyong Qianjin (She Lun)" (Editorial: Advancing courageously along
Orientation charted by Party Congress), Peoples Daily, November 15, 2002, available online at
<http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/
 paper464/7738/737664.html>, accessed on November 15,
2002.
50 
"Zhongguo Gongchandang Dishiliuci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui zai Jing Bimu" (The 16th National
Congress of the Communist Party of China convened in Beijing), Peopler Daily, November 15, 2002,
p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/7738/737676.html>, accessed on
November 15, 2002.
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of xiaokang she hui, as a few patchy messages emerged on the Qiangguo Luntan. By
and large, those messages, demonstrated in Appendix 2, neither praise the economic
performance achieved in the past, nor express satisfaction about the improvement in
their living standards.
C. The "Three Represents" and the Accession of Private Entrepreneurs into
the Chinese Communist Party
Jiang Zemin repeatedly upheld his notion of the "Three Represents" (sange daibiao)
when delivering the Report to the 16th Party Congress. He summarised the lesson
from CCP history over the past thirteen years as that the Party must always
"...represent the development trend of China's advanced productive forces, the
orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."5 ' Shortly after the Congress, the term,
"Three Represents" was written into the Constitution of the CCP.
In addition to a stream of authoritative editorials and an ocean of lower-level
comments from a variety of news outlets to boost the nationwide political campaign
of studying the "Three Represents," the People Daily released a series of articles
complimenting and conveying the importance of the "Three Represents" for the
future of the entire Party. For example, "The Three Represents is the crystallisation of
the Party's collective wisdom and a guiding ideology the Party must follow for a long
time to come.. .The Three Represents is an operative guideline to create a new
"Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report at 16th Party Congress (1)," People Daily, November 18, 2002,
available online at <http:ffenglish.peopledaily.com.cn120021 1/1 8/print2002 1118_i 06983.html>,
accessed on November 23, 2002.
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situation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new century."52
Additionally,
"The Party delegates are unanimous in support of the 'Three Represents' when
discussing the amendments of the constitution of the CCP It is a common wish amongst
the Party members and the majority of ordinary people to write the 'Three Represents'
into the Constitution of the CCP "
Indeed, the People Daily and Xinhua News Agency emphasised the great changes in
society by stressing that China's social structure after more than two decades of policy
of reform and opening-up is no longer composed simply of workers, farmers and
intellectuals; the original social strata are disintegrating and new classes are taking
shape and becoming stronger.54
Amongst the 2,114 party delegates in the Grand Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi
Pei and Qiu Jibao were amongst the first handful of entrepreneurs from the private
sector to be officially sanctioned to attend the Party congress in the CCP's history. As
a matter of fact, they enjoyed high-profile attention after the political leaders from all
sorts of media, both national and international. In this respect, the Party's goal in
inviting such prominent capitalists to its premier political event was to highlight a
52 
"Ba 'Sange Daibiao' Zhongyao Sixiang Queli wei Dang de Zhidao Sixiang" (Establish firmly the
important thoughts of the 'Three Represents' as a guiding ideology that the Party must follow),
People's Daily, November 11, 2002, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
aper464/7697/734952.html>, accessed on November 11,2002.
"Ba Quanmian Guanche 'Sange Daibiao' Zhongyao Sixiang Xieru Dangzhang Shi Guangda
Dangyuan de Xinyuan he Yiwan Renmin de Xinsheng" (To write the 'Three Represents' into the
Constitution of the CCP is a common wish amongst the Party members and the majority of ordinary
people), People's Daily, November 11, 2002, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/paper464/7697/734953 .html>, accessed on November 11, 2002.
"CAS Marks off Ten Social Strata in Chinese Society," People's Daily, December 17, 2001,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/17/eng200 1121 7_86852.shtml>,
accessed on January 25, 2002; "Zhengque Renshi Woguo Xinde Shehui Jieceng" (Understanding the
New Social Strata in the People's Republic of China Correctly), Xinhua News Agency, February 23,
2003, available online at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2--3-02/23/cOflteflt_74 I 036.htm>,
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significant stage in China's transformation from impoverished icon of collectivised
farming and inefficient state industry to the world's dynamic market economy. 55 Jiang
did not, however, advocate opening the party's doors wholly to the private sector.
Instead, he stressed that those from other social strata including private entrepreneurs
who were considered for admission must first undergo a long period of testing. It is
argued that Jiang did not want to offend conservatives who believe that accepting
businesspeople into the Party's ranks will undermine it.56
The "Three Represents" has especially promoted far-reaching political
campaigns in the CCP organisations before and after the Party Congress,57 nationally,
provincially and locally. Following a politically correct boosting of the "Three
Represents," the Qiangguo Luntan also invited Li Juru, Vice-President of Central
Party School, for instance, to take questions during the convention of the Party
Congress. Several online messages questioned whether this unprecedented initiative
of co-opting private entrepreneurs would seriously challenge the CCP's core support
of the proletariat and impact the future of Party building and its reorientation.
Especially critical Net users rejected the idea of incorporating capitalists into the CCP
simply because the consequence would encourage private entrepreneurs to take
advantage of this membership to re-exploit other people.
accessed on March 7, 2003.
" Susan V. Lawrence, "Jiang Ensures Party Endures," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 165, No. 46,
November 21, 2002, PP. 34-38.
56 
"Behind China's Closed Doors," &onomist, Vol. 365, No. 8298, November 9, 2002, pp. 41-43.
' See, for example, "Ba Sange Daibiao Zhongyao Sixiang Quli wei Dang de Zhidao Sixiang" (To
establish firmly the important thought of the 'Three Represents' as the guiding ideology of the Party),
PeopIe Daily, November 11, 2002, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GBI
shizheng/1 9/20021111/8631 76.html>, accessed on November 12, 2002; "Buduan tuijin de sixiang
lilunjianshe" (Constantly bring forth theoretical thought building), People Daily, November 1, 2002,
available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/26/2002  1101/855783 .html>, accessed
on November 3, 2002.
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Typical questions were posed to the guest, such as: "Can we declare that these
government officials are implementing the thought of the 'Three Represents' when
they spend public funds to provide for their mistresses?" ("Fanfuhua," 2002-11-10,
15:44:22)
Ans.: "Such extremely few officials are precisely the targets that we should endeavour to
wipe out when implementing the important thought of the 'Three Represents" ("Yang
Ylyong," 2002-11-10, 15:48:24)
Re: "Corrupt officials are in small numbers at any time" ("Fayanruzuo," 2002-11-10,
15 :52: 16)
Re: "Wherever 'No Shifting and Urinating' is written means that people are indeed
doing so" [implying such situations do indeed exist] ("Zhejiangcaomin," 2002-11-10,
15:53:20)
Re: "The number of people who have been disclosed is surely small, but what about
those who haven't been uncovered?" ("Genyuan," 2002-11-10, 15:52:00)
Re: "No, it's not in small quantities. Village governors in Guangdong province and
elsewhere are doing it as well" ("Atuzai," 2002-11-10, 15:50:14)
Many doubts were expressed about the proposal, raising questions such as "Can we
say the Party is from now the paradise of capitalists?" ("Wuxiandidai," 2002-11-06,
16:13:27) or reaffirming the tediously ideological question about whether the Party
should represent all walks of life, or merely the working class ("Chuanchangshan
erzhanzhehejiu weiyideren," 2002-11-06, 15:55:06) Generally speaking, there were
heated debates about the idea of incorporating private entrepreneurs into the CCP. On
the one hand, some commented: "If capitalists are allowed to enter into the CCP, it
means they can legitimately get wealthy by exploiting others and then become
members of the Party." "When Jiang Zemin vowed to protect all legitimate income
even when it did not come from work, it is to safeguard the act of exploitation" [of
capitalists], according to some Netizens. ("ongbeilaoxiang," 2002-11-10, 16:44:15)
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However, there are messages welcoming such ideas as long as the capitalists referred
to are creating job opportunities and paying taxes. In their expressions, the idea of
"exploitation" does not exist simply because they are creating fortunes for the whole
people and country as well. Besides, it is a more sophisticated political means to
control the bourgeoisie that some Internet users believe they cannot plainly judge
individuals' progressiveness or backwardness in political awareness.
D. Political Reform
The theme of "political reform" or even "Chinese democratisation" has drawn much
attention from scholars and policy makers since the launch of economic reforms and
opening up in the late 1970s, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. One of
the critical questions for reform of China's political system is the role for the Party and
its relationship to other organ isations like the business sector. Yet the Tiananmen
Incident of June 1989 put a complete halt to whatever progress might have been made
with regard to political reform.
Jiang reasserted in the Report to the 16th Party Congress that
"...adhering to the 'Four Cardinal Princzles, we must go on steadily and surely with
political restructuring, extend socialist democracy and improve the socialist legal
system in order to build a socialist country under the rule of law and consolidate and
develop the political situation characterised by democracy, solidarity, liveliness,
stability and harmony.
58 The Four Cardinal Principles—to keep to the socialist road and to uphold the people's democratic
dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought—are the foundation on which the CCP claimed to build the country.
"Zhongguo gongchandang di shiliuci quanguodaibiao dahui zi jing kaimu" (16th CPC Party
Congress opens in Beijing), Peoples Daily, November 9, 2002, available online at
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During the 16th Party Congress, official media like the People Daily tended not to
cover much about the issues like political reform that might provoke unnecessary
discussions or unrealistic public expectations. Official media sources have instead
stressed much about the Party construction or the rule of law, urging, for example, "To
strengthen and improve Party building, we must hold high the great banner of Deng
Xiaoping Theory, implement the important thought of the 'Three Represents' in a
comprehensive way."6° "Under the CCP leadership, we will move forward to building
a country that is ruled by law, and to ensuring that the laws are observed and strictly
enforced, and law-breakers are prosecuted." 6 ' And, "To establish a socialist political
civilisation, it is imperative to enhance the government's ability to perform official
duties according to the law."62
How do Internet users view the issue of the political reform? Is their stance
consistent with that of officials?
Question to the guest: "What is the trend and tide in politics?" ("Dahuazhongyou,"
2002-11-10, 15:51:39)
Ans.: "It is political democratisation—a great upgrading of political civilisation and
continuous improvement of the political system. It is rather important to China." ("Lu
Jianhua," 2002-11-10, 15:57:29) (Note: Lu Jianhua is a PhD of Sociology from the
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/7684/733929.html >, accessed on November 9, 2002.
60 
"Haobu Fangsong di Jiaqiang he Gaishan Dang de Lingdao, Quanmian Tuijin Dang de Jianshe
Xinde Weida Gongcheng" (Spare no efforts to strengthen and improve the party's leadership and fully
advance the greater new undertaking of party building), People Daily, November 12, 2002, p. 1,
available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/7707/735655.html >, accessed on
November 12, 2002.
61 
"Yifa Zhiguo: Dang Lingdao Renmin Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi Guojia" (To rule the countiy
under the leadership of the party to build a socialist country under the rule of law), People Daily,
November 10, 2002, p. 6, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/7689/
734362.html>, accessed on November 10, 2002.
62 
"Jianshe 'Zeren Zhengfu" (Develop a responsible government), People c daily, November 12, 2002,
p. 6, available online at <http://www.people.com.cnJGB/paper464/7707/735635.html >, accessed on
November 12, 2002.
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Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Re: "According to Marxism, the economic base detennines the superstructure. Is that
correct?" ("Fayanruzuo," 2002-11-10, 16:0 1:22)
Re:" I strongly agree. But political democratisation is not merely democracy within the
CCP, it should be expanded outside the CCP. . ." ("Genyuan," 2002-11-10, 16:00:22)
Re: "It is such a cliche. Why can't we see any significant progress made?"
("Aozhoudalongxia," 2002-11-10, 15:58:48)
Increasing opinions were expressed as to whether there are any new initiatives of
political reform in the Report. Those messages were heatedly aired and debated on the
Net, as these illustrations demonstrate in Appendix 3.
Section IV Discussions and Conclusions
A. Discussions
With limited formal channels of political participation, and a skewed as well as
conservative news media environment, Chinese Internet users show enthusiasm to
take part in online political debates. In a sense, they are fulfilling their political and
social right of being a citizen, and in another sense, it is their wish to make their online
opinions heard by government officials. Jin Mengyu, a media expert in Beijing,
supports this, claiming,
"The advantages of the Qiangguo Luntan are not merely its pioneering role in this field,
but its unrivalled status of being mainstream media and staying close to the centre [of
the hierarchy]. A very noticeable phenomenon is many Netizens 'desire that what they
say online should be heard. ,,63
63 Jin Mengyu ,"Qiangguo Luntan: Toushi Wenlu?" (The Strong Country Forum: Throwing a Stone to
Clear the Way?", Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan, No. 23, June 3, 2001, available online at
<http://www.chinanews. com.cnlxinwenzhoukan/200
 1 -23-50/txti(6)%20 I .html>, accessed on April
12, 2003.
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But how independent is the Qiangguo Luntan? When Jiang Yaping, head of the
People Daily online version, was asked whether online chat rooms should set
agendas for public discussions, he acknowledged: "There is no doubt about that. We
do not conceal our intention to set online agendas in directing opinions of online users
since we are the media under the auspices of the Central Committee of the CCP. We
ought to firmly reflect our own perspectives and will."64 Fearing for cyber chaos and
destabilising opinions opposed to the rule of the Communist regime, the officials of
the Qiangguo Luntan skilfully set agendas for discussions during the proceedings of
the 16th Party Congress by establishing a special forum within the Qiangguo Luntan,
and most importantly, manoeuvring several guests who are basically in line with the
government's stance to take questions from Netizens and to some extent propagate
official viewpoints. Nevertheless, the reality found from my research for this project
is that the posted messages and questions on the Qiangguo Luntan do exhibit a certain
degree of autonomy, deviating from the authorities' deliberate agendas mirrored in the
People Daily, and relatively critical of the authorities, although it is believable that a
large amount of harsher messages have been weeded out before they could appear on
the forum. Observations of the author seem in accordance with the assertions of Wu
Guoguang, the former top-aide and speech writer for the ex-Party general secretary
Zhao Ziyang, that the old role of the People Daily in shaping and restructuring
Chinese public opinion is nowadays seemingly unsustainable. 65 Daniel C. Lynch has
64 Mm Dahong, "Renmin Ribao Wangluban han Lianhe Zaobao Dianziban Zhubian Changshuo Dianzi
Luntan," (Editor-in-Chief talks about the Discussion Forum: from the Peoples Daily and the Lianhe
Zaobao), Renminwang Qiangguo Shequ Lunlan, September 2, 1999, available online at
<http://bbs.people.com.cn/fuwu mtmt-l/002.html>, accessed on April 12, 2003.
65 Guoguang Wu, "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the Peoplec
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also commented, "... [i]n today's setting of administrative fragmentation,
property-rights reform, and technological advance, the People c Daily and Xinhua
[News Agency] can only set the agenda for a very few politically active
individuals."66
B. Conclusions
As a result, this dissertation holds that the Qiangguo Luntan has begun a process of
incrementally forming a critical cyberspace in Habermas's sense of "public sphere,"
although it is still in its "primitive" stage. The term "primitive" has a few implications.
First of all, the form of online public debates and consultations is not very deliberative.
Messages posted are to a large extent short in terms of word count and contents. They
usually contain one or two lines of message, which are relatively far from being
thoughtful consultations and debates. These are far too brief to be considered as
serious contributions to debates, though they do reveal an active interest in politics.
Such an online phenomenon does not emerge solely in the Qiangguo Luntan, but
almost everywhere else in other chat rooms or BBS establishments in China.
Moreover, messages are usually posted under assumed names. This does allow people
to express views that may be more controversial, but at the same time it may also
encourage the floatation of ideas that they do not themselves always fully believe in.
All of this is sometimes dismissed as "guan shui" (literally "adding water" in
Mandarin), an online sub-culture that is less reflexive and at times illogical in
Daily," The China Quarterly, No. 137, March 1994, pp. 194-211.
Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State. Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed
China, p. 161.
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content.67 Despite many critical and deliberate messages, which contradict official
propaganda and contribute to further public consultations, without the more
deliberative form of debates and discussions, it does not follow that there is currently
a full-fledged public sphere in Chinese cyberspace.
Secondly, the quantity of posted messages on the special forum of the Qiangguo
Luntan is relatively small. They totalled some hundred messages, a sharp contrast to
that of the April 2001 U.S. Spy Plane Incident alone, when several thousands of
messages were posted in a very short space of time. There may be at least two possible
explanations for such differences: On the one hand, the Spy Plane Incident was such
an unexpected international crisis between the US and China that the reactions of the
Chinese authorities obviously lagged behind and were slow to tackle it. It thus left
much leeway for the Netizens to get involved online and vent their sentiments in a
short period of time. Unlike the Spy Plane Incident, the 16th Party Congress was a
well-planned political event and great concerted efforts and precautions were made
before and during the Congress on the forum to prevent any online anarchy. On the
other hand, PRC textbooks and the official press, as Susan Shirk claims, have usually
been "socialising people into a highly suspicious attitude towards governments in
Japan, the U.S. and Taiwan," as they are the "hot-button" issues of Chinese
nationalism, and the rapidly growing popular press and Internet chat-rooms often take
even harder lines. 68 The Spy Plane Incident thus apparently attracted much more
67 Xin Yizhou, "Qiangguo Luntan: Minjian de Shengyin, Xuanxiao de Jiangtan," (The Strong Country
Forum: Civil Voices, Clamorous Forum), Chuanmei Guancha, June 3, 2002, available online at
<http://bbs.people.com.cnlfuwu/mt/mt-  1/0 12.html>, accessed on April 12, 2003.
68 Susan L. Shirk, Chinese Nationalism and Policies Toward the United States, Japan and Taiwan.
Publication of The ASPEN Institute Policy Progranis—U.S.-China Relations, March 29 —April 7,
2002, pp. 9-47, available online at <http://www.aspeninst.org/congressional/pdfs/shirk.pdf,
accessed on October 26, 2002; Minxin Pei, "Hearing the Voice of the People at Last: Chinese Gain An
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attention from Netizens than the Party Congress. We may tentatively conclude from
comparing the two cases that as long as a particular event, national or international, is
anticipated by the authorities concerned, the political impact of the Internet is most
likely diminished, because it has allowed enough time for the Chinese government to
prepare for it, and for the online censorship to be alerted. The challenge will come
from unanticipated crises. To some extent this corresponds with what James
Mulvenon, Stuart Johnson and Nina Hachigian have argued, namely that in spite of
Beijing's relatively successful countermeasures in tackling the political use of the
Internet. In Hachigian's words,
"...[tJhe power shifts wrought by the Internet will surface clearly only during an
economic or political crisis in afuture China where the Internet is far more pervasive. At
that time, the Internet will fuel discontent and could be the linchpin to a successful
challenge to party rule. ,,69
Thirdly, the reason why the public sphere is still primitive is because the authorities
have from time to time thwarted the medium to silence the opposition's opinions of
the party and regime, which have been expressed on the Net. In fact, the Chinese
authorities are notorious for heavy-handed measures to repress dissident use of the
Internet,70
 resulting in slow but incremental development of the Internet for political
use. Paradoxically this has also widened the divide between the regime and Internet
Indirect Role in Shaping Policy," Newsweek, Vol. 137, No. 19, May 7, 2001, p. 21.
69 Nina Hachigian, "China's Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, p.
118. See also Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of
the Internet and Beying's Counter-Strategies (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 2002).
70 Several pieces of work have been written on the subject. See, for example, Kalathil and Taylor C.
Boas, "The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the
Counterrevolution," First Monday, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2001, available online at
<http://www.uirstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_8/kalathil/>, accessed on September 8, 2001; Jonathan
Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, "Internet Filtering in China," IEEE Internet Computing, Vol. 7,No. 2,
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users because the latter have adopted the old technique of dissidents in authoritarian
regimes by overtly praising the regime, whilst in practice meaning the opposite. To
some extent this has strengthened the sense of e-community, because regular visitors
to chat rooms know how to read the messages that they see. But this community is still
in an inchoate form, since greater openness would provoke retribution.
Yet undeniably the Qiangguo Luntan has presented a more relaxed environment
for public opinion than that of the People Daily, otherwise it would not attract many
Netizens to keep posting and viewing the messages in the forum. According to
Caroline Straathof, a corporate executive of Sohu.com who worked for several years
in the Internet industry in China, the people and the society in the country are to a
great extent "under-communicated." Therefore, "the Internet's impact is bigger than
in a country that already has 57 news channels in killing taboos and taking up issues
that were not discussed previously."7'
It is impossible to find any information available showing how many viewers
have read a particular message and how many messages have been deleted by the Web
master for whatever reasons. This makes it more difficult to judge the impact of online
public debates upon those Internet users who simply view particular messages
without participating in the debates or the true picture of what the online debates
would be without these constraints. In other words, we cannot assess the e-social
capital, based upon the interactions of the virtual community in the forum that has
been created. Further research through interviews or questionnaires may be required
March/April 2003, PP. 70-77.
71 Caroline Straathof, "New Media and Democracy: Case Studies—China," Are the New Media Good
for Democracy?—Media Round Table Report (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2001), p. 23, available
online at <http://www.idea.int/200 1forum/media/mrpapers/roundtablereport.pdf, accessed on
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to better understand the social bond of online community: social networks, norms and
trust.72 However, some speculative thoughts as to the general relationship between
public sphere and e-social capital are that both concepts are usually interplayed in a
closely positive relation, which implies that a full-fledged public sphere normally
accompanies strong social capital. In China's case, the authorities may tolerate a
relatively nascent online public space, but they are to be bound to step in and possibly
stifle the online social capital if it is likely to be converted into social Web/networks in
the physical world. In the meantime, it seems sensible to believe that the degree of
government intervention varies from subject to subject. In other words, the level of
government intervention may be assumed to be higher in political and dissent matters,
but lower in economic and social affairs, and much lower in sports and entertainment,
since Chinese leaders have long upheld the doctrine of Deng Xiaoping that
"development is the fundamental principle," whilst the overriding belief is "stability
above all else."
To summarise, this chapter has endeavoured to answer the primary research
question: how and to what extent the Chinese Internet users act and respond on
Internet discussion boards. We can see that whilst there is a primitive form of public
space on the Chinese cyberspace, e-social capital is less apparent. By and large, the
implication of the current formation and development of the public sphere and
e-social capital in China make us cautiously optimistic about the prospect for the
May 15, 2002.
72 Some key questions of interview or questionnaire may be identified, such as: Do you feel you are
belonging to the community of the Qiangguo Luntan? How often do you visit and/or post message in
the Qiangguo Luntan? Do you usually reply message posted by whom you know of? If yes, how many
online users people you know? Do you usually go online to meet other Netizens in the forum? Do you
contact Netizens you meet after getting offline?
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Internet's impact upon the political system in the PRC. As David T. Hill and Krishna
Sen have warned from the experience of Indonesia, where the Internet did play a
significant role as a catalyst for political change in 1998,
"A flourishing public space underpinning a new democracy in Indonesia may emerge
from the Web ofpolitical conversations on the net but only f there is a continued and
conscious commitmentfrom the particlpants to maintain an autonomy from the state and
capital.
This chapter has contributed to the overall argument of the dissertation with a critical
investigation into the "virtual" public debates in China. On the one hand, this section
has demonstrated the actual lively public debates conducted in Chinese cyberspace.
On the other hand, compared with the contingent events documented in Chapter 5,
this Chapter has shown the nuanced difference of Internet-induced change in
non-contingent (or well pre-planned) events. The implication of my findings confirms
what has been argued that the Internet-induced (political) impact is greater in those
incidents of crisis than those of well-planned events because the authorities may have
more time and leeway to take necessary action to minimise the Internet's impact. In a
word, the Internet has facilitated a qualitatively different impact here, as compared
with the separate events that were described in Chapter 5. In the next chapter, this
dissertation will continue to consider the public debates conducted over the Internet
with another political event—lOth NPC and CPPCC Congresses, which were well
prepared long in advance. The exploration will aim to further confirm the validity of
the findings in Chapter 6.
David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "The Internet in Indonesia's New Democracy," in Peter Ferdinand
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(ed.), The Internet, Democracy and Democrat L-ation, pp. 119-136.
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Chapter 7 The Political Impact of the Internet upon Value
Orientation (II): Case Study of the 10th National
People's Congress and 10th CPPCC (March 2003)
Section I
	
Introduction
The National People's Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), dubbed the "two sessions"
("hang hui"), are probably the most significant political events after the National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Associated with China's leadership
transition, the first session of the 10th NPC in March 2003 marked a distinctive
change by ushering in an almost entirely new set of key government personnel,
including a new President and Premier.' The session also elevated the theme of
governmental organisation restructuring, and paved the way for the implementation
of the goal to "...build a comparatively well-off society in an all-round way" set at the
CCP's 16th National Congress in November 2002. The first session of the 10th NPC
was thus convened to turn the guidelines of the 16th Party Congress into the will of
the state through legal procedures.
The "two sessions" formed a preplanned ceremonial event that was
state-oriented and manipulative in nature. Using the "two sessions" as a case study,
this chapter argues that a nascent public space for "virtual" political participation,
albeit with Chinese characteristics, can be found in online forums in China.
Even though China is far from being a democracy, the Internet may still have an
impact. The use of Web sites to disseminate government information vertically and
'For more discussion regarding the Chinese leadership transition and the 10th NPC, see H. Lyman
Miller, "The 10th National People's Congress and China's Leadership Transition," China Leadership
Monitor, No. 7, Summer 2003, available online at <http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20033/
lm.pdf, accessed on August 25, 2003.
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allow feedback from citizens is one possible example. 2
 Yet another is horizontal
communication between citizens on electronic bulletin boards and in discussion
groups. This latter possibility is especially likely to be a significant factor in an
authoritarian country. As Howard Rheingold argues, "The political significance of
computer-mediated communication lies in its capacity to challenge the existing
political hierarchy's monopoly on power communications media, and perhaps thus
revitalise citizen-based democracy." 3
 In this respect, bulletin board systems (BBS),
chatrooms, Weblogs, Peer-to-Peer technologies, Short Message Service (SMS), and
listservs may be utilised to exchange ideas, disseminate information, debate issues,
mobilise opinion, and eventually build lasting sociopolitical bonds. Nonetheless,
nondemocratic regimes have, to varying degrees, orchestrated concerted efforts to
control the Internet—despite simultaneously expanding and promoting the diffusion
of the new medium in the hope of reaping the potential economic benefits promised
by the new technologies. Commentators like Geoffry Taubmann have raised the
question of whether or not "built-in incompatibility" exists between nondemocratic
rule and the Internet.4
The main argument in this chapter is that the discussion forums mediated by the
2 Vertical mode of communication between governments and citizens is not the main focus of this
research paper. For more on the electronic government/governance in China and its interactions with
citizens, see, for example, Junhua Zhang, "China's 'Government Online' and Attempts to Gain
Technical Legitimacy," ASIEN, No. 80, July 2001, available online at <http://web.syr.edu/
—ztan/
Gov2.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2001; Junhua Zhang, "Will the Government 'Serve the People':
The Development of Chinese E-Govemment," New Media & Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, pp.
163-84; "Jiefang ribao anfang Shanghai zhengfu bumen wangzhan" (A secret investigatory survey of
the Shanghai city government's web site by journalists from the Liberation Daily), People Daily,
July 7, 2003, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/l4562/1955049.html >,
accessed on July 31, 2003; "Renmin shiping: 'Wangshang zhengfu' yinggai shenmoyang?" (People's
Daily commentary: What the "online government" should be?), People 's Daily, July 11, 2003,
available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian11033/1961999.html >, accessed on July
31, 2003.
Howard Rheingold, The l'irtual Community: Surfing the Interne (London: Minerva, 1994), p. 14.
Geoffry Taubmann, "A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to
Nondemocratic Rule," Political Communication, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 1998, pp. 255-72.
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Internet have actually supplied and sustained a virtual "public space" 5—venues for
discussions, consultations, and information dissemination of issues—that is in
essence framed to a wider public. The questions guiding this research are the ways in
which and to what extent Internet users in China interact on Internet discussion boards.
Underlying the analysis are two crucial concepts—public opinion and "virtual"
political participation—that define the realm wherein political initiatives from below
may grow and the political impact of the Internet may be visible. Empirical evidence
from the 10th NPC and the 10th CPPCC in March 2003 forms the base of this
investigative case study.
The body of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the online discussions that
appeared on Qiangguo Luntan (Strong Country Forum) around the time of the first
session of the 10th NPC and 10th CPPCC. This data set is contrasted with the
coverage appearing in the Party's mouthpiece, the People 's Daily. There are two
essential grounds for such a comparison. First, messages posted on the discussion
board can be assumed to be closer to expressions of spontaneous individual
opinion—ideas which stand in sharp contrast to the reader or audience views
appearing in most Chinese mass media, which are effectively edited and manipulated
to fall in line with the editorial policy of state- or party-controlled press organs.6
Second, Qiangguo Luntan has been widely acknowledged as the most popular and
Any sort of communication (including political communication) requires at least two essential
elements: one is the "public" and the other is the "public place." Drucker and Gumpert have argued
that the public place is the catalyst for expression in the public forum, and is also the backstage area for
unstructured and informal social gatherings. See Susan J. Drucker and Gary Gumpert, "Freedom and
Liability in Cyberspace: Media, Metaphors, Paths of Regulation," in Susan J. Drucker and Gary
Gumpert (eds.), Real Law@ Virtual Space: Communication Regulation in Cyberspace, (Cresskill, N.J.:
Hampton Press, 1999), P. 80.
6 Daniel C. Lynch argues that one of the most significant developments in Chinese "thought work"
since the 14th Party Congress in 1992 is the combination of mass media and telecommunications in
the form of numerous radio and television hotlines—jiaodian fangtan (focus) programmes, where
listeners with access to a telephone can ask questions and offer opinions. See Daniel C. Lynch, Afler
the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed China (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 101.
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influential Chinese-language online discussion forum sponsored by news media in
mainland China. The forum's popularity among Internet users has boosted "virtual"
civic engagement to a level much higher than that by any other traditional media. The
analysis of online discourses will centre on four separate, yet interrelated categories of
issues: (a) "san-nong", i.e. "nongye" (agriculture), "nongcun" (village), and
"non gmin" (farmers); (b) employment and social security; (c) the role and reform of
the NPC and the CPPCC; and (d) the rule of law. Exploration of these discourses
should illuminate the impact that these discussions have had on China's politics in
general, and public opinion and political participation in particular.
Section II	 The Internet, Public Discourse, and Value Orientations
Over the past two decades, political communication has comprehensively been
transformed by global processes of liberalisation and deregulation as welt as by the
diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs). 7
 The forces of
media commercialisation and conglomeration have also given rise to a series of
general tendencies at the level of national politics—altering the ways in which
political actors attempt to communicate with one another. 8 Manuel Castells in fact
argues that all politics now subsist within the frame of electronic media.9
The increasing online dynamics of public discourse have been argued to have a
positive part to play in facilitating and reinforcing "virtual" political participation and
See, for example, James Stanyer, "Political Communication in Transition: Conceptualizing Change
and Understanding its Consequences," European Journal of Communication, Vol. 18, No. 3,
September 2003, pp. 3 85-94.
See, for example, Junhao Hong and Yu-Chiung Hsu, "Asian NIC's Broadcast Media in the Era of
Globalization: The Trend of Commercialization and its Impact, Implications, and Limits," Gazette,
Vol. 61, No. 3/4, July 1999, pp. 225-242; John Street, Mass Media, Politics, and Democracy (New
York: Palgrave, 2001), chap. 6; Terhi Rantanen, The Global and the National: Media and
Communications in Post-communist Russia (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Nancy
Morris and Silvio Waisbord, eds., Media and Globalization: Why the State Matters (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp.
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civic engagement in cyberspace, as the Western literature has suggested)° Apart from
other sociocultural impacts, these shifts have implications for other aspects of
political life: in the nature of popular support, and in the basis of legitimacy, the party
politics and systems.
In short, the prior research has suggested that cyberspace is indeed changing the
Chinese people not only in terms of the socioeconomic physics of human life, but also
in terms of the political physics as well. This effect has been achieved by broadening
the size, volume, and power of online political participation. Yet without base-line
measures of online activity, we are unable to assess the impact of the Internet in any
systematic way, being unable to compare the impact of Internet discussion forums
with those in traditional media outlets. This chapter will therefore present the online
discourses—the "san-nong" issue, employment and social security, the NPC and
CPPCC, and the rule of law—that were conducted on Qiangguo Luntan during the
time that the two sessions took place in March 2003 in order to highlight the theme of
public discourse and "virtual" political participation mediated on the Internet in
transitional China.
Section III Tenth NPC and CPPCC: Contrasting Qiangguo Luntan with the
People's Daily
A. The "San-Nong" Issue
39 1-392.
° There is much literature arguing that the Internet has a positive effect in shaping the public sphere in
general terms. See, for example: Lincoln Dahlberg, "The Internet and Democratic Discourse:
Exploring the Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending the Public Sphere," Information,
Communication & Society, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, pp. 6 15-633; Mark Poster, "Cyberdemocracy: Internet
and the Public Sphere," in David Porter (ed.), Internet Culture (New York and London: Routledge,
1996), pp. 201-217; Douglas Kellner, "Intellectuals, the New Public Spheres, and Techno-politics," in
Toulouse and Luke, The Politics of Cyberspace, 167-186; Lincoln Dahlberg, "Computer-Mediated
Communication and the Public Sphere: A Critical Analysis," Journal of Computer-Mediated
Communication, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 2001, available online at <http://www.ascuse.org/jcmc/
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Since the CCP's 16th Congress in late 2002 put forward the twenty-year objective of
building a comparatively well-off society, where improving the livelihood or income
of farmers and other related rural agricultural issues have become particularly salient
on the national development agenda. This issue ,
 has been more prominent since
China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in late 2001. Whereas a
majority of urban residents have prospered under more than two decades of reform
and opening up, farmers' incomes have stagnated for years, thereby further wIdenIng
the income gap between rural and urban areas. Bernstein and Lu have warned that
rural unrest has been rising as peasants rebel against paying increasing fees and ta'es
charged by local authorities." Economic disadvantages aside, the rural areas have
also been left behind in such sectors as infrastructure, education, medical care, and
social welfare—thereby keeping the impoverished from enjoying the beneflits of
China's growing prosperity.
Former Premier Zhu Rongji conceded that, despite his pledge to transform iLh
condition of China's peasantry when he took office in March 1998, farmers still faced
glutted grain markets, sliding prices, slow or even negative income growth, and a
heavy tax burden. In delivering his Report on Government Work to the first session of
the 10th NPC, Zhu emphasised the significance of agriculture and the rural economy
for the communist regime's survival. In this report, he reiterated that "developing
agriculture and the rural economy and increasing farmers' income should be the top
priority in the new government's economic work, and that the government should
conscientiously implement all policies and measures designed to lighten the burden
on farmers." 2
 Acknowledgments of Zhu's assertions were echoed in the mainstream
vol7/issuel/dahlberg.html>, accessed on December 11,2002.
Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lu, "Taxation without Representation: Peasants, the Central and
Local States in Reform China," The China Quarlerly, No. 163, September 2000, PP. 742-763.12 Zhu Rongji, "Zhengfu gongzuo baogao" (Report on government work), March 5,2003; full text was
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media like the People 's Daily by the new Premier Wen Jiabao who states that "...the
comparatively sluggish development of agriculture and the slow increase of farmers'
income have emerged as a major problem facing his new cabinet." 3 The concerns of
Zhu and Wen are reflected in the government's proposed budget for 2003, which
promises—despite the problem of an increasing deficit—to finance the country's
ongoing rural development, agricultural restructuring, and social security projects.'4
Coupled with the deepening market economy and the concentration of the
economic boom in the eastern coastal regions, the Chinese government has obviously
perceived the severity of the developmental imbalance represented by the "san-nong"
issue: agriculture is not a top priority sector in the national development; the majority
of government funding is pouring into the industrial and IT sectors. Addressing the
consequences and determined to improve the living standards for farmers, the
authorities set the issue of"san-nong" as one of the most pressing agenda items of the
government's work for the next five years. Official media like the People 's Daily
cover a series of reports both from Government officials and delegates' opinions. The
Minister of Agriculture Du Qinglin, for example, promised that "China will carry out
a series of reforms to streamline government agencies in rural areas, as past of the
nationwide effort to alleviate farmers' economic burden." And, "The most
significant and difficult part of building a well-off society in an all-round way hinges
released by the Xinhua News Agency on March 19, 2003, and is available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/ GB/shizheng/1 6/2003031 9/947375.html>, accessed on March 22, 2003.
"Wen Jiabao zongli da Zhongwai jizhe wen" (Premier Wen Jiabao answering questions from
domestic and foreign journalists), People's Daily, March 19, 2003, p. 1, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8738/8  16649.html>, accessed on March 20, 2003.
14 Xiang Huaicheng, "Guanyu 2002 nian zhongyang han difang yusuan zhixing qingkuang ji 2003
nian zhongyang han difang yusuan caoan de baogao" (Report on the implementation of the central and
local budgets for 2002 and on the draft of the central and local budgets for 2003); full text was released
by the Xinhua News Agency on March 20, 2003, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GBI
shizheng/19/20030320 /948375.html>, accessed on March 22, 2003.
IS 
"Nongye he Nongcun Jingji Xingshi Shixian Ic Lishixing Zhuanbian" (Agriculture and the
situations of the rual economy have undergone histororical transformations), People Daily, March 11,
2003, p. 4, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8668/811778.html >,
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on the issue of 'san-nong.' We shall do our utmost to resolve the problem and as a
result increase farmers' income." 16
 Some delegates have also expressed serious
concerns about the issue, commenting "Do not let farmers down. There should be a
comprehensive social security for farmers. Implement tax reform to alleviate farmers'
burden."7
There were enthusiastic discussions over the issue on Qiangguo Luntan both
during and after the proceedings, with opinions expressed on how the issue should be
tackled from the perspectives of"Netizens." Several examples of this discussion over
the Internet are illustrated in Appendix 4.
The statements listed in Appendix 4 demonstrate a simple but profound political
message: a growing number of people are getting involved in online public debates.
This "virtual" political participation could potentially foster a more positive regard
amongst Chinese citizens for political processes and democratic practices. The
number of Internet users in China is currently around 80 million,' 8 the world's second
largest Internet population second only to the United States. If the figure is credible,
80 million users are still a minority of 6 per cent of the total population of 1.3 billion.
The majority of Chinese are either computer-illiterate or financially unable to gain
access to the networked world. It is thus significant that farmers have little say in
online debates on related farm issues. Since employment and social security are
largely related to the "san-nong" issue, many other Internet users have also exhibited
accessed on March 11, 2003.
6 
"Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Zhangchun Fenbie Canjia Daibiaotuan
Shenyi" (Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Zhangchun joined in panel
disccusions), Peoples Daily, March 9, 2003, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/paper464/8652/810506.html>, accessed on March 9,2003.
17 
"Sannong Wenti Zui Guanqing"(The Sannong issue is the most concerned), People s Daily, March 9,
2003, p. 5, available online at <http://www.people.com.cnJGB/paper464/8652/8  1 0468.html>,
accessed on March 9, 2003.
18 See China Internet Network Information Center (CNN[C), Semiannual Survey Report on the
Development of China's Internet (January 2004), available online at <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/
download/manual/statisticalreport13th.pdf, accessed on February 17, 2004.
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concern over reform of state-owned enterprises and the country's entry into the WTO.
B. Employment and Social Security
Economic reform has fundamentally transformed labour and employment relations in
communist China and rendered the traditional social security system (which was
based on the work unit [danwei]) increasingly both inadequate and inefficient in the
age of a capitalist market economy. The "iron rice bowl" (tie fanwan)
policy—lifelong employment and a self-sufficient welfare system within each work
unit—created by the centrally planned economy of Mao's reign has been dramatically
eroded by the introduction and strengthening of market-oriented economic reforms
since the 1980s. 19
 The phenomenal economic success of the past two decades has also
been accompanied by a wide array of challenges not only to the social security system
itself, but also to the communist sociopolitical structure as well. Chinese scholar Hu
Angang, for example, has remarked that
"China is faced with a war of employment. The serious pmblem of layoffi and
unemployment has produced tremendous influence in China's economy, society, politics,
and every other aspect of life and has become the most severe challenge to China's
development in the first ten years of the new centw-y. 20
Michel Bonnin has argued that the main source of instability in China today is the
employment situation of the urban employees and workers. 2 ' Indeed, the record-high
19 See, for example: Joe C.B. Leung, "Social Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects,"
International Journal ofSocial Welfare, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 73-85; Peter Whiteford, "From
Enterprise Protection to Social Protection: Pension Reform in China," Global Social Policy, Vol.3, No.
1, April 2003, pp. 45-77; Sarah Cook, "From Rice Bowl to Safety Net: Insecurity and Social
Protection during China's Transition," Development Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, November 2002,
pp. 6 15-635; Peter Saunders and Xiaoyuan Shang, "Social Security Reform in China's Transition to a
Market Economy," Social Policy andAdminisiration, Vol. 35, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 274-289.
20 
"Zhuanjia huizhen Zhongguo jingji wuda nanti" (Experts for group consultations on five major
Chinese economic problems), Guoji jinrong bao (International Financial Daily), June 28, 2002, p. 4.21 Michel Bonnin, "Perspectives on Social Stability after the Fifteenth Congress," in Hung-mao Tien
and Yun-han Chu (eds.), China Under Jiang Zemin (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p.
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urban unemployment 22
 and the soaring income gap between China's relatively
prosperous coastal regions and its poorer countryside (where about 70 per cent of
China's population of 1.3 billion live) show the urgent need for improvements in
employment and social security.
Despite the record-high urban unemployment and the soaring income gap
between the coastal and inland regions, however, the official accounts conveyed by
the media seem to suggest that the government is complacent over its "success" in
managing these problems. On the whole, official media like the People 's Daily tend to
glorify past and present achievements, rather than thoroughly review and debate
contemporary issues facing the country. The Minister of Labour and Social Security,
Zhang Zuoji, for example, commented in the People Daily that "China has made
considerable progress in improving its social security system, has basically developed
a market-oriented employment mechanism, and has established a framework of social
security."23
 Other key officials have likewise boasted that spending in the past five
years on social welfare has increased nine-fold, while agiiculture and education
expenditure has doubled. The central government has also announced an initiative to
better manage the country's national welfare fund by tackling the huge pension
shortfall—developing the rural backwaters and ensuring there is support for state
pensioners and the jobless.24
There are voices calling for further development of the social security net. The
158.
22 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' annual report on social trends noted that in the coming
years China's unemployment rate could surge above 15 percent, compared with an official figure of
3.6 percent in urban areas now, though unofficial estimates put the figure around 8-20 percent. See "A
Survey of China—Urban Discontent," The Economist, June 15, 2002, p. 13.23 
"Zhang Zuoji, Yang Yanyin jiu jiuye han shehui baozhang, zuidi shenghuo baozhang deng huida
jizhe wen" (Zhang Zuoji and Yang Yanyin answering questions on employment, social security, and
minimum social insurance), People r Daily, March 13, 2003, p. 4, available online at <http://www.
people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8688/8
 1 3340.html>, accessed on March 13, 2003.
24 Xiang Huaicheng, "Guanyu 2002 nian zhongyang han difang yusuan zhixing qingkuang ji 2003
nian zhongyang han difang yusuan caoan de baogao" (Report on the implementation of the central and
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People 's Daily also covered comments from senior Party cadres and government
officials in relation to this issue. Luo Gan, for example, stressed that "The government
will further establish and improve a social security system, and develop social relief
and welfare programmes for the impoverished in urban and rural areas." 25 Some
delegates suggested, "The authorities need to strengthen the re-employment
programmes for those laid-off women and to initiate relevant regulations to improve
the worsening unemployment."26
The Budget Report may indeed signal an important shift in economic policy that
places less emphasis on ratcheting up fixed-asset investment and instead boosts
allocations for the rural and urban poor. 27 Note that Premier Zhu issued a stern
warning during the 10th NPC session that the poverty and frustrations of some 800
million rural dispossessed residents could threaten both the country's economic future
and the foundations of CCP rule.28
The statements listed in Appendix 5 show that China's Internet users are
demonstrating their cares via cyber participation and conducting public debates over
public policy. These Netizens make suggestions as to the serious problems of
unemployment and social security net by either confronting the official agenda or
debating what the media coverage has accidentally or deliberately left out.
local budgets for 2002 and on the draft of the central and local budgets for 2003)
25 
"Fazhan Shehui Fuli he Shehui Baozhang Shiye, wei Teshu Shehui Qunti he Kunnan Qunzhong
Paiyou Jienan" (Establishing the social welfare and insurance business for those special groups and
the needy), People Daily, March 8, 2003, p. 4, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GBI
paper464/8647/810144.htm1>, accessed on March 8, 2003.
26 
"Jianyi Baozhang Funu Jiuye" (A proposal to suggest to guarantee the employment for women),
People's Daily, March 10, 2003, p. 6, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GBI
paper464/8660/811177.html>, accessed on March 10, 2003.
27 James Kynge, "Beijing Budget Shifts Emphasis to Help the Poor," Financial limes, March 7, 2003.
28 Zhu's concern over the social security system in the rural areas is echoed by Chen Xiwen, deputy
director of the Development Research Center of the State Council, who stated that for the time being
the country's social security system is not able to cover the total rural population of 800 million. See
"Nongye han nongcun jingji xingshi shixian le lishixing zhuanbian" (The situation in agriculture and
221
Reading between the lines of these discussions, one can see that a covert
anti-government sentiment exists among contributors. Their opinions are usually
challenging the government's agenda and sending an important message: that the
mass media and the state mechanism have failed to address issues that the public is
genuinely concerned about. It is reasonable to assume that numerous "reactionary"
and "unhealthy" opinions have been stifled for fear of provoking further social
frustration and disillusionment over the so-called "market socialism." 29 Some
Netizens have realised that the role of the NPC and CPPCC needs to be strengthened
in order to better tackle pressing issues of the day.
C. The Role and Reform of the NPC and CPPCC
In theory, the NPC is the highest legislative institution through which the Chinese
people exercise their state power; the CPPCC is China's top advisory body, which is
comprised of delegates from the CCP, various "democratic" parties, nongovernmental
organisations, ethnic groups, and other social strata. The people's political
consultative conferences at all levels are supposed to be dedicated to political
consultation, democratic supervision, and participation in as well as discussion of
major political issues. The preface of the PRC Constitution (1982), however, pledges
the NPC's adherence to the principle of CCP leadership. In this respect, the
hierarchical leadership led by the CCP has long resulted in a lesser degree of NPC
autonomy in the overseeing of government policy •
 than is prescribed by the
Constitution.
During the 10th NPC session, Chairman Li Peng of the 9th NPC Standing
the rural economy have undergone historic changes), People's Daily, March 11, 2003, p.4, available
online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8668/811778.html >, accessed on March 13, 2003.
29 Reporters Without Borders, China: Living Dangerously on the Net—Censorship and Surveillance of
Internet Forums, May 12, 2003, available online at <http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=6793>,
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Committee urged people's congresses at all levels to attach equal importance to the
supervisory and legislative roles: the supervisory role should be standardised and
codified, and power must be subjected to oversight in order to avoid corruption. 3° In
the meantime, he stressed the political leadership of the CCP over the NPC, stating
that:
"We should translate the CCP guidelines into the will of the state through legal
procedures, and take concrete steps to better integrate the upholding of CCP leadership
with the efforts to make the people the true masters of the country and to govern the
country according to law. "s'
And, "The People's Congress should voluntarily adhere to the leadership of the CCP,
perform its functions according to law and contribute to the development of socialist
democracy and political civilisation in China."32
In a similar tone, the new chairman of the 10th CPPCC National Committee, Jia
Qinglin, repeatedly noted that
"...the 10th CPPCC National Committee will follow the direction of Deng Xiaoping
theory and the important ideas of the 'Three Represents', carry out the spirit of the
CCP s 16th National Congress, concentrate on the two major themes of unity and
democracy, and give full play to its role in political consultation, democratic
supervision, and participation in the deliberation and administration ofstate affairs.
accessed on May 14, 2003.
° "Li Peng: Jinyibu shixian rendajiandu gongzuo guifanhua faluhua" (Li Peng: Further implementing
the supervisory role of the NPC deputies in a standardized and codified fashion), People 's Daily,
March 13, 2003, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/10307/
10314/20030313/942496.html>, accessed on March 13, 2003.
31 Li Peng, "Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao" (Report on the
work of the 9th NPC Standing Committee), Peoplec Daily, March 10, 2003, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1
 6/20030321/949488 .html>, accessed on March 22, 2003.
32 
"Renda Yaowei Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Zhengzhi Wenming Zuochu Gongxian" (The People's
Congress should contribute to the development of a socialist political civilisation), People Daily,
March 11, 2004, p. 4, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8668/8l1784 .
html>, accessed on March 11, 2003.
Jia Qinglin, "Zai Quanguo zhengxie shijie yici huiyi bimuhui shang de jianghua" (Talk at the
closing meeting of the 1st session of the 10th CPPCC), People s Daily, March 15,2003, p. 1, available
online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8705/814533.html >, accessed on March 15, 2003.
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Most importantly,
"The People's Congress system best suits and accords with the Chinese national
conditions and characteristics, and thus it cannot be abolished. We have to stick
unswervingly to this political system because it will guarantee the common people their
fundamental interests, as well as ensure China's prosperity and longevity.
Premier Wen declared that China would proceed with "political restructuring" (other
than "political reform") in three aspects: decision-making, law-based administration,
and democratic supervision. Specifically, China would draw opinions from officials,
experts, and civilians for major issues and economic construction projects in order to
forge a scientific and democratic decision-making system; a law-based administration
would be implemented. Meanwhile, China would also push forward democratic
supervision, with the government being supervised by the NPC and CPPCC, the
common people, and the media. 35 Wen also underscored the role that the CCP would
and ought to play in the face of arduous societal modernisation by saying ". . .the only
way out is to give scope to all positive factors and rely on the joint efforts of the
people throughout the country under the leadership of the CCP." 36 In general, the
People's Daily has played a central role in propagating the achievements of the NPC
and CPPCC over the past five years. This newspaper has highlighted the quantities of
laws enacted, especially those that usher in openness and competition; the property
rights law, the venture capital investment law, the state-owned assets law, and the
corporate bankruptcy law.
"Bixu Jianchi de Genben Zhidu" (The People's Congress system is such a fundamental system that
should be adhered to), People's Daily, March 13, 2003, p. 5, available online at
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8688/8.html >, accesed on March 13, 2003.
"Wen Jiabao zongli da Zhongwai jizhe wen" (Premier Wen Jiabao answering questions from
domestic and foreign journalists), People 'S Daily, March 19, 2003, p. 1
36 
"Chinese Vice Premier Underlines Democratic Decision Mechanism," Xinhua News Agency, March
5, 2003, available online at <http://www.10thnpc.org.cn/english/features/57347.htm>, accessed on
March 7, 2003.
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On the other hand, there were several messages posted on Qiangguo Luntan that
expressed deep concern about the reform of the NPC and CPPCC. A message posted
by one citizen, "Bimu yangshou diandianshui", for example, proposed that the
numbers of deputies ought to be reduced significantly and full-time professional
deputies initiated, whilst thoroughly interactive debates should take place in lieu of
the current symbolic annual sessions (3/5/2003, 11:26:29). Such contentions were
affirmed by other contributors such as "Xiaoxiao gongmin" (3/6/2003, 13:37:03) and
"Chang siliang" 3/6/2003, 13:03:05) who further stimulated debates about the role
and restructuring of the future "two sessions." One participant wrote: "It needs to be
ensured that the deputies are really elected by the people. Their representation has to
reflect the will of people; otherwise, they could be merely nicknamed a 'rubber stamp'
and a veteran club comprised of retired Party and government officials" (Zhenyan
wuji 01, 3/5/2003, 23 :05 :34). Many more opinions were expressed on this issue in
Appendix 6.
Apart from making suggestions on the reform of the NPC and CPPCC, the online
debates demonstrated scepticism towards the government's determination and ability
to restructure the two government-affiliated organs. Some of the online messages
have expressed their views on One of the most sensitive issues: Is China to be ruled by
"the CCP" and a handful of top-ranking cadres or to be ruled by "law"?
D. The Rule of Law
While the legal system was effectively at ground zero prior to the reform and opening
up in the late 1 970s, the Chinese government has come to realise that, as the country
opens up more to the outside world, there is a pressing need to introduce legislation to
ensure foreign inventors a stable and lawful investment environment. The Chinese
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legal system needs to be more in line with international practice. This process has
been accelerating since China entered the WTO in late 2001. Jiang Enzhu, spokesman
for the 10th NPC, confirmed that the NPC would give priority to meeting the needs of
the market economy, social progress, and the challenges of WTO membership during
its five-year term between 2003 and 2008. Tony Saich argued that the legal system
in China is
"...simply one spec/Ic cog in a bureaucratic machine that is built to achieve state
objectives. It enjoys parity with other bureaucratic entities. This kind of system means
that enforcement is variable depending on the power of the administrative agencies
concerned. ,,38
The weakness of China's legal system has to a large extent enabled rampant
corruption and serious abuses of power to permeate the country, breeding resentment
and frustration amongst the populace because there are virtually no conduits for them
to voice or redress grievances and effectively defend people against predation.
Scholars, both at home and abroad, have suggested remedies. Liberal Western
scholars such as Larry Diamond hold that "China urgently needs political reform
primarily because a rule of law, with an independent judiciary and other autonomous
institutions of horizontal accountability, is vital." Chinese scholar Wei Pan
advocates an alternative, "consultative rule of law regime," which is a rule of law
regime supplemented by democracy rather than a democracy supplemented by the
rule of law.4°
' 
"China to Establish Comprehensive Legal System by 2010," Peopler Daily, March 17, 2003,
available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/2003O3/1
 7/en g2003 0317_Il 3397.shtml>,
accessed on March 18, 2003.
38 Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 123-124.
Larry Diamond, "The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China," Journal of Contemporaiy
China, Vol. 12, No. 35, May 2003, pp. 319-331.
40 Wei Pan, "Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China," Journal of Contemporary China,
No. 34, February 2003, pp. 3-43.
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The media reports during the Two Sessions have largely praised achievements
made in legalisation over the past five years. The Rem in Ribao, for example,
commented "The socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics has basically
completed for the past five years."4 ' Yet, there are suggestions to improve the socialist
legal system, i.e., "strengthening legalisation and improving the Chinese legal system;
raising the level of law enforcement by administrative authorities and cultivating a
law-abiding citizenry."42
In the realm of Internet-mediated public discourse, a diversified spectrum of
opinions—from radical proposals of change, through a moderate pragmatic approach,
to a more conservative inclination—regarding the rule of law has been posted. For
instance, one Internet user posted a message favouring democratic supervision under
the leadership of the Communist Party because he thought the CPP could safeguard
the people's constitutional rights. 43 This posting attracted several hundred viewings
—which is a rare phenomenon on the discussion forum—and further provoked heated
debates over the relationship between the CCP, the rule of law, and democracy.
Samples of such messages are listed in Appendix 7.
Some Internet users have pointed out that the administrative, legislative, and
judiciary organs of the state must be linked to media investigation and public scrutiny.
Otherwise, China will not be able to rein in such problems as rapidly mounting
corruption, rising crime, inequality, arbitrary abuse of power, and declining appeal of
' 
"Yifa Zhiguo Dian Jishi—Jiujie Quanguo Renda Wunian Gongzuo Huigu" (Laying the foundation
for the rule of law—the review of legalisation over the past finve year under the 9th NPC), People i
Daily, March 5, 2003, p. 5, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8614/
807762.html>, accesed on March 5, 2003.
42 
"Shuli Fazhi de Quanwei" (Consolidating the authority of legal system), People r Daily, March 14,
2003, p. 5, available online at <http://www.people.com.cnIGB/paper464/8698/8  13965 .html>,
accessed on March 14, 2003.
' Qing Yuan, "Dang lingdao xia de minzhu jiandu zhidu keyi baozhang renmin de hefa quanli" (A
democratic supervisory system under the leadership of the party can safeguard the people's legitimate
rights), posted in the "Qiangguo Luntan" at 13:42:57, March 6, 2003.
on electronic bulletin boards, participants may choose not to post a responding message but may
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ruling legitimacy—nor will China be able to deliver better, fairer, and more
transparent and effective governance. (See Appendix 8)
In contrast to the range of public opinion expressed on the Internet, the official
People 's Daily has exhibited only an overwhelmingly positive image of the two
sessions and promoted politically correct information highlighting the achievements
in legislative work. The government work report, for example, concluded that
"...the government has intensUled administrative supervision, auditing, and economic
supervision—contributing significantly to promoting the exercise of administrative
powers according to law, fighting corruption, building a clean government, and
uncovering major economic cases. All the measures adopted for the comprehensive
improvement of law and order has been put in place, resulting in a turn for the better in
law and order and thus making the people feel more secure. "
In addition, Li Peng promised that there would be greater openness and transparency
in legislative work and that the people should be involved in the enactment of laws;
this would be accomplished in part by soliciting public opinion, conducting surveys,
and holding hearings on legislative matters. Note, however, that Li added that the
work of the NPC must adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party.
Section IV Discussions and Conclusions
A. Discussions
With limited formal channels of political participation and a government-directed
news environment that discouraged openness, people in pre-reform China felt that the
general environment did not allow them to speak freely, particularly on public
instead simply observe a specific topic or issue.
Zhu Rongji, "Zhengfu gongzuo baogao" (Report on government work), March 5, 2003.
46 
"Renda gongzuo yaozai dang de lingdao xia buduan kaituo chuangxin" (Constantly expanding and
innovating the work of the people's congress under the leadership of the party), People Daily, March
12, 2003, p. 1, available online at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper464/8678/812626.html >,
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occasions. After a quarter of a century of dramatic economic change in their lives,
however, more and more Chinese Internet users are now beginning to enthusiastically
take part in online political debates and consultations. This kind of political
participation is obviously facilitated by the global revolution in communication
technology. In a sense, Chinese Internet users are fulfilling their political and social
rights as citizens: the ability both to make their opinions heard by government
officials and to hold these officials more accountable and responsive. The classical
democratic theory has also emphasised the importance of direct participation in public
affairs. Bowler and Donovan note, "...participation is not just of value in and of itself,
but also has an educative role that promotes civic engagement and wider virtues."47
Whilst the Communist Party and government are retreating from their once
"totalitarian penetration" of the economy and society, the general public are finding
and reviving their voices both in the socioeconomic sphere and a lesser extent in the
political arena. Some Chinese, in particular those who are better-off, are now starting
to speak and act for themselves online.48
As noted above, the majority of Chinese Internet users are either
computer-illiterate or financially unable to gain access to the networked world.
Nevertheless, some Chinese media commentators and practitioners believe that,
compared to Internet users in other countries, Chinese Netizens seem to demonstrate
greater enthusiasm for expressing their viewpoints over issues of social, political,
economic, and even military matters. They argue in part that the Internet is a venue
accessed on March 12, 2003.
' Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, "Democracy, Instituions and Attitudes about Citizen Influence
on Government," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 2002, p. 374.
48 Studies and surveys have pinpointed that the majority of Chinese Internet users come from urban,
coastal, and economically better-off backgrounds and are generally young male intellectuals, with
85.1 per cent of users being aged between 18-35 and 84 per cent of users being high school and college
graduates. See CNNIC, Semiannual Survey Report on the Development of China c Internet (October
I 997—January 2004), available online at <http://www.cnnic.net.cnlindex/OE/00/I  I /index.htm>,
accessed on February 17, 2004.
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where Netizens may enjoy a relatively freer space for articulation than in the
traditional media. 49 Additionally, modern Chinese history has also provided evidence
regarding the critical role that elite or intellectual discourses play in guiding public
opinion and in exciting further public debates. The elite leaders in the May Fourth
Movement (1919) and the June Fourth Tiananmen Incident(1989) were often referred
to as "Enlightenment intellectuals." This term is analogous to the political science
concept of "opinion leaders" who influence the public and set a demonstration effect
amongst citizens. Online political debates and consultations are in this regard
becoming a critical hinge that can link grass-roots politics with broader potential
social and political change.
As a result, the widening of public horizontal communication brought by the
Internet is becoming an important source for the formation and growth of public
opinion in a diversified civil society with a fledgling public sphere. 5° This change is
due to the comparative ease and convenience promised by the medium, allowing
unprecedented access to multiple sources of news. This trend does not suggest,
however, that the Chinese authorities have given a loose rein to those Chinese using
the Internet. Instead, the government has tried to shape what it calls a "healthy and
Wang Xiaodong, "Hulianwang yu Zhongguo de sixiang duoyuanhua" (The Internet and thought
pluralization in China), BBC Chinese Service, May 9, 2002, available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/chinese/chinanews/newsid_742000/742239 1 .stm>, accessed on March 6,
2003; Jin Mengyu, "Qiangguo luntan: toushi wenlu?" (The strong country forum: throwing a stone to
clear the way?), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China News Weekly), No. 23, June 3, 2001, available
online at <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/ xinwenzhoukan/200 1 -23-50/txt/(6)%20 I .html>, accessed
on April 12, 2003.
50 The argument is further supported by the most recent research report on Internet use in China which
was released in mid-November 2003. The two-year project, conducted by the CASS, surveyed Internet
usage and impact in twelve Chinese cities. Key findings include: (1) 71 per cent of Internet users and
69 percent of non-users agreed that the Internet gives people more opportunities to express their
political views; (2) 79 per cent of Internet users and 77 per cent of non-users agreed that the Internet
gives people a better knowledge of politics; (3) 79 per cent of Internet users and 73 per cent of
non-users agreed that the Internet will give the government a better understanding of the views of its
citizens; and (4) 60.8 per cent of Internet users and 61 percent of non-users agreed that the Internet
gives people more opportunities to criticize government policies. See Guo Liang, "Surveying Internet
Usage and Impact in Twelve Chinese Cities," The CASS Internet Report 2003 (Beijing: CASS
Research Center for Social Development, 2003), pp. 55-57, available online at
230
orderly" online environment, mainly through the use of firewalls; Internet regulations
and policing; threats and arrests to contain public Internet use; and encouraging
self-censorship among Netizens and the business sector. Yet firewalls are
intrinsically porous,52 as this investigative case of the two sessions has shown. A
recent survey conducted by "Reporters Without Borders" also reveals that the
censorship efforts of the moderators in control are patchy: the monitors are neither
omnipotent nor omnipresent. There exist at least small cracks in the system of
self-censorship where space for freer expression can exist, even though such
opportunities may just last for a few minutes. 53 The dissertation's argument is an
extension of Chen and Shi's research in which they contend that media exposure in
Chinese-language news outlets have had negative effects on people's attitudes
towards authority and political institutions in general and accordingly people have
little trust and political support in their government. 54 Therefore, the Internet in this
regard challenges state hegemony over the dominance of unitary public opinion that
the government has long envisaged through stern media and propaganda machines.55
In comparison with the official People Daily coverage of the two sessions in
March 2003, the civic discourses conducted in chat rooms like Qiangguo Luntan
suggest that the Internet has begun a process of incrementally forming a deliberative
<http://www.markle.orgInews/parts.4_to_7.pdf, accessed on November 18, 2003.
51 See, for example, Michael S. Chase and James C. Mulvenon, You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident
Use of the Internet and Being's Counter-Strategies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).
52 See, for example, Jason Lacharite, "Electronic Decentralisation in China: A Critical Analysis of
Internet Filtering Policies in the People's Republic of China," Australian Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 37, No. 2, July 2002, pp. 333-346.
Reporters Without Borders, China: Living Dangerously on the Net—Censorship and Surveillance of
Internet Forums, May 12, 2003, available online at <http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=
6793>, accessed on May 24, 2003.
Xueyi Chen and Tianjian Shi, "Media Effects on Political Confidence and Trust in the People's
Republic of China in the Post-Tiananmen Period," East Asia, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2001, pp.
84-118.
" In Yuezhi Zhao's words, it is termed "Party Journalism"—monolithic, positive, and highly
predictable journalism that manipulates the spatial and temporal dimensions of news to suit the state
agenda on certain issues. See Yuezhi Zhao, Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the
Party Line and the Bottom Line (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 49.
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and burgeoning cyberspace, a kind of "public sphere." Party chief Hu Jintao in a CCP
Politburo meeting declared that press coverage of meetings and leadership activities
has to be improved, ordinary people's concerns have to be addressed, and more
importantly, news has to be made "close to the reality, close to the masses, and close to
the public's lives"—the so-called "three closes" (san tie fin);56 the truth, however, is
that the people's right to know (zhi qing quan) is yet underdeveloped. The core of the
problem is obvious: the media in China is not truly independent; they are in large part
an extension and complement of the Party and government. In sharp contrast, the role
the mass media plays in China is distinct from the function of a "watchdog" as its
equivalent is perceived in the West. The Chinese authorities may tolerate a more
autonomous media space in covering news in economic and social domains as long as
these reports do not provoke potential social unrest and/or economic disorder. The
unbending stance against dissenting news is unambiguous when coverage concerns
political issues and in particular when it concerns the image and criticism of the
Communist Party. The People 's Daily has therefore followed a propagandistic
practice in covering the proceedings:
The emergence of multiple voices in the press has provided a more accurate and
realistic picture of Chinese society and people today, and the problems and
contradictions inherent in their daily lives. The fact that ordinary people felt
that they were represented gave them the feeling that they were apart of the two
sessions and, as a result, they had an even deeper respect for the event.57
56 
"Hu Jintao zongshuji zhuchi zhaokai Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju huiyi" (General Secretary
Hu Jintao chaired the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee), Xinhua News
Agency, March 28, 2003, available online at <http://202.84. 17.73  :7777fDetail.wct?RecID = 1 1
&SelectID=1&ChannellD=4255&Page = 1>, accessed on April 6, 2003. Further stress of the "three
closes" can be seen, for example, in Li Zhangchun, "Cong 'San tie jin' rushou gaijin jiaqiang
xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo" (Improve and strengthen propagandistic thought work through the "three
closes"), Xinhua News Agency, May 20, 2003, available online at <http://202.84.17.73:7777/
Detail.wct?RecID6&SelectIDl &ChannelID4255&Page 1>, accessed on May 21, 2003.
"Mass Media Experts Comment on Coverage of NPC, CPPCC," Peoples Daily, March 19, 2003,
available online at <http ://english.peopledaily.com.cn1200303/1  9/eng200303 19_il 3 57.shtml>,
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On the one hand, the official media have provided lavish coverage of the two sessions.
On the other hand, voices of ordinary people are underreported. The underlying
rationale seems apparent: Chinese leaders have long upheld the sacred doctrine of
Deng Xiaoping that "development is the fundamental principle" (fazhan shi ying
daoli), while the overriding principle is "stability above all else" (wending yadao
yiqie). Official media coverage of such a paramount political event is premised on this.
As a consequence, this principle requires the media to toe the Party and government
line. As a leading "organ paper," the People Daily has rigidly conformed to what the
guidelines58 have stipulated, claiming to
"...operate according to DengXiaoping theory and the important doctrine of the Three
Represents ', incarnate earnestly the spirit of the 16th Party Congress, stick to the
course of democratic, honest, united, stable, mobilising, and positive propaganda;
grasp firmly the correct course of public opinion; and propagandise major
accomplishments achieved in the past five years with great vigour. "
Specifically, acting as the Party and government mouthpiece, the People 's Daily
published "lianghui tegao" (feature reports)—a series of special reports presented
prior to the two sessions, designed to set the official agenda and thus guide public
debates over the proceedings. Both successive news coverage and the opening as well
as closing editorials were released in accordance with the progression of the two
sessions.
Such concerted action has propagandised the remarkable achievements in reform,
development, and stability carried out over the past five years under the leadership of
accessed on March 22, 2003.
58 Lianghui xinwen baodaojihua (Guidelines for news report during the two sessions).
"Chenggong lianghui de chenggong fanying—Renmin Ribao 2003 nian lianghui baodao jianshu"
(The successful reflections of the successful two sessions—summary of news report of the People
Daily on the two sessions), Xinwen zhanxian, April 2003, available online at <http://www .
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the Party Central Committee—thereby minimising the negative images to emerge
from public frustration and social stratification due to more than two decades of
reform and opening up. Prior to the growth of information and communication
technologies, the task was relatively effortless. Since then, the government has found
it difficult to completely stifle the dissenting news and information made possible by
such new media as the Internet, E-mail, and short message service (SMS) messaging.
As evidenced by examples presented in Chapter 5, citizens have shown little faith in
official government pronouncements. Mistrust of the authorities has been growing
and possibly given way to cynicism and speculation when particularly a major
sociopolitical crisis takes place. The state media is in this respect seemingly burying
government voices since the propaganda present less what people want to read or are
concernd about. The coverage of the People Daily during the two sessions was also
more propaganda-oriented than people-based. Such coverage cohered with the
political mobilisation techniques that the regime has long exerted: "all articles with
one face, all mouths with one voice, and everyone parroting words and quotes from
the People Daily editorials."60
A special chat forum on Qiangguo Luntan entitled "Lianghui taolun zhuanqu"
was set up for the two sessions on March 1St. Seven NPC deputies and seven CPPCC
members appeared as guests on the forum, taking questions from Internet users in
order to guide "correct" public opinion and defend government perspectives when
necessary. Since the authorities support the so-called "yulun jiandu"6 ' (supervisory
snweb.com/gb/xw/2003/04/ a0401005.htm>, accessed on May 1, 2003.
60 Li Xiguang, "ICT and the Demise of Propaganda," Zhonghua chuanmei wang (Media China Net),
May 19,2003, available online at <http:f/academic.mediachina.netJlw_view.jsp?id666>, accessed on
May 19, 2003.
61 The term "yulun jiandu" was first raised in the CCP Central Committee's "Political Report"
delivered to the Party's 13th Congress (1987) and consecutively repeated in the 14th (1992), 15th
(1997), and 16th (2002) congresses. See Jiang Zemin, "Quanmianjianshe xiaokang shehui, kaichuang
Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye xin jumian" (Building a comparatively well-off society in an
all-round way and create a new situation in building socialism with Chinese characteristics), Ta Kung
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function of public opinion mediated by the media), about nine hundred postings
poured into the forum during the two-week-long proceedings. Against this backdrop,
Qiangguo Luntan has become the unique hub of both online consultations and even
petitioned activities that circumvented the formal judiciary and procuratorial organs
during the annual sessions of the NPC and CPPCC. Unlike a handful of "liberal" news
media—such as Nanj'ang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) or Being Qingnian Bao
(Beijing Youth Daily) which often probe beneath sanctioned news presentations, 62
 the
People Daily was tied to the official point of view. For example, several Internet
users had evidently pleaded to the deputies for help and involvement because they
believed the deputies' "privileged position" 63 in Chinese politics might solve their
difficulties.64 Such messages have prompted further discussions. In other words, the
more lively the discussions and the closer they are to the political edge, the more
readers are attracted. 65 What has been termed "yulun jiandu" by Chinese officials
seems to be government-led supervision of public opinion, and is a top-down crafted
Pao (Hong Kong), November 9, 2002, available online at <http://www.takungpao.com/news/
2002-11-9/l6con-72505.htm>, accessed on November 14,2002.
62 growing number of Chinese media outlets have tried to make the most out of policy by probing the
edges of the shifting official boundaries. As Chin-Chuan Lee has noted, "Many newspaper editors
have confessed [to him and to others] that their front page endorses the planned economy, their second
to eighth pages support the mixed economy, and their ninth to sixteenth pages advocate the market
economy." See Chin-Chuan Lee, "Servants of the State or the Market?: Media and Journalists in
China," in Jeremy Tunstall (ed.), Media Occupations and Professions: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), p. 246. The Chinese authorities, however, have begun to require journalists to
take re-assessment tests from 2003 onward, ensuring that the licence system may make particularly the
independent-thinking reporters toe the Party line. See Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Mainland Journalists
to Face Ideology Test," South China Morning Post, December 7, 2002.
63 One of the characteristics of the NPC is that the deputies are normally not full-time legislators. By
and large, being a member of the NPC in China is simply a side job. Primary occupations include
judges, lawyers, party cadres, government officials, and so forth.
As an example, a message entitled "Renda daibiao qing bang women huyu: zhizhi shiye danwei
lingdao ruci siyi gaige" (NPC deputies, please call upon leaders of enterprise units to stop their
arbitrary reform), posted by "Dang diaomin haishi shunmin" at 22:02:00, March 24, 2003, revealed
that several employees from a remote sensing corporation in Guangxi had called for the improvement
of their pension and welfare system. See Wang Yougen, "Ben cheguansuo de fubai shili: heyi gan shi
'Renda' wei xingtong xushe?" (The power of corrupt officials—why do they dare to ignore NPC
deputies?), at 18:15:56, March 7, 2003; and Dou Xueyuan, "Huyu baohu jubao gaoguan fubai de
jubaoren" (Urging protection for those who unmask corrupt high-profile officials), at 12:31:11, March
5, 2003.
65 Andrew Stroehlein, "Internet Censors in China Loosening Their Grip," Online Journalism Review,
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tactic of directing public discourse through the incarnation of official ideologies.
Public opinion from a government perspective is not supposed to challenge,
undermine, or even subvert; but to uphold and support the government's presentation
and opinion-moulding (socialisation). However, the question arises: Can public
opinion and debates be guided or directed within the context of globalisation of
information technology?
As a matter of fact, Qiangguo Luntan is not the only online popular forum that
provides a public arena to communicate, interact, and debate over issues in Chinese
cyberspace; there are other Internet forums that serve different discourses—such as
Sh/i Zhongguo (Century China) at <http://www.cc.org.cn >; Huaxia zhiqing (Chinese
Educated Youth) at <http://www.hxzq.net>; Xinlang wang at
<http://www.sina.com.cn>; and Sohu at <http://club.sohu.com>. The mushrooming
of online Internet forums and the growth of online communities exemplify a nascent
civil society taking root in a communist regime and can be attributed to the intensified
diffusion and use of the Internet. 66 Such an acknowledgment may also serve to
underpin the arguments presented in this chapter. To repeat, it is mainly because
Qiangguo Luntan is not the sole discussion board in Chinese cyberspace that the
forum enjoys relatively freer and deliberative public space in comparison to
"almost"67 mass media such as the People ' Daily.
In the meantime, the selection of Qiangguo Luntan highlights the reality that
May 23, 2003, available online at <http://www.ojr.org/ojr/world_reports/1053660077.php >, accessed
on May 26, 2003.
66 Guobin Yang has conducted an ethnographic case study of "Huaxia zhiqing" based on his online
participant observation and close contact with its collective management. He argues that "Huaxia
zhiqing" is only one of many cases ofthe co-evolution of the Internet and civil society in contemporary
China. Yang's case study reflects the challenges and dynamics of an incipient civil society. See Guobin
Yang, "The Co-evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China," Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 3,
May/June 2003, pp. 405-22.
67 It is arguable that every mass media outlet has to a varying degree had connections with the
Communist Party and/or governments at all levels. In both theory and reality, the Party and/or
government are their chief patrons, although the subsidies received from them are now in a decline
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even a forum sponsored and administered by a foremost "organ paper"—the People 'S
Daily—can demonstrate the dynamic public discourse and "virtual" civil engagement,
albeit one still at a primitive stage. This is essentially because online debate is for the
time being still not very deliberative and rational in the Habermas sense of the "public
sphere,"68 although it has shown the publicness of the access and participation. As we
have seen from the postings regarding various issues earlier on, the messages are
often too brief to be considered as thoughtful contributions to debate, although the
section on the "rule of law" appears to have been more interactive and deliberative.
Some Internet users simply disseminate articles that they think interesting without
adding any comment, and some read postings without making any contributions of
their own.
One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that the authorities are attempting to
prevent cyberspace from becoming a hotbed of anti-government discussion; they are
undoubtedly trying hard to silence Internet-based opposition to both the Party and
regime, particularly during the critical political events such as the two sessions or the
Party's national congress. Government intervention has thus deterred at least some
people from venting genuine opinions, which may be too critical about sensitive
issues. Likewise, it is difficult both for a researcher based outside or inside China
without "connections" to acquire the entire collection of contributions posted on the
forum because some messages are believed to have been automatically weeded out by
filtering programs before having the chance to appear online. Other messages are
manually deleted even though they have successfully been posted. These types of
partly because of the ongoing press reform measures and China's entry into the WTO.
68 See Peter Ferdinand and Chin-fu Hung, "The Internet, e-Social Capital, and Public Sphere—A
Study of Qiangguo Luntan during the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
(November 2002)" (Paper presented at the conference on "China and the Internet: Technology,
Economy, and Society in Transition" at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of
Southern California, May 30-3 1, 2003).
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censorship have obstructed a complete account of what is really happening in Chinese
cyberspace.
The existing evidence is nonetheless sufficient to answer the research question
posed at the outset of this chapter. One of the primary reasons is that the research has
been done without deliberately sifting through one forum like Qiangguo Luntan to
find interesting or provocative messages in favour of the conclusions drawn.69
Moreover, the online messages that have been presented were not selected to justif'
the arguments, but instead these kinds of messages are so widespread that it is
necessary to select an illustrative sample.
Moreover, it is of importance to compare the contingent and the well-prepared in
Internet-induced change after investigating contigent events and accidents in Chapter
5 and non-contingent ones such as the congresses of the Party, NPC and CPPCC in
Chapters 6 and 7. In an authoritarian regime like China, the authorities can usually
mobilise every resource available to prevent, deter, or at least minimise any (fatal)
challenge provided they are given enough time to react. This is precisely where the
Internet may pose greater impact upon China's political system if any contigent or
accident takes place. The new media in this regard serves as the catalyst to induce the
Net's power and thus facilitate a qualitatively different impact, as compared with the
congresses that have been well prepared long in advance. It accordingly makes sense
to compare non-contingent events with contigent ones; such a comparison highlights
the extent to which the Internet impacts upon political system in a given (authoritarian
69 There are, of course, some messages that are "strongly" sympathetic to the government's agendas
mirrored in People 's Daily. Interestingly, they might adopt the old technique of dissidents in
authoritarian regimes of overtly praising the regime, while in practice meaning the opposite.
Apparently, regular visitors to chat rooms know how to read the messages. For example, a message
posted by "Lu shi" on 3/7/2003 (10:18:10) claims that "Ex-Premier Zhu Rongji is an honest and
upright official. He is also a good official full of wisdom and stratagems. People will not forget you."
Messages like this could very well mean the opposite.
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state) context.
B. Conclusions
The Internet and its affiliated chat rooms characterised as computer-mediated
communications (CMCs) make information relatively accessible by the grass-roots
level. Such horizontal communication challenges those assertions made by
authoritarian governments about their "success stories" in managing as well as
controlling information flow—both on- and off-line. Netizens are now enjoying the
relative ease of (horizontal) communication just as easily as the process can be
performed through the top-down propaganda channels by governments, such as
Internet versions of state-owned media coverage and the electronic government
projects. In other words, with the Internet, people can now speak more freely among
themselves, debate and consult with ideas and public issues comparatively more
easily, and gradually engage the mainstream generators of news and opinions such as
the official media and propaganda machine.
The case studies as demonstrated in this chapter have broadly supported the
argument articulated in the introduction that Internet-based political participation is
leading to a gradual but steady change of value orientation and an emerging nascent
public space in China. This finding somewhat challenges the interpretation of Kalathil
and Boas as well as others, who tended to downplay the role played by the Internet.
The Chinese government, they believe, has done a rather good job in regulating and
utilising the Internet in a manner that strengthens Party governance. This dissertation
argues, instead, that there are grounds to remain cautiously optimistic about the
Internet's impact on China. This is not to promote "technological determinism" but
instead a wish to re-evaluate the impact of the new media on the basis of solid
evidence.
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With the rising expectations and public demands for an improved quality of life
and protection of social, economic, and political rights, the citizens of transitional
China may not merely want the regime to address their demands through (state-owned)
mass media, but also require adequate channels to proactively articulate them in the
first place. This bottom-up force or pressure derived from the general public may
facilitate and reinforce a favourable social basis of the twin effects: the increasingly
dynamic civic society and Internet diffusion. In other words, this incipient online civic
engagement and fledging public space serves as a precondition for a civil society,
which in turn is the foundation for and a necessary ingredient of any future
democracy/democratisation. A nascent public space for "virtual" civic engagement,
albeit with Chinese characteristics, can indeed be found in online forums in China.
This chapter has basically confirmed what have been argued in Chapter 6, that
the Internet has contributed to the public debates in Chinese cyberspace. After the
separate discussion of the contingent events (Chapter 5) and non-contingent events
and accidents (Chapter 6 and 7), it is now appropriate to accentuate the significance of
the contingencies and incidents in Internet-induced change upon China's political
system. A profound explanation with regard to structural constraint in Chinese
cyberspace is to be explored in the following concluding chapter, showing why the
Internet may not fully realise its democratic potentials. The constraint is what will be
addressed in the conclusion—prolonged stability, and delayed Internet impact upon
China's political system.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
Section I
	 Evaluation of the Impact of the Internet upon the Chinese
Political System
Whilst western concepts of "public opinion" have been extensively addressed, there
has been a dearth of scholarship on China's counterpart. It is partly because this
reflects the political reality in China that publicly posting unauthorised bills like
posters in the street are banned. On the other hand, those who have long been
accustomed to perceiving communist China as an autocratic regime believe that the
top communist leaders need not give any heed to what their people think, let alone the
idea that public opinion might influence government policy. Since the legitimacy of
the regime is not based primarily upon the majority support of the electorate, outsiders
may form the impression of a total monopoly of Chinese government control over its
media as well as its effective tools of political manipulation. In short, under the
cardinal guidelines of Chinese political correctness, the Chinese public are often
perceived as unlikely to form any independent opinions over political expression, and
thus unlikely to make any significant impact upon public policies.
Ever since the late Qing dynasty in the second half of the 19th century,
modernisation has been the major project for Chinese leaders as they compete with
their western counterparts, as well as their more recently developing neighbours in
East Asia. The core of modernisation at the time of the Qing dynasty was to
industrialise China to safeguard the country from western commercial and military
aggression. To make China a strong (qiang) and wealthy (flu) state was the top priority
of the newly established Republican government. In Mao's China, the "Great Leap
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Forward" (da-yue-jin) in the late 1950s epitomised his ambition to speed up the
process of industrialisation, which he conceived of as a nationwide mobilisation to
construct a massive steel and iron sector as the strategic industry in the development
of a communist society. Nevertheless, Mao did not succeed in hauling China out of its
still desperate backwardness. Instead, following the disastrous "Cultural Revolution,"
a series of government measures were implemented, known as the "second
revolution," under Deng Xiaoping's reign. 1 Deng's successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao, have also addressed the theme, with different national strategies that reflect the
information age. In Jiang's words, "Digitalisation will become a power house in the
modemisation process, and information technology (IT) is one of China's top
priorities and a driving force behind the country's economic development."2
When information and communication technologies (ICTs), principally
symbolised by the Internet, converge on the political environment in most
authoritarian and developing countries, ICTs allow the possibilities of the public
gaining more latitude in expressing opinions. Communist China is a particularly
significant country in this respect. Here, the (mass) media was traditionally used by
the authorities to serve as tools of propaganda (xuanchuanjiaoyu) and for purposes of
agenda-setting (yulun daoxiang). Entering the Internet age, the state is seen to assure
its economic competitiveness in a globalised context where information largely drives
In Deng's words, "The reform we are now carlying out is very daring. But if we do not carry it out, it
will be hard for us to make progress. Reform is China's second revolution. It is something very
important that we have to undertake even though it involves risks." Deng Xiaoping, "Reform is
China's Second Revolution," Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3 (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1998), available online at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vo13/text1
c1160.html>, accessed on May 30, 2002.
2 Hou Mingjuan, "Jiang Says IT Is a Top Priority," China Daily, August 22, 2000, available online at
<http://ddi.uni-paderborn.de/didaktik/aktuell/china_daily_wcc2000.html>, accessed on May 12,
2002.
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global and domestic economy. The government keenly bolsters the development of
information and network technology, but at the same time, it has been persistently
trying to minimise the undesirable effects that the Internet has brought about since it
was introduced in the early 1990s. Because the political impact of the Internet has
caused the Beijing government unease as it threatens its long-held monopoly over the
flow of information, the regime has adopted a variety of strategies to harness it, limit
the impact of the new technology to an acceptable degree, and hopefully to turn it to
the government's benefit, particularly in the prospects of e-commerce and
e-government.
In the area of e-commerce, the government has initiated a so-called "twin-track
strategy" that ambitiously integrates industrialisation into the grand process of
informatisation. Informatisation is treated as the key in promoting industrial
advancement, industrialisation and modernisation in China. The key importance and
role of the Information Technology will principally be to serve as the basic,
pioneering, supporting and strategic industry of the national economy, and
increasingly play a pivotal part in promoting the domestic economy, national safety,
the welfare of citizens, and social development.4
For the development of electronic government, the Chinese government has not
merely rhetorically underlined the magnitude of the correct "agenda-setting," but has
also vigorously shaped it in the "Government Online Project" since 1998, the year
which was dubbed China's "Government Online Year." The project can, in one sense,
For more about China's "twin-tract strategy", see, for example, Xiudian Dai, "Towards a Digital
Economy with Chinese Characteristics?" New Media and Society Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, p. 144.
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005)—Information Industry, Ministry of Information Industry,
available online at <http://www.trp.hku.hkJinfofile/chinaJ2002/10-5-yr-plan.pdf, accessed on
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be interpreted as the authorities' proactive effort to restore the propaganda machinery
that has been weakened throughout the reformist period, and particularly the gradual
reduction in the state's monopoly over the provision of information and
communications.5
This dissertation was written with the ambition to answer the two fundamental
research questions, presented at the outset: Is the Chinese government as much in
control of public debates on the Internet as it is of debates in other forms of media?
And does the Chinese government still control and manipulate public opinion as
much as it has traditionally done? These two questions are closely interrelated with
the concepts of public opinion and the Internet. To approach the questions set in the
introduction chapter, the dissertation began with a literature review in Chapter 2 of the
general theme of the Internet's impact upon the political system in established
democracies and some developing as well as authoritarian states, thus, laying the
foundation for research on the politics and public opinion in the age of the Internet in
China. One of the major findings derived from reviewing existing works is that there
is very little literature tackling the theme of public opinion in China, even after the
introduction of ICTs, particularly the Internet. The prevailing literature has tended to
suggest that the Internet has little impact upon politics and public opinion in China.
This assumption is contested in this dissertation in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3, the dissertation investigated the fundamental issue of Internet
governance in China. As generally perceived, the increasing availability of
information made possible by global information systems, including the Internet, will
September 14, 2002.
See also Xiudian Dai, The Digital Revolution and Governance (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp.
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affect governance and the political process. In authoritarian states like China, it is also
true that Internet governance there will influence the creation, dissemination,
availability, and use of information on the Internet in global information systems. The
Internet regulation regime in China is crucial as Internet control is made with regard
to information production, access, distribution, and use, which may in turn swing to a
more open or closed cyberspace. As a consequence, what decides the setting of online
public debates hinges partly on Internet censorship and anti-control measures. As the
chapter's conclusion reveals, Internet governance in China has achieved some success,
resulting in self-censorship to some degree amongst Internet users. Yet the system of
Internet control is porous and far from foolproof. It accordingly provides grounds for
testing whether the Chinese government is as much in control of public debates on the
Internet as it is of debates in other forms of media.
Chapter 4 considered the relationship between Internet entrepreneurs and the
government in the wider context of telecommunication systems. Following the
industrial and technology polices, as well as Internet regulations addressed in Chapter
3, an account was provided of how Internet entrepreneurs emerge and of their
operational environment, which the authoritarian Chinese regime has cautiously
managed. It is argued that relations here can be characterised as a hybrid
clientelist-corporatist complex. Case studies are provided to support the arguments.
Such a relationship does have implications for civil society in China because the
Internet entrepreneurs have helped unleash a more plural society, even though they
have closely cooperated with the authorities.
In Chapter 5, the focus moved to consider the actual use of the Internet by
15 1-152.
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Netizens in China. As the conclusion of Chapter 4 shows, the Internet entrepreneurs
may not boldly promote or even fully realise the Internet's political potential. What in
turn makes the Internet significant is how and to what extent the medium is utilised by
Netizens in China. This chapter provides empirical evidence to support the argument
that the reinvigoration of civil and political rights in the wake of wider diffusion and
utilisation of the Internet may stand at the forefront of facilitating a freer sociopolitical
environment, although it is still in an embryonic stage. The discussions centre on four
dimensions of Internet-mediated impact, with each category illustrated by one case: (a)
foreign relations: the U.S. spy plane collision; (b) domestic political issues: the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak; (c) legal politics: the BMW incident;
(d) dissent politics: the Falun Gong movement.
In Chapter 6, there was an investigation of the impact of the Internet upon
authoritarian regimes with specific reference to China. This chapter addressed the
issues of the formation and development of a public sphere and online social capital in
China with an empirical analysis of messages posted on the Qiangguo Luntan (Strong
Country) Web site during the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China in
November 2002. The discussions centred upon four separate yet intertwined
categories of issues, (a) corruption, (b) the concept of xiaokang shehui (a moderately
- wealthy society) and income inequality, (c) the theory of the "Three Represents" and
the official accession of private entrepreneurs into the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP); and (d) political reform. By contrasting the official coverage of the themes that
appear in the People Daily, the examination of the Qiangguo Luntan can help
explore the extent to which the Internet has facilitated the evolution of e-social capital
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and the possible emergence of a public sphere, albeit with Chinese characteristics.
The conclusion demonstrates that whilst there is a primitive form of public space in
the Chinese cyberspace, c-social capital is less apparent. Nevertheless, the implication
of the current formation and development of the public sphere and c-social capital in
China make us cautiously optimistic about the prospect for the Internet's impact upon
the political system in China.
Chapter 7 is another micro investigation into the online messages posted on the
Qiangguo Luntan during the first session of the 10th NPC (National People's
Congress) and the National Committee of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference) held in March 2003. Similar to the previous chapter, this
one centres on the discourses of four categories of issues: (a) "san-nong", i.e.
"non gye" (agriculture), "nongcun" (village), and "nongmin" (farmers); (b)
employment and social security; (c) the role and reform of the NPC and the CPPCC;
and (d) the rule of law. Examination of these discourses illuminates the impact that
they have had on China's politics in general, and public opinion and political
participation in particular. Specifically, these case studies have broadly supported the
argument that Internet-based political participation is leading to a gradual but steady
change of value orientation and an emerging nascent public space in China. In
addition, it is a main argument of this chapter that after examining separately the
contingent events in Chapter 5, and well-prepared political events in Chapter 6 and 7,
one can tentatively conclude that the Internet will be more likely to have a (political)
impact in China when accidents and contingent events occur as compared with
non-contingent events such as the various congresses.
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Section II	 Prolonged Stability, Delayed Internet Impact upon Political
System in China
The revisionist literature of technology determinism is right to caution us that
• . understanding the impact of information technology in China requires knowledge
not only of the ways in which technology works, but also of the political system,
culture and history of that country." 6
 Indeed, examining the Internet's impact upon the
political system in China leads to a mixed message, that is, on the one hand, there
seems little basis for the assertion that the Internet and Short Messaging
Systems/Services will fundamentally change the political system, bringing
democracy to authoritarian states like China when we look at the stringent Internet
regulations and polices, together with the clientelist-corporatist complex of
state-business relationship in the Internet industry. Nevertheless, when considering
actual Internet use on the mainland, there is striking evidence to support the
determinists' claim that the Internet, among other things, has facilitated the
awakening of awareness about civil and political rights and the formation of a
primitive form of public space. In some cases like the SARS outbreak, the Jiangxi
school blast, the BMW accident case and so forth; the Internet's impact has been more
noticeable than in others. It does begin to hold the Chinese government more
accountable and responsive to the people's right to know.
Why cannot the Internet completely realise its democratic potential in China? I
argue that the reason lies chiefly in the relatively extended stability that the regime has
6 Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., China and the Internet: Politics and the Digital
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maintained since the reform and opening launched a quarter of a century ago. Despite
the "political upheavals" that culminated in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the
CCP has managed to achieve a prolonged economic and sociopolitical stability,
particularly from the 1 990s onwards. The economic growth of the previous decades
has relatively improved the economic well-being of the majority of the population,
reinforcing the determination to deepen the market economy in the new century.
There are still unstable forces that are likely to challenge the capacity and authority of
the CCP. Amongst other things, laid-off workers who have fallen victim to the
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises, the lack of a comprehensive social
security net, and the economic crises that are destructively inherent in the widespread
fraud in the banking and credit systems are all potentially subversive forces that might
significantly alter the existing prolonged stability which the Chinese regime has
attained. In these cases, the Internet, serving as an effective communications channel,
may augment grievances and dissatisfaction and act as a catalyst for political change.
The notion of the "Three Represents" proposed by Jiang Zemin has delicately
attempted to coopt elites from the private economy in the CCP, aiming to solicit
political support from potentially subversive business groups like the private (Internet)
entrepreneurs. In addition, the state has also maintained social control as one of the
crucial pillars to the continuing of the PRC. Yet the state is increasingly challenged by
societal organisations, such as Falun Gong. However, the state has arguably
exploited its "authoritarian power structures to crush any overt opposition and ride out
Leap Forward (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 6.
See, for example, Vivienne Shue, "Global Imaginings, the State's Quest for Hegemony, and the
Pursuit of Phantom Freedom in China: From Heshang to Falun Gong," in Catarinac Kinnvall and
Kristina Jonsson (eds.), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity
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any unrest."8 At any rate, the state has managed to sustain a relatively prolonged
stability despite increased challenges from subversive forces of socioeconomic arenas.
In short, we can cling to the argument that the final outcome of political change
(dependent variable, see Figure 1.1) still relies upon a complex pattern of interaction
between political and socioeconomic development (independent variables).
Nevertheless the Internet is arguably set to transform the political system and its
associated development as examined in the literature review chapter. Fearing the
trend of "peaceful evolution" from the Internet's democratising impact, the
communist regime is trying to grapple with the challenges of the interplay of
globalisation and marketisation, symbolised by the Internet, so as to prevent it
undermining further the ruling capacity and authority of the CCP, and help it actively
uphold one of its pillars of power—information control. The CCP, in particular, have
proactively shaped the use and development of the Internet medium from the very
beginning of its introduction. Set aside a series of measures adopted to promote
self-censorship amongst Internet users, the government is so keen to attempt to
control the Internet through a variety of means. This includes constructing basic
network infrastructures and connection backbones, imposing online content filtering
and censorship, implementing relentless criminalization charges against offensive
Internet users. These measures lay down warnings and make an example of
discouraging potential offenders of Internet laws and regulations. In a sense, it reflects
the uneasiness felt by Chinese leaders who are managing the propaganda and media
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 2 10-229.
Saich, "Globalization, Governance, and the Authoritarian State: China," in Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
and John D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in A GlobalL-ing World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000), p. 224.
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systems and cannot totally control the free flow of information in cyberspace as they
used to do in harnessing traditional press and mass media.
Besides, the economic factor does affect the Internet in one way or another. In
this thesis, I have discussed that the Internet entrepreneurs have on the one hand
co-operated with the authorities to make the most of profits from the business
opportunity-laden marketplace and a relatively protected ICT sector. Still, the private
business elites have on the other hand helped unleash a more plural and diversified
society that is increasingly underway in China because of their profit-oriented
management of the Web sites and online contents. Also some of them (especially
outside Beijing) have found ways of coexisting with official regulations whilst at the
same time conniving at their circumvention by Internet café users.
In the realm of culture and society, one key feature is that Internet users are
mostly well-to-do urban elites, professional people, and students. It is the so-called
digital divide. Considering the rapid economic growth in China in the past decades,
these elites are more commercially motivated since they are the major beneficiaries of
China's economic reform. They tend, at least for the time being, not to act as a
disruptive group like countryside peasants, migrant workers, or urban unemployed
workers who feel relatively deprived of economic prosperity and a social security net.
Taking account of the current development of state-society and state-business
relationships in China, the Party-state has subtly maintained prolonged stability, Of
course it will take increased efforts on the part of Chinese leadership to contain the
challenges of Internet and globalisation from undermining further the power and
governance of the CCP. Thanks to the prolonged socio-economic stability, the Internet
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is yet to turn into an absolute alternative media environment under current political
milieu. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the Internet has
facilitated the emergence of a nascent public space in China. The public discourse
mediated by the forces of ICTs and globalisation is also making the government more
transparent and accountable as examined in this dissertation (Chapter 5). Yet, there
are Netizens who toe the government line and buy their arguments.
It should be remembered that there is a line to be crossed with commenting on
public affairs and direct advocacy for democracy, democratisation, socially and
politically sensitive issues like pro-Taiwan/Tibet independence, and the Falun Gong
movement. Apart from that there is a grey area of economic and sociopolitical issues,
where people may debate in a different tone from the official account. The public
discourse may also be conducted in a different form of words but address essentially
identical things. This makes reading and analysing the online messages challenging
but rewarding. It is challenging because a full knowledge of the language is a must, as
well as an understanding of the prevalent cyberculture. This makes it difficult
sometimes to comprehend the hidden agenda of messages and accordingly impossible
to analyse the posted messages with any computer assisted qualitative data analysis
software, as was attempted in an earlier stage of this research. The messages are also
rewarding because there is a subtle difference between public debate and discourse
conducted in open forums by Chinese outside China. It forms partly what has already
been addressed in previous chapters, i.e., a nascent public space for virtual civic
engagement with Chinese characteristics.
To sum up, the Internet has not at this stage fundamentally transformed China's
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political system, let alone caused a sudden political regime collapse and engendered a
sweeping democratisation process. The Internet is nevertheless expanding people's
minds, facilitating public discourse, and pushing for more transparent and
accountable governance. In other words, the Chinese government could be argued as
not being as much in control of public debates on the Internet as it is of debates in
other forms of media channels. There is indeed increased scepticism arising from
Internet-mediated messages that articulate contradictory or even challenging tones
against the ways the government deals with public issues and affairs. The government
cannot control and manipulate public opinion as much as it has traditionally done.
Although the rise of dynamic public opinion is relatively small in terms of scale and
vigour, these virtual discourses, at any rate, are positive for a healthy public space to
be carved out in the future. If the stable system that provides "prolonged stability" in
China is seriously challenged and undermined, such as by political and
socioeconomic crises, the Internet-enhanced political change may precipitate the
processes.
Section III Contributions and Limitations
A. Contributions
Apart from the major findings noted above (Section 1), the major contributions have
to be related to the research questions set at the onset of this dissertation. As noted,
there is little literature tackling the theme of public opinion in communist China for
various reasons. Works either deliberately ignore the possibility of public opinion
generated over mass media or they are in practice prevented from conducting public
opinion research independently because of the regulation that prohibits independent
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social surveys by any foreign organisations and individuals. This work has
contributed to a more systematic picture of public opinion on political issues with
documented examples, thanks to the Internet.
Specifically, this research has shed light on how to measure the impact of the
Internet upon political debates, and to document the political impact of the Internet.
The analytical approach employed in this work is to contrast the public debates
conducted in cyberspace with official media coverage of the same themes around the
same time. The Internet's impact upon political debates will be demonstrated if there
is a marked difference between the two. In other words, if the expected effect and
outcome is not what the authority initially envisaged, the significance of Internet
impact can be assumed to have increased. It suggests that the CCP cannot completely
manipulate and direct public opinion and debates as it is accustomed to.
Meanwhile, when researching the Internet's political impact in a given
(authoritarian) state, this dissertation has specifically distinguished the level of impact
from contingency and pre-planned political events. Within contingent cases, a special
attention to the nature of contingency is given to tell expected contingency from
unexpected one. In so doing, this work has contributed to the general literature that
highlighted the subtle different level of the political impact of the Internet and has
shed light on further research topics in the realm of Internet studies.
Moreover, this work highlights a usually neglected phenomenon that researching
the political change or transformation in China can also be conducted from different
See Shewai Shehul Diaocha Huodong Guanli Zhanxing Banfa (Temporary Measures for the
Management of Social Survey Activities Involving Foreign Nationals), China National Statistics
Bureau, AJ.Lgust 15, 1998, available online at <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfg/gzjgfwj/t2OO2O424
18337.htm>, accessed on May 15, 2004.
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aspects like the impact of ICTs (Internet, e-mail, online chatrooms, short messaging
systems, blogs, and peer-to-peer technology such as Yahoo Messenger, ICQ, QQ,
Skype) on its political system. The traditional approaches towards the study of
political change, i.e., modemisation approach, transition approach, and structural
approach, may be enriched thanks to the advent of new technologies in the
increasingly networked, globalised and marketised world. This micro-level approach
to the study of public discourse mediated online may form a solid sociopolitical basis
to advance research of a wider political impact. In other words, this subject may be
related and applied to the broader theme of political change beyond China; in a similar
setting of authoritarian states in which the authorities embrace the new media for
potential commercial benefits but at the same time try to control the new technologies
lest they might become politically subversive forces. In sum, the exploration of this
research subject yield a number of contributions that can be related to the wider theme
of political transformation.
B. Limitations
There are a number of research limitations that ought to be addressed at the end of this
work:
First of all, it should be clear that we are still in the early stage of technological
innovation, with probably the first glimmers of the full Internet implications and
impacts ahead. It is as a result too soon to make a final judgment at this phase about
the Internet's impact upon China's political system or change. A series of researches is
'° See David Potter, "Explaining Democratization," in David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh
and Paul Lewis (eds.), Democratizalion (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), pp. 10-24.
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necessary not only to acquire a comprehensive and substantial account of the
Internet's impact on politics, but to build a solid foundation for the future Internet
study in a comparative perspective as well. One thing, nonetheless, seems certain at
this point: China is being inextricably linked with and affected by the global
phenomenon of the Internet, and the new media are increasingly playing a pivotal role
both in the socioeconomic arena and political affairs.
Secondly, it has to be conceded that there were few interviews with Internet
entrepreneurs and practitioners. There were two major constraints: on the one hand,
Internet business elites tend to be reluctant to be interviewed where researchers are
outsiders, especially from abroad, when research questions relate to political and
governmental issues. On the other hand, the present regulation in China which bans
any serious social survey activities by foreign organisations and individuals without
government permission has also compounded the difficulty of independent research
of Internet survey and questionnaires involving attitudes and usage of online and
offline Internet users.
Thirdly, empirical data on the treatment of the Internet by some major (political)
events like the 15th CCP National Congress (September 1997), 9th NPC and CPPCC
Sessions (March 1998), atrocities committed against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia
(May 1998), the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (May 1999), were
unavailable despite requests to major Internet portals such as the People Daily or
Sina.com. There are two major reasons: first, I embarked on this research project from
October 2000, and secondly, the data is not accessible for outsiders for various
concerns on behalf of the Internet media companies.
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Section IV Agenda for Further Studies
This dissertation has focused, as far as possible within the time and space constraints,
on a number of issues with regard to the Internet's impact upon public debates in
mainland China. The objective of this work has been to understand public opinion and
politics in China in general, and the impact of the Internet on political system in
particular. There nevertheless remains a rich agenda for future studies that are in part
related to the limitations noted above.
First, a wide range of online and offline surveys and interviews could be
conducted with joint efforts from researchers based in Chinese institutions. This can
in part practically resolve the regulation limits imposed on social survey activities
imposed on foreign researcher(s). Meanwhile, online surveys may eliminate the
problem of interviewer bias and in particular, when the research questions come to
politically sensitive issues. This is especially helpful in the Chinese context that the
respondents are likely to give "politically correct" answers. As such, this can be a
serious research problem in surveys. As a consequence, these measures can enhance
the capacity of future research to engender a more comprehensive empirical basis for
further conceptualisation and theorising on the Internet's impact upon political change
in authoritarian states in general, and public debates in particular.
Secondly, a series of comparisons of public debates on political events, such as
Party Congresses and NPC and CPPCC Sessions, can provide a longer-term
comparative picture. This could also further conceptualising and theorising on the
Net's impact upon politics.
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Thirdly, it may be worth considering the relationship between the level of public
sphere and e-social capital not only in the Chinese context but also in any existing
democracies in the near future. To be specific, is "e-social capital" a rather high-level
attribute associated with well-developed public sphere? Can it be measured? Is it
plausible, both in theory and reality, that we have e-social capital in different degrees,
for discussions on different topics, such as politics, economics, society, domestic or
international contexts?
Fourthly, a Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)
like NVivo may be employed to help analyse the political impact of the Internet in
China provided the public debates are deliberatively conducted. This project initially
attempted to utilise the NVivo to strengthen the validity of research findings from
qualitative data garnered from online discussion forums. It turned out to be the case
that the cyber debates were not so rational and deliberative because of shorter
messages and discourses. One of the main characteristics of CAQDAS is that it can
help process a huge amount of data and information from, say, in-depth interviews.
Through collecting data from empirical (field) work, including interviewees' sex, age,
educational background, profession, .. . and so forth, researchers can then utilise
CAQDAS to process the data garnered besides their online debates, and derive any
causation relationship between the designated variables (independent, mediating or
dependent). For the time being, debates in the Chinese cyberspace were not so
deliberative and were at times inconsistent for various reasons such as Netizens'
insufficient legal and socio-political information/knowledge. Prevalent online
censorship and increasingly physical intimidation and arrest of Internet users have
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also contributed to China's current cyberculture. Nevertheless, as more and more
people become familiar with the Internet, and as they are willing to disclose their
identity and are able to discourse more on public issues with deliberation in
cyberspace, there will be an increased need to exploit the qualitative computer
programmes to assist both data analysis and concept construction because of the
exponential proliferation of material.
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Appendix 1
Corruption
"The reason why corruption prevails over Party organisations has nothing to do
with the integrity of our legal system, but the act of overriding the law by the
Party" ("Jueqizhonghua," 2002-11-05, 18:12:19)
"Despite the continuous release of new theories [on corruption], the problem
does not yet diminish. The more we talk about 'practice,' the more we emphasise
'theory.' Does it mean we are making progress [in combating corruption]?"
("Liema," 2002-11-06, 16:15:30)
"In Mao's era, corruption was not as serious as it is now. The Party is usually
boasting to march with time, but why does corruption appear rampant? What's
the reason?" ("Hairui 2000," 2002-11-06, 16:01:47)
"Such rhetoric that attributes the cause of corruption to deficits of institutions
and regimes is in fact intended to shirk government responsibility at all levels."
("Jiubanxian," 2002-11-10, 15:33:35)
"Will it be plausible to establish a Hong Kong modeled 'Independent
Commission Against Corruption' (ICAC) in order to combat corruption?"
("Luntanj ianxisheng," 2002-11-10, 15:34:16)
"It has already been proclaimed in the Report to the 15th Party Congress that the
Party would adhere to the principles of exercising strict self-discipline,
maintaining the progressiveness and purity of Party members, but why are
corrupt officials instead increasing?" ("Bali," 2002-11-10, 17:28:37)
"The solution to anti-corruption is to consolidate the authority of members of
Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, but the
dilemma is that party secretaries outrank those members..." ("Baihuayuan,"
2002-11-06, 16:06:01)
"It is notorious that Party cadres are corrupt, but why is this problem consistently
unresolved? But why could the corruption problem be remedied during Mao's
era?" ("Woshilaoyang," 2002-11-06, 16:07-27)
Q: "Without analysing the cause of corruption, do you reckon we are able to
handle the problem?" ("Jiangzhenhuazhennan," 2002-11-11, 20:49:29) "Did the
Report make any conclusion on the cause of corruption?"
("Jiangzhenhuazhennan," 2002-11-11, 20:41:27)
Ans.: "We can learn from the Korean experience on managing corruption
problems; our legal and democratic systems are developing and the punishment
for corruption is tightening up." ("Liyanwei," 2002-11-11, 21:04:18)
Re: "Because this is not a special report on governing corruption, it cannot
elucidate every problem in detail." ("Laoxin," 2002-11-11, 20:5 1:00)
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Re: "After all, this [corruption issuel is what the public is most concerned about"
("Jiangzhenhuazhennan," 2002-11-11, 20:53:49)
"Although the government has repeatedly taken a harsh stance on corruption,
what is the actual effect? The fundamental cure [for corruption] hinges on
'institutions'..." ("Hongjianqing," 2002-11-11, 20:45:41)
Appendix 2
Xiaokang Shehui and Income Inequality
"To deeply comprehend the meanings of building a well-off society is something related
to common benefits of every citizen" ("Fayanruzuo," 2002-11-10, 15:06:54)
"I don't agree with the statement that the basic medical and health conditions in rural
areas are minimally adequate. Many peasants are becoming much poorer because of
illness..." ("Shangwangliuniaopaozao," 2002-11-10, 15:06:41)
". . .But I have seen many kinds of peasants in rural areas that cannot afford even to go to
primary school. The reason is that they are poor on one hand, and it is useless to study
on the other hand..." ("Luntanjianxisheng," 2002-11-10, 15:04:53)
"Does it mean we are in a xiaokang shehui when 20 per cent of wealthiest population
own 80 per cent of national wealth?" ("Zhubaj iechixigua," 2002-11-10, 15:31:23)
"What are the characteristics of a well-off society? How do we realise when we have
built a well-off society?" ("April," 2002-11-10, 14:57:05)
"Whilst governments boast of building a well-off society in an all-round way, do they
really mean the authorities will put particular emphasis on solving the poverty and
employment problems for the impoverished population?" ("Gaogaoshan," 2002-11-10,
15:06:28)
"Building a well-off society in an all-round way is fair enough" ("Dazhi," 2002-11-Il,
20:11:5 1)
Re: "It seems we have heard it for more than ten or twenty years"
("Jiangzhenhuazhennan," 2002-11-11, 20:15:38)
Appendix 3
Political Reform
"1 can't see any difference in the Report to the 16th Party Congress when
compared to the one in the 15th Party Congress in terms of the discussions of the
political reform" ("Qiannianmaohuozi," 2002-11-12, 15:05:03)
"Do you think the pace of political reform is in line with that in economic reform?
Does the pace of political reform lag far behind that of economic reform?"
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("Tashixianminzhuhaochuduo," 2002-11-12, 15:03:04)
"1 don't think that implementing political reform can really combat corruption.
We should not be too zealous" ("Jueqizhonghua," 2002-11-12, 15:02:52)
"What is the crystallisation of the political reform measures in the past thirteen
years?" ("Shangqiongbiluo," 2002-11-12, 15:28:53)
"We can almost find the answers to those questions raised in the Qiangguo
Luntan from reading the Report. The role played by the Qiangguo Luntan in the
building of political democracy is increasingly significant. ("Xuebu," 2002-11-11,
21:20:01 & 21:22:43)
"Absolutely right! That is the reason why I adore the Report very much. I think it
has synthesised the collective human wisdom among the entire Party
membership, fellow countrymen and even all overseas Chinese." ("Dazhi,"
2002-11-11, 21:22:38)
"Do you have any conscience as intellectuals when boasting like that? Is the
Report comprehensive within such limited words" ("Zhonghuadiyisaohangmu,"
2002-11-11, 21:22:10)
Question to two guests: "Could you talk about China's democratisation? This is
the issue I most care about." ("Zhongguodeminzhuhuajianshe," 2002-11-11,
21:13:57)
Ans.: "The functioning of democracy is examined whether it can improve and
sustain people's living standards" ("Dazhi," 2002-11-11, 21:17:25)
"Then, do you think we are in a democracy now?" ("Aozhoudalongxia,"
2002-11-10,21:19:14)
Response of the first guest: "We don't really possess much democracy, but we do
have some democracy because I can chat a lot freely after leaving my working
unit," ("Dazhi," 2002-11-11, 21:21:49)
Reply from the second guest: "There is still some progress in the democratic
process like village elections" ("Li Yanwei," 2002-11-11, 21:21:10)
"It looks as though there are necessary contradictions between the two [political]
systems" ("Guoyougu," 2002-11-11, 21:18:48)
"Democracy is a kind of system, a kind of national system" ("Wosiguwozai,"
2002-11-11,21:16:43)
"You are ordinary people and I'm the master" ("Baguoyumin," 2002-11-11,
21:16: 13)
"There is no such expression in the Report, is there?" ("Ergou," 2002-11-11,
21:15 :44)
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"Our democracy is still progressing. We are enjoying much greater freedom
under democracy than before. Nevertheless it ought to make progress
continuously. There is no way of achieving democratisation in a moment" ("Li
Yanwei,"2002-11-11, 21:15:18)
"Democracy with Chinese characteristics is the most progressive form of
democracy in the world" ("Guoyougu," 2002-11-11, 21:15:12)
"[This sort of democracy has] abundant features, but scant substance.
("Wozhendebuzaihu," 2002-11-11, 21:20:40)
Appendix 4
The "Sang-Nong" Issue
"The key to China's problems is the village issue. To solve it hinges on settling
the land problem." ("Nongmin yao jincheng", 3/5/2003, 21:02:07)
"Resolving the 'san-nong' issue requires that we transform villages into the
paradise of those who are self-employed. This can be done through developing
information technology." ("Tiancheng oude", 3/7/2003, 17:28:58)
"My suggestion to reform agriculture is to have the reform mainly carried out
through developing various service agencies that are devoted to the rural
development of agriculture. In addition, informatisation, limiting the use of
fertilizer, and directing more assistance to the farmers living in northeast China
should all be implemented." ("WK1I" 3/8/2003, 13:15:08)
"Never be dishonest or perfunctory in tackling the 'san nong' issue. Several
[concrete] measures should be taken into account when solving the problems. At
a minimum this includes reviewing the difference of the 'price scissors' of
agriculture and industry, and the physical infrastructure for the development of
agriculture." ("Rujia ergou", 3/9/2003, 13:33:22)
"Although NPC deputies and CPPCC members have all talked about the issue of
'san nong,' their remarks appear to be rather grandiloquent and infeasible. I think
it is more important to focus on the improvement of agricultural production."
("Guangfu", 3/8/2003, 22:25:37)
"Great improvements ought to be made in village employment opportunities [so
that farmers would rather stay in the countryside than go out to look for jobs in
the cities]." ("Mai mai tf', 3/8/2003, 19:29:06)
"Urbanisation is fundamental to solving the 'san-nong' issue. Nevertheless, the
critical point is how and to what extent we can urbanise the villages." ("Guan
kui", 3/8/2003, 18:07:47)
"The 'san-nong' issue needs to be treated as a systemic problem, so that a better
constructed and more comprehensive plan will be initiated to deal with it." ("Hu
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huanfu", 3/13/2003, 08:18:29)
"Completely solving the 'san-nong' issue requires exerting much more effort to
improve overall education in the villages." ("Micang gubo", 3/15/2003,
16:00:09)
"Dealing with the 'san-nong' problem requires improving job creation in order to
absorb the surplus of manpower from the villages. In addition, enacting relevant
laws to prohibit job discrimination against immigrant farmers from villages and
reinforcing extensive applications of information technology within villages will
contribute to the accomplishment of the task." ("Weimingxiansheng", 3/15/2003,
17:45 :53)
Appendix 5
Employment and Social Security
"The elderly are indeed those who are impoverished in our society. Many of
them have become the victims of the reform and the restructuring of their work
units. They are refused a pension allowance when they retire or get laid off."
("Xiaoba lazi", 3/6/2003, 20:42:42)
"Can the NPC deputies care for people of the so-called 'laosanjie', those
middle-aged workers who have fallen victim to the Cultural Revolution,
1966-70]? They are economically worse off and many of them are now jobless.
The governments at all levels should initiate policies to take particular care of
them by granting them compensation and pensions." ("Y-," 3/9/2003, 21:06:41)
"Cease the illegal campaign of laying off workers!" ("Ti xiagang gongren shuoju
gongdao hua", 3/7/2003, 13:58:37)
"The conundrum of social insurance/security for the rural farmers who are now
working in the cities can be resolved by means of transfer payment to the
villages where they used to live rather than paying the cities where they are
currently working. This may improve social security in the villages and
countryside, and in the meantime take into account the high mobility of farmers."
("Mai malt?', 3/10/2003, 13:40:46)
"Build up a comprehensive social security net!" ("Jiu ban xian", 3/6/2003,
20:22:19)
"The key to solving the unemployment problem is to create job vacancies to
deal with] the excessive surplus of rural manpower. Both the government and
entrepreneurs ought to work closely in order to promote job creation." ("Chang
siliang", 3/12/2003, 14:37:31)
"It is necessary to enact relevant labour and employment laws in order to protect
individual labour from suffering from the reform of the state-owned enterprises."
("Gujing w", 3/10/2003, 23:37:40)
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"Improve and reinforce well-functioning labour unions for all immigrant farmers
working in the cities. The labour unions should play the key role in bridging the
gap between the farmers and the cities, and should address their concerns. The
labour rights [of immigrant farmers] have also to be safeguarded by law."
("Shangqiongbiluo", 3/13/2003, 14:58:14)
Appendix 6
The Role and Reform of the NPC and CPPCC
"How many proposals submitted by the NPC deputies can be adopted and put
into practice?" (Cynically argued by "Yue wang tu", 3/5/2003, 21:59:36)
"Why do the NPC deputies have their opinions heard only for a few days during
the [annual] session?" ("Nan manzi", 3/5/2003, 19:45:32)
"Rules to elect NPC deputies have to be promulgated." ("Lu shi", 3/7/2003,
10:18: 10)
"The NPC deputies should be elected through free and fair elections." ("Aiguo
zhishi", 3/7/2003, 10:44:26)
"The NPC deputies ought to become full-time positions, and the Congress'
electoral system reformed as well." ("Sanmian hongqi wansui", 3/7/2003,
10:06:14)
"To ensure the separation of powers, government officials cannot simultaneously
be NPC deputies and CPPCC members." ("Ren si", 3/10/2003, 09:49:26)
"Can the NPC deputies effectively supervise themselves?" ("Kefei xiansheng",
3/10/2003, 13:42:48)
"Responsibility rather than honour is far more important for the NPC deputies.
Those claque members [who just come to compliment the achievements of the
party and the government] must be dismissed right away." ("Shangjie diyi ban,
xiazhuan disi ban", 3/10/2003, 14:17:15)
"How can they [NPC and CPPCC delegates] watch over the government if they
themselves are government officials?" ("Kefei xiansheng", 3/10/2003, 13:47:24)
"The NPC should rectify their rules of procedure in accordance with the rules set
in the CPPCC codes." ("Mai mai ti", 3/10/2003, 12:07:47)
"Instead of submitting proposals from individual members during the two
sessions, I think it would be more plausible to concentrate on a few critical issues
and come up with solutions to them." ("Mengju hongqi", 3/9/2003, 17:12:20)
"Can the common people's proposals be directly handed in to the NPC
deputies?" ("Li meidao", 3/12/2003, 14:44:20)
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"There should be more full-time NPC deputies in the future." ("Chexy 654,"
3/11/2003, 20:07:04)
"To enhance the transparency of the NPC [and CPPCC] proceedings, their
political consultations and debates ought to be broadcast live." ("Sanmian hongqi
wansui", 3/11/2003, 13:54:13)
"The numbers of NPC deputies and CPPCC members should be reduced since
many of them know little about their paramount obligations [to review
government policies]. ... Only when thoughtful debates are conducted during the
two sessions—as in Western parliaments—can we judge that a genuine Chinese
democracy is beginning to take shape." ("Wanli shuang", 3/13/2003, 21:18:54)
"There should be NPC deputies selected from this Internet forum in the next
session, for the Netizens are superior and better informed—and their opinions
are profound but practical." ("San niu ge", 3/16/2003, 18:40:32)
Appendix 7
The Rule of Law: Part I
"Democratic supervision under the leadership of the Communist Party hinges on
a very critical condition that there should be no factional interests within the
Party. However, the reality is ... [that these factional interests do exist]."
("Zhengshizhe", 3/16/2003, 10:14:16)
"The key point is that the Party should be separated (distanced) from factional
interests. However, the Party is a net, a horrible net [that cannot be divided]."
("Shengling 12345", 3/14/2003, 07:56:23)
"I'm not against the leadership of the Communist Party. But the key is its
governance. The Party's leadership ought to be restructured and its power
checked." ("Lu ming", 3/13/2003, 21:04:52)
"Saying is one thing, doing is another. It is too early to comment [on the good of
democratic supervision under the leadership of the Communist Party]." ("Tudi 2",
3/13/2003, 10:52:40)
"Corruption will absolutely exist if a political party has stayed in office for long.
And if it loses popular support, the party will die for sure." ("WWW 11225500,"
3/12/2003, 20:54:20)
"History has proven that 'sanquanfenli' (separation of the legislative, executive,
and judicial functions of a government) under the leadership of the Communist
Party is unlikely to ensure the people's constitutional rights." ("Huayangfanxin,
hualiyouhua", 3/11/2003, 21:41:31)
"No matter what the nature of regime is, an excellent one is one that can function
effectively." ("Guang xun", 3/12/2003, 00:58:51)
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"Election, supervision, and checks-and-balances would guarantee the people's
constitutional rights. Merely holding an election is insufficient." ("Wu ren",
3/11/2003, 18:20:58)
"To rein in corruption would require political reform: strengthening the functions
of the NPC, ruling the country according to law, and implementing effective
supervision." ("Zhu muzhen", 3/11/2003, 11:17:54)
"Never blindly copy models of foreign systems. Democratic supervision is much
better." ("Guangxun", 3/11/2003, 01:17:14)
"Other than practising the Western model of a multiparty system in which all
political parties contest for power, it is worth considering to divide the CCP into
several cliques." ("Kongdangdeyuanye 2", 3/11/2003, 00:5 1:52)
"Only when there is a general election on the basis of universal suffrage can the
people's constitutional rights be assured. People can accordingly decide whether
the incumbent officials should be dismissed or stay in office." ("Wanli shuang",
3/11/2003, 21:38:26)
Appendix 8
The Rule of Law: Part II
"A journalism law must be enacted in order to ensure that news reports can truly
reflect public opinion and people's lives." ("Ren Si", 3/10/2003, 10:16:44)
"I agree. The rule of law has to transcend the will of the leaders, and the abuse of
power has to be denounced as well." ("Yun zi wuxin shui zi xian", 3/10/2003,
21:09:43)
"The restructuring of government agencies at all levels, government spending,
and the salaries of NPC deputies must all be legalised and supervised in
accordance with law." (" Wanli shuang", 3/10/2003, 21:41:28)
"Discrimination against migrant workers from poorer provinces in major urban
areas is evidently prevalent. It is so ironic that the government has long boasted
of a 'socialist country under the rule of law.' I urge that an 'anti-discrimination
law' urgently be enacted." ("Mo long", 3/11/2003, 21:23:15)
"I agree. The current situation is fairly grave—discriminating against workers on
the basis of education, age, and gender." ("Xinzhong de meng", 3/12/2003,
09:57:04)
"There are more than one hundred million hepatitis patients suffering
discrimination in the job market. Who is going to speak up for them?"
("Nengbuneng g-uanxin guanxin women", 3/13/2003, 15:32:05)
"What people are much more concerned about are democracy, rule of law, and
science." ("Dang zhi pat", 3/13/2003, 12:20:33)
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"No, people are more keen to live fair and just lives. ("Xiao flu", 3/13/2003,
23:34:39)
"What China really needs is an independent judiciary." ("Lan bo", 3/12/2003,
10:13 :27)
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Appendix 9
Interview Questions:
I. What is your understanding of the development of the internet and its impact on
business opportunities in China?
2. What are the prospects for Internet-related business in China?
3. How would you cope if faced with the Chinese Government's (arbitrary)
regulations?
4. What actions would you take? (following the question No. 3)
5. Do you employ the so-called "Big Mama" to monitor chat-rooms and check
on-line contents? If so, what are the ways in which you conduct the checking and
monitoring?
6. Do you block certain Web sites or pages? Do you have examples of any practical
actions you have been involved in?
7. What do you understand by the term "Self-discipline" pledged by some 100
Chinese Internet business players on 26th March 2002?
8. How do you make profits from operating Internet portals (internet café/bar) in
China?
9. In general, do you think it is easy or difficult to get a license to operate your
internet business?
10. What job and role do you believe Internet entrepreneurs have had in the
transition of the Chinese society?
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